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‘Let everyone examine themselves’: Radical Emotional Reflexivity in Scottish Reformed Protestantism, 1590-1640

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Declaration

I declare that this thesis has been composed solely by myself and that it has not been submitted, in whole or in part, in any previous application for a degree. Except where states otherwise by reference or acknowledgment, the work presented is entirely my own.

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Abstract

This thesis argues that radical emotional reflexivity – self-examination of one's emotions, 'radical' because intentional and rigorous – was a central practice in Scottish Protestantism between 1590 and 1640. It was fundamental because Scottish Protestants believed that purposeful identification of emotions could mobilise desired emotional change that would bring communion with God. They evaluated their emotions within a linguistic-conceptual framework which led them to identify their emotions as: a spiritual journey, directed by God, which involved the experience of various 'supernatural' emotions. They undertook this practice to evoke emotional change. Consequently, this process was built into corporate worship and motivated zealous Scottish Protestants to write and read personal spiritual narratives.

The thesis takes a fresh approach to familiar source material – spiritual diaries, autobiographies, dialogues, poetry, liturgical guides, sermons, and theological treatises – by viewing them through the lens of radical emotional reflexivity. Recent historiography has discredited stereotypes of the emotionally repressed Scottish Presbyterian by showing that early modern Scottish piety had a highly emotional character. However, it has not sufficiently appreciated that the emotional intensity of the source material was the product of a rigorous self-reflective process used to provoke spiritual change. This is because recent writing has not engaged with the function of language about emotion built into corporate religious practice and personal piety. As a result, this project provides a comprehensive analysis of the vocabulary of emotion and its purpose in early modern Scottish Protestantism, and consequently explains why the source material was created and presented Scottish Protestant piety as highly emotional.

The argument begins with an outline of the theory of emotion (chapter 1) and the end-goal against which Scottish Protestants judged their emotions: happiness in enjoying God (chapter 2). The next chapter examines the language Scots used about their emotions in corporate worship and

personal piety. It argues that in both contexts Scottish Protestants evaluated their emotions as a spiritual journey under God's hand, the subjective dimension of salvation (chapter 3). Then follows an analysis of what Scottish Protestants meant when they identified 'supernatural' emotions as feelings caused by God and as perceptions of communion with God (chapter 4). Finally, the thesis argues that Scottish Protestants engaged in radical emotional reflexivity to mobilise desired emotions, which explains why they wrote and read narratives of the soul's spiritual journey (chapter 5).

In sum, this study examines what judgements Scottish Protestants made about their emotions, how they made these judgements, and why they evaluated their emotions at all.

Lay Summary

This thesis examines the language Scottish Protestants used about their emotions in the early seventeenth century. Despite popular caricatures to the contrary, between 1590 and 1640 corporate worship and personal piety in Scotland were intensely emotional. What is more, the examination of the self, including the emotions, was built into the practice of public ritual and private devotion. The diaries, autobiographies, memoirs, spiritual narratives, dialogues and other sources historians have used to analyse the emotionality of Scottish Protestantism were the result of this process of self-examination; they were the written product of an author interpreting a subject's emotions. What this means is that the scholar does not have 'direct' access to the emotions of historical actors and communities, but rather sources through which authors offered an evaluation of a person's feelings. Thus the study of the history of emotions, and by extension Scottish Protestant emotionality, consists in analysing the language and concepts authors used about theirs or another's feelings.

Consequently, this project explores the vocabulary of emotion in early seventeenth century Scottish Protestantism and how it was used in public religious practice and private devotion. To do this, it engages with the philosophical, theological, and contextual assumptions that informed the meaning of the language used about emotion by Protestants in Scotland. In so doing, the thesis breaks new ground by explaining what Scots meant by their language about emotion; how they determined what language they should use about their emotions; and why they intentionally examined what language they should use about their emotions. The project argues that the reason why the examination of emotion – 'radical emotional reflexivity' – was the emotional spine of corporate worship and personal spirituality was because Scots were taught and believed that through this process they could evoke desired emotions. In this way, the thesis provides a fresh perspective on Scottish Protestant emotionality by analysing the language of emotion built into public worship and private devotion in light of its function.

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Abbreviations

DSL	*Dictionary of the Scots Language*, Scottish Language Dictionaries Ltd. Online Edition. https://www.dsl.ac.uk.
FBD	*The First Book of Discipline*, ed. J. K. Cameron (Edinburgh, 1972).
ODNB	*Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Online Edition. https://www.oxforddnb.com.
OED	*Oxford English Dictionary*, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Online Edition. https://www.oed.com.

Contents

Introduction

This thesis argues that the rigorous examination of emotion was a practice central to Scottish Protestantism in the early modern period. It claims that radical emotional reflexivity – the intentional (and thus radical) analysis of experience – was important within Scottish Protestant culture because its adherents were taught and believed that through the categorisation of one's experiences desired emotions could be mobilised. The focus of this project, then, is to analyse the judgements Scottish Protestants made about their emotions, why they made those specific determinations about their emotions, and why they examined their emotions at all. By its comprehensive examination of why the source material presents Scottish Protestant piety as intensely emotional, the thesis augments the research already done on the experiential dimension of Protestantism in early modern Scotland and takes a new methodological approach to the history of emotion.

The study offers a fresh perspective on the primary sources that have been studied in relation to Scottish Protestant emotionality – spiritual diaries, autobiographies, memoirs, dialogues, poetry – with its focus upon these texts as the creation of Scottish Protestants who were engaged in radical emotional reflexivity. This approach is taken because the project recognises that the textual evidence was produced by Scottish Protestants to stimulate and evoke certain emotional responses in their reader. Consequently, this thesis analyses the source material as a material form of self-examination to understand better the judgements Scottish Protestants made about their emotions and what they hoped to achieve by making these evaluations. To do this, the study is primarily an analysis of the language authors used about their emotions and the practice of examining their feelings. By this process, the linguistic-conceptual framework authors and readers shared can be reconstructed, which can be used to infer the origin, nature, and function of these personal writings within their original context.

Justification for this methodological approach to the analysis of Scottish Protestant emotionality is best explained in two stages; first, an

examination of what radical emotional reflexivity is, and the practice's place within the literature on the history of emotions, will outline the object that this project analyses; second, a review of the historiography on emotion in early modern Scottish and international Protestantism will illuminate the significance of this thesis. There will follow a final section which explains how this hermeneutical approach will be implemented and a synopsis of the study's argument, with key outcomes identified.

1. Radical Emotional Reflexivity and the History of Emotions

Reflexivity, a concept primarily explored in the field of sociology, is a purposeful process in which the subject is held as the object of cognition and feeling.[1] Emotional reflexivity, a concept also developed by sociologists, is defined as an intentional activity in which the object of cognition and feeling is the subject's emotions.[2] Importantly, it is a deliberate activity. The subject engaged in emotional reflexivity does so consciously, fully aware of what they are engaged in. The philosopher Charles Taylor has called this focussed analysis of the subject as an object 'radical reflexivity'.[3] This distinguishes it from concepts such as 'habitus', Pierre Bourdieu's idea that culture shapes the actions of the body and mind at an unconscious level as a kind of instinctual knowledge imparted through socialisation.[4] To make clear that it is the intentional self-examination of the emotions that this thesis is concerned with, 'radical' is prefixed to 'emotional reflexivity' throughout this study.

The sociologist Morris Rosenburg has identified three modes of radical emotional reflexivity, which are analogous to three emotional 'practices'

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[1] Margaret S. Archer, *The Reflexive Imperative in Late Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1; David Farrugia and Dan Woodman, 'Ultimate Concerns in Late Modernity: Archer, Bourdieu and Reflexivity' in *British Journal of Sociology*, 66, no.4 (2015), 627; Mary Holmes, 'The Emotionalization of Reflexivity' in *Sociology*, 44, no.1 (2010), 140; Ian Burkitt, 'Emotional Reflexivity: Feeling, Emotion and Imagination in Reflexive Dialogues' in *Sociology*, 46, no.3 (2012), 459-460, 462-463.

[2] Mary Holmes, 'Researching Emotional Reflexivity' in *Emotion Review*, 7, no.1 (2015), 61; Burkitt, 'Emotional Reflexivity', 462-463.

[3] Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Gateshead, Tyne & Wear: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 177.

[4] Monique Scheer, 'Are Emotions a Kind of Practice (and is that what makes them have a history)? A Bourdieuian Approach to Understanding Emotion' in *History and Theory*, 51, no.2 (2012), 199-201; Farrugia and Woodman, 'Ultimate Concerns', 630.

Monique Scheer has used in her study of the emotions in history. The first is emotional identification or naming.[5] Emotions have an interpretative, evaluative component. If a person has a feeling without cognition, it is unintelligible and lacks meaning.[6] It cannot be automatically distinguished from other physiological phenomena. Disambiguation takes place when the feeling is identified or named. This happens when a person examines their emotions and categorises them in relation to socially learned emotion types, such as joy, fear, sadness, and so on. An experience's emotion type can be classified by consideration of it as a kind of effect.[7] This method focuses upon a feeling's cause. When the factor which caused an experience is identified, then the expected emotional effect of that cause, the 'emotional logic' of the given context, is used to categorise the subject's experience. For example, if somebody hit Jenny, she could plausibly identify her feeling as anger, given it is expected within her society that she would be angry when punched. Additionally, emotions can be identified by their effects.[8] Experiences can be classified by a subject through comparison of the physiological reactions and bodily behaviours their feelings seem to have caused with socially learned emotion types. So, when Jenny cries, she can reason she does so because she is sad, given that in her society the cause of sobbing is identified as sorrow. Thus, a subject can identify their emotions through the evaluation of what has caused their feelings and what results their feelings have produced.

A second mode of radical emotional reflexivity analysed in this thesis is emotional display or communication.[9] This is when a subject attempts to convey to another that they have experienced a particular kind of emotion as a means to stimulate an emotion in their audience. It could be characterised as an interpersonal variation of emotional identification. Whereas naming an emotion can be done by a subject alone, emotional communication requires

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[5] Morris Rosenburg, 'Reflexivity and Emotions' in *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 53, no.1 (1990), 4-7; Scheer, 'Bourdieuian Approach', 212.
[6] Scheer, 'Bourdieuian Approach', 212.
[7] Rosenburg, 'Reflexivity and Emotions', 5-6.
[8] Rosenburg, 'Reflexivity and Emotions', 6-7.
[9] Rosenburg, 'Reflexivity and Emotions', 7-10; Scheer 'Bourdieuian Approach', 214-215.

two participants. The subject who has identified their own emotion tries to communicate their categorisation to another through their language, facial expressions, voice pitch, volume, props, costumes, makeup, gestures, bodily postures, changes of skin colour, and other socially agreed signs which manifest an emotion type.[10] Note, this identification can be sincere or an act of deception: the subject's professed identification of their emotions may differ from what they really think about their feelings. For example, it may be advantageous to Jenny to convey to her boss that she likes them even though she finds them repulsive. The other participant is the audience, who the subject of an emotion seeks to persuade that the identification of emotion they have presented through their body is the correct interpretation of their, the subject's, experience. The success of this communication depends upon the subject's capacity to display and the audience's ability to interpret emotions in relation to socially learned and shared ideas.[11] The practice of emotional display, then, constitutes a communal negotiation over the identification of the subject's emotions between a subject and their audience. The reflexivity is twofold: the subject who communicates their emotion examines their emotions when they intentionally identify their feelings through their bodily performance; the audience purposefully evaluates the subject's somatic and material expressions through an imagination of the feeling which ought to have caused these gestures *as if it were their own emotion*, and then names them in relation to the relevant socially learned emotion types. In other words, both the subject and the audience are engaged in the practice of radical emotional reflexivity when participating in an act of emotional communication. Given that emotional communication is fundamentally a variation of emotional identification, for the sake of brevity it will be treated throughout the thesis as an interpersonal form of naming an emotion, except where explicitly distinguished.

[10] Scheer, 'Bourdieuian Approach', 215; Rosenburg, 'Reflexivity and Emotions', 9-10.
[11] Scheer, 'Bourdieuian Approach', 214.

The third mode of radical emotional reflexivity which is examined is emotional experience or mobilisation.[12] This practice attempts to stimulate a desired emotion. This can be done through the control of the stimuli which are the causes of feelings.[13] An increase in exposure to a phenomenon which is believed to cause desired emotions, and a decrease in the influence of that which is thought to cause unwanted emotions, is the way to mobilise 'right' emotion. Thus, control over a subject's thoughts, emotions, and actions can all be used to mobilise wanted emotions. Additionally, manipulation of the body can also be used to evoke emotion. The key is to regulate and, if necessary, intentionally change some psychosomatic factor so that the right stimuli cause the right emotions. In this thesis, it is the Scottish Protestant assumption that the intentional identification of emotion can mobilise desired emotions which is of interest. The reason why is explained below.

Historians of emotion have not used the sociological idea of radical emotional reflexivity in their research. However, the main methodological approaches they have employed engage with concepts which are like radical emotional reflexivity. To analyse the emotional identification, communication, and mobilisation of an individual or group would require the examination of the socially shared and learned linguistic-conceptual framework which informed how and why subjects name, display, and evoke emotion in the ways that they do. Similarly, those scholars who have pioneered the disciplinary study of emotions in history have focused on the cultural values which have shaped how people in history have categorised and stimulated their emotions. William Reddy's concept of 'emotive', influential within the field, emphasises the interpretative dimension of emotional identification. Inspired by J. L. Austin's concept of 'speech-acts', Reddy has argued that an emotive, an emotion-word, is both constative and performative.[14] The phrase 'I am sad' describes both something about the subject and at the same time changes the subject, as the phrase situates their psychosomatic experience

[12] Rosenburg, 'Reflexivity and Emotions', 10-11; Scheer, 'Bourdieuian Approach', 209-212.
[13] Rosenburg, 'Reflexivity and Emotions', 11.
[14] Jan Plamper, *The History of Emotions: An Introduction*, trans. Keith Tribe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 252.

within a linguistic-conceptual framework.[15] Building on Reddy's work, Barbara Rosenwein has argued that a useful heuristic is the idea of 'emotional communities'.[16] She has proposed that an emotional community is a group of people who share the same valuations of emotion and its expression. Thus, the historian of emotions, in her view, analyses the 'mindset' of an emotional community so that they may determine the community's attitudes to emotion, how it should be communicated, and what was considered appropriate psychosomatic behaviour. Rosenwein has achieved this by studying the language people used about their emotions.[17] The idea of emotion as practice or performance, a flourishing approach within the history of emotions, also involves a linguistic-conceptual analysis of the source material. This is because it is only in relation to a recognised system of socially learned signs that a subject can embody and, thus, perform an emotion which is intelligible to the self and others.[18] Consequently, historians of emotion like Scheer have studied the language used about a gesture's meaning to reconstruct its emotional significance within its original context.

Thus, the predominant approaches in the history of emotions argue that the historian is not to produce a descriptive account of an individual's or group's feelings, as if they can be accessed directly through the primary evidence. This is impossible, given the necessarily interpretative nature of source material relevant to the history of emotions. Rather, the history of emotions is, in the main, a study of the language and cultural presuppositions

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[15] William M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 96-111; Plamper, *History of Emotions*, 252; Tania M. Colwell, 'Emotives and Emotional Regimes' in *Early Modern Emotions: An Introduction*, ed. Susan Broomhall (New York: Routledge, 2016), 7.

[16] Barbara H. Rosenwein, 'Worrying About Emotions in History' in *The American Historical Review*, 107, no.3 (2002), 842; Barbara H. Rosenwein, *Generations of Feeling: A History of Emotions, 600-1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 3-10; Plamper, *History of Emotions*, 67-71; Andrew Lynch, 'Emotional Community' in *Early Modern Emotions: An Introduction*, ed. Susan Broomhall (New York: Routledge, 2016).

[17] Barbara H. Rosenwein, 'Problems and Methods in the History of Emotions', in *Passions in Context*, 1, no.1 (2010), 10-24.

[18] Scheer, 'Bourdieuian Approach',199; Katie Barclay, 'Performance and Performativity' in *Early Modern Emotions: An Introduction*, ed. Susan Broomhall (New York: Routledge, 2016), 14-16; Plamper, *History of Emotions*, 265-269.

which influenced the valuations historical actors made about their emotions.[19] That this thesis focuses on the identification and mobilisation of emotion by Scottish Protestants, which necessarily involves a study of the linguistic-conceptual framework which informed these practices, means that it takes an approach which is broadly aligned with the methodologies currently influential within the field. However, because a study of radical emotional reflexivity focuses upon the author's intent in their use of language about emotion to derive its original meaning, it is open to a post-modern critique that the intention of an author is unimportant as there are a multiplicity of interpretations readers can discover within the document which are equally valid.[20] If this allegation is sound, all the methodologies employed to study the history of emotions are undermined, as their central focus is the linguistic-conceptual framework within which an author's vocabulary and grammar had meaning.

The decision to take a new approach to the history of emotions by examining radical emotional reflexivity, as opposed to emotives, emotional communities, or emotional performance, has been made because as a method it introduces fewer alien assumptions into the analysis of Scottish Protestantism than its alternatives. While the language of 'radical emotional reflexivity', 'identification', 'communication', and 'mobilisation' may have arisen in modern times, the practices they denote were an integral aspect of Scottish Protestantism in the early modern period. The quotation in the title of this thesis, 'let everyone examine themselves', is indicative of the radical reflexivity which Protestants in Scotland were taught to embrace.[21] The emphasis upon self-examination led many Scottish Protestants to create sources which represent a material engagement in radical emotional

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[19] Peter N. Stearns, and Carol Z. Stearns, 'Emotionology: Clarifying the History of Emotions and Emotional Standards' in *The American Historical Review*, 90, no.4 (1985), 824-834.
[20] Roland Barthes, 'The Death of the Author', trans. Richard Howard, in *Aspen*, no.5-6 (1967); Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatalogy*, trans. Gayatri Spivak (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1967); Michel Foucault, 'What is an Author' in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1969).
[21] Robert Bruce, *The Mystery of the Lord's Supper*, ed. T. F. Torrance (London: James Clarke, 1958), 139. This is a modernised version of Bruce's quotation to provide clarity for a modern audience and to avoid the gendered language in which he expressed the claim.

reflexivity. Spiritual narratives, used to identify the emotions, were an instrument that could facilitate desired emotions in the reader. To this end, authors 'fashioned' and 'presented' their subject's in a concerted manner to elicit a felt response in the reader.[22] Their self-writing was a form of emotional communication, the writer's language intended to persuade their audience of the classification they had assigned to their subject's experience. This was to work in the reader (whether they be the author, their family, or a wider community) an emotional response, and hence through personal writing authors created a material object which functioned as an emotional stimulant. Additionally, radical emotional reflexivity permeated Protestant worship in early modern Scotland. The communication and evocation of emotion was integral to preaching, penitential rituals, psalm singing, and the Lord's Supper. That the whole community was expected to engage in these acts of corporate worship meant that most of the populace regularly engaged in radical emotional reflexivity. Hence, liturgical guides and eye-witness testimony indicate the shared language and concepts which Scottish Protestants used when communicating and mobilising emotion in public worship.

Since this project analyses the history of emotion through the lens of radical emotional reflexivity, this means it approaches the extant source material in a manner which approximates the way Scottish Protestants read these sources. Put another way, by this method the thesis makes explicit the assumptions Protestants in Scotland took as a given in their creation and reception of these texts. By contrast, to analyse the source material through the lens of emotives, emotional communities, or performativity would be alien to the linguistic-conceptual framework of early modern Scottish

[22] D. Bruce Hindmarsh, *Evangelical Conversion Narrative* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 15-16; Kathleen Lynch, *Protestant Autobiography in the Seventeenth-Century Anglophone World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 10, 13-15; David George Mullan, *Narratives of the Religious Self in Early-Modern Scotland* (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2010), 1-8, 21-24; Tom Webster, 'Writing to Redundancy: Approaches to Spiritual Journals and Early Modern Spirituality' in *The Historical Journal*, 39, no.1 (1996), 33-56; Margo Todd, 'Puritan Self-Fashioning: The Diary of Samuel Ward' in *Journal of British Studies*, 31, no.3 (1992), 236-264: Owen C. Watkins, *The Puritan Experience* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), 31-32, 226-228.

Protestantism. These ideas rely upon a post-modern thought-world for their meaning and do not correspond to values, practices, or goals with which Scottish Protestants wrote or read the extant sources. They impose a hermeneutic upon the evidence which neither author nor reader would have embraced. Thus, these approaches introduce into the analysis of the sources concepts and aims which do not reflect the priorities of the communities in which they were made, and so risk distorting the results. Therefore, the project takes a new methodological approach in the history of emotions, focusing upon the practice of radical emotional reflexivity in Scottish Protestant emotionality, because it will provide the best access to the meaning of the language used about emotion in the extant source material.

2. Self-Examination of Emotion and the Historiography of Scottish Protestantism

To locate the significance that an analysis of radical emotional reflexivity in Scottish Protestantism has, the state of historiography on early modern Protestant emotionality needs to be considered. Recent research on emotion in early modern Protestant Scotland is revisionist, a reaction against the common stereotype of the emotionally repressed Presbyterian. This caricature was initially put forward by Scottish Episcopalians in the latter half of the seventeenth century, who identified Presbyterianism's theology and emphasis upon self-examination as mobilising a suicidal terror in its adherents.[23] This kind of critique was echoed in James Hogg's *Confessions of a Justified Sinner* (1824), which parodied the radical emotional reflexivity Scottish Presbyterians encouraged. At the end of the confession, the 'editor' declares that the self-examination of Robert Wringhim reveals that he is either 'the greatest wretch' or a 'religious maniac, who wrote and wrote about a deluded creature, till he arrived at the height of madness, that he believed himself the very object who he had been all along describing'.[24] In more

[23] Alasdair Raffe, *The Culture of Controversy: Religious Arguments in Scotland, 1660-1714* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2012), 133-134.
[24] James Hogg, *The Private Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified Sinner*, eds. Kate Caldwell, Edward Crossan, Jamie Swanson, Michelle Ho, Barry Begg, Megan Kelly, Shanaz

recent times Presbyterianism, and in particular its personification in the person of John Knox (*c*.1514-1572), has been blamed for 'every pathological trait in Scottish identity', such as the perceived tendency for Scots to repress their emotions.[25] Edwin Muir, who had a profound influence on Scottish literary culture in the twentieth century, argued that Knox's impact on Scotland was so corrosive that his 'religion which outraged the imagination' led to the destruction of Scottish music, painting, sculpture, architecture, prose, and poetry.[26] Muir gave poetic voice to what he believed was the emotional heritage Presbyterianism bequeathed Scotland, due to its emphasis on rigorous self-examination in the pursuit of religious purity.

> But Knox and Melville clapped their preaching palms
> And bundled all the harvesters away,
> Hoodocrow Peden in the blighted corn
> Hacked with his rust beak the starving haulms.
> Out of that desolation we were born.[27]

Modern historiography has argued against this negative caricature of early modern Scottish Protestantism. It has claimed that Scottish Protestant piety had a powerful experiential dimension. Louise Yeoman's thesis 'Heart-work' broke new ground when it argued that inner spirituality was integral to covenanting devotion.[28] The real psychological changes Scottish Protestants underwent in conversion, she argued, gave them a sense of empowerment and feelings of ecstatic joy. Yeoman's comprehensive overview has been built upon by authors like David Mullan and John Coffey, who have further established and analysed the intense emotionality of this religious tradition.[29] This revisionist movement is situated within the reinterpretation of early

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Miah, Kinga Acsai, Gillian Swinton, Lisa Fleming, and Jonathan Kaney (Edinburgh: Merchiston Publishing, 2009), 279.

[25] William Storrar, *Scottish Identity: A Christian Vision* (Edinburgh: The Handsell Press, 1990), 27; *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020.

[26] Edwin Muir, *John Knox: Portrait of a Calvinist* (London: Johnathan Cape, 1929), 308-309.

[27] Edwin Muir, '1941' in *The Narrow Place* (London: Faber, 1943); C. R. A. Gribben, 'The Literary Cultures of the Scottish Reformation' in *The Review of English Studies*, 57, no.228 (2006), 68-70.

[28] Louise Anderson Yeoman, 'Heart-work: emotion, empowerment and authority in covenanting times' (PhD, The University of St Andrews, 1991), viii.

[29] David George Mullan, *Scottish Puritanism, 1590-1638* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); John Coffey, *Politics, Religion and the British Revolutions: The Mind of Samuel Rutherford* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

modern Reformed Protestantism's relationship with emotion in current historiography. The reorientation of academic literature on this subject has highlighted the rich emotional life and the more positive experiential aspects cultivated by sixteenth and seventeenth century international Protestantism.[30] That the emotional pattern of conversion typified Reformed experience, as has been argued by scholars like Owen Watkins and Charles Cohen, has come to dominate the interpretation of international and Scottish Protestant emotionality within contemporary literature.[31] However, while there is consensus that Scottish Protestantism was not 'emotionally repressed', there is variation as to how positively scholars have assessed this emotional style. This is seen in their different emphases: while Yeoman focuses on 'heart-work' or 'heart-knowledge', a subjective experience of doctrine which leads to emotional growth and intensely satisfying experiences, Michelle Brock has examined the 'darker side' of emotion in Protestant Scotland, her research engaged with attitudes towards experiences of Satan and negative feelings.[32]

Despite these developments, modern historiography of Scottish and international Protestant emotionality has not fully appreciated that the extant source material it analyses was produced by authors engaged in radical emotional reflexivity. This is apparent in the language historians have used to define their aims and expound their conclusions about Scottish Protestant

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[30] Peter Lake, *Moderate Puritans and the Elizabethan Church* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 116-168; Charles E. Hambrick-Stowe, *The Practice of Piety: Puritan Devotional Disciplines in Seventeenth-Century New England* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982); Charles Lloyd Cohen, *God's Caress: The Psychology of Puritan Religious Experience* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Jean Williams, 'The Puritan Quest for Enjoyment of God' (PhD, The University of Melbourne, 1997); Tom Schwanda, *Soul Recreation: the Contemplative-Mystical Piety of Puritanism* (Eugene, Origen: Pickwick Publications, 2012); Alec Ryrie, *Being Protestant in Reformation Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 17-95; Abram C. Van Engen, *Sympathetic Puritans: Calvinist Fellow Feeling in Early New England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); S. Bryn Roberts, *Puritanism and the Pursuit of Happiness: The Ministry and Theology of Ralph Venning, c.1621-1674* (Suffolk: Boydell & Brewer, 2015); Alec Ryrie and Tom Schwanda, eds., *Puritanism and Emotion in the Early Modern World*, (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

[31] Watkins, *Puritan Experience*, 9; Cohen, *God's Caress*, 11-14, 104; Yeoman, 'Heart-work', x-xi; Mullan *Scottish Puritanism*, 87.

[32] Yeoman, 'Heart-work', vi-xii; Michelle D. Brock, 'Internalizing the Demonic: Satan and the Self in Early Modern Scottish Piety' in *Journal of British Studies*, 54, no.1 (2015): 23-43; Michelle D. Brock, *Satan and the Scots: The Devil in Post-Reformation Scotland, c.1560-1700* (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2016).

emotionality. Yeoman's thesis is an examination of the 'inner world' of Scottish Protestant spirituality.[33] Mullan's discussion of conversion and assurance includes claims like 'the sense of assurance… guaranteed the place of emotion in puritan piety', and 'James Mitchell's religious emotion manifested itself so powerfully that his friends worried about him'.[34] Brock's work examines 'demonic experiences' while Ryrie has analysed the 'intense emotional experiences' of British Protestants.[35] Even Cohen, who acknowledges the context in which puritans created their spiritual testimonies, considers such documents as 'unvarnished accounts of personal experience… laying bare the development of grace in ordinary folk'.[36] In each case, the language used by the scholar assumes that the source material is descriptive of an emotion open to analysis. Their statements betray a presupposition that the sources provide direct access to the experiences of Scottish Protestants. This means that they present a relatively 'flat' analysis of these texts, taking statements as reports of experiential phenomena. What is missed by such approaches is the motivations and alien conceptual worldview which informed the language Scots used in these documents. In other words, they fail to appreciate the medium in which Scottish, English, or North American Protestant judgements about emotion come to a historian. Thus, while Mullan has recognised the evaluative nature of spiritual self-writings (an assessment discussed above), even in his work the idea that the primary evidence constitutes a material form of radical emotional reflexivity has not permeated his analysis of Scottish Protestant emotionality.[37] While scholars who have paid attention to the genre of spiritual narratives have better recognised its evaluative form, those who have made this argument have only engaged, in a limited way, with the reasons why authors identified their subject's emotions in the ways that they did.[38] This is because the focus of these scholars was not the language authors used when they identified

[33] Yeoman, 'Heart-work', i.
[34] Mullan, *Scottish Puritanism*, 99-100.
[35] Brock, 'Internalizing', 25; Ryrie, *Being Protestant*, 4.
[36] Cohen, *God's Caress*, 21,
[37] Mullan, *Narratives*, 1-8, 21-24.
[38] See Footnote 21.

and mobilised emotion through their texts, but the genre of self-writing in early modern Protestantism. Put another way, these scholars did not apply their insights about the genre of these texts to the history of emotions. As a result, there is a gap in the modern historiography of Scottish Protestant emotionality in relation to the evaluative dimension of the source material, which has limited its insight into the emotional judgements made by Scottish Protestants.

Therefore, this thesis offers a fresh perspective on the source material because it recognises that the source material was the product of purposeful self-examination of the emotions in order to evoke desired emotions in the reader. The project acknowledges that the source material conveys the author's *interpretation* and *evaluation* of their subject's feelings as informed by their linguistic-conceptual framework. Hence, the thesis focuses on the vocabulary and ideas which Scottish Protestants used to make their judgements about their subject's emotions. It explains what Scottish Protestants meant by their language, distinguishing their alien concepts from modern theories of emotion. Moreover, the project explains *why* Scottish Protestants *created* texts which were written forms of radical emotional reflexivity and *why* these sources *presented* Scottish Protestant piety as intensely emotional. Thus, the thesis goes beyond description of Protestant emotionality in early modern Scotland to the analysis of why Scottish Protestants judged it to have an intense emotional style and why they evaluated their emotions at all. It integrates into the analysis of Scottish Protestant emotion the origin, form, and purpose of the texts historians have used to examine the experiential dimension of Scottish Protestantism.

3. Method, Structure, and Outcomes

This thesis takes a new approach to Scottish Protestant emotionality by its examination of radical emotional reflexivity between 1590 and 1640.[39]

[39] The timescale for the source material has been limited to between 1590 and 1640 for two reasons. The start date of 1590 has been selected because this was approximately the time when introspective piety blossomed in Protestant Scotland, and so the practice of radical emotional reflexivity became central to Scottish Protestant private devotion. 1640, two years

Practically, this means the study explores the language Scottish Protestants used to identify, and thus mobilise, their emotions. To this end, it explores the vocabulary of emotion built into corporate worship. Listening to sermons, participation in the Lord's Supper, penitential rituals, and psalm singing all provided opportunities in which Scottish communities could learn and practice their use of language in relation to their emotions. Consequently, how radical emotional reflexivity was built into the official guidance for, clerical commentary on, and eyewitness accounts of Scottish Protestant public worship, are examined. The language used in the identification and mobilisation of emotion in corporate ritual bled into the private piety of those Scottish Protestants who most zealously adhered to the faith. Their application of this emotional vocabulary and grammar to their interior lives has been preserved through the highly emotional diaries, memoirs, autobiographies, confessions, dialogues, and religious poetry they produced. Thus, this thesis examines the emotional language Scots were taught in public worship, and how some of the most committed and learned Scottish Protestants used this linguistic register when they examined their own feelings. Notwithstanding the variety Scots had in their comprehension and application of the semantic repertoire of emotion they learned in corporate worship, analysis of sources related to public and private devotion can provide insight into the shared vocabulary and grammar Scottish Protestants were educated to use about their emotions. Therefore, this project abstracts from the source material the patterns of language taught in religious worship and, to varying degrees, used by Scots when engaged in radical emotional reflexivity, to recreate the shared vocabulary Scottish Protestants could employ in their identification, and consequent mobilisation, of emotion.

To understand why the extant material about corporate worship and the spirituality of pious Scots followed particular conventions in their use of

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after the National Covenant, has been identified as the end date because prior to the divisions caused by the wars of the three kingdoms there was, in the main, a common theology and piety practiced in Scotland, despite significant political and ecclesiological differences. Consequently, there was a shared linguistic-conceptual framework about emotion. Thus, ending in 1640 allows the thesis to engage with the language which Scottish Protestants engaged with in their piety. See Mullan, *Scottish Puritanism*, 3-4.

emotional language, the conceptual framework which tacitly justified the linguistic expressions Scots were taught to make about their emotions must be examined. This is especially important because much of the language used in these sources appears familiar to a modern audience. However, this similarity is only apparent. The shared vocabulary of emotion employed in Scottish Protestant worship and the devotions of the most faithful is radically different to a contemporary interpretation of feeling. Consequently, the language sources use about emotion must be, in the words of Cohen, 'translated' to reveal an 'utterance's pristine connotation'.[40] In his study of puritan emotionality in New England, he attempted to uncover the original linguistic meaning of the phrases puritans used in their spiritual testimonies through analysis of the ministry's teaching, which acts as a hermeneutic for his examination of the laity's language about their emotions. This thesis takes a similar approach to a broader range of material. In addition to the internal evidence provided by sources related to public worship and the piety of the most zealous, sermons, theological treatises, piety manuals, philosophical discussions, and physiological studies are analysed to make explicit the assumptions Scots made in their use of language about emotion. Put another way, the study's examination of these sources uncovers the ideas and attitudes Scots were taught to express when they identified, and in so doing mobilised, their emotions.

In defence of the main argument, the first two chapters engage primarily with theological texts to analyse basic assumptions that were foundational to the practice of self-examination in early modern Scotland. Chapter one examines the theory of emotion Scottish Protestants presupposed in their identification and mobilisation of emotion. It argues that Protestants in Scotland assumed a modified Thomist interpretation of the emotions, and that each aspect of this theory was integral to the language Scottish Protestants used about their emotions. The second chapter analyses the stated and socially learned goal of Scottish Protestants –

[40] Cohen, *God's Caress*, 20-21.

communion with God, which they identified as happiness. That Protestants in Scotland assumed that fellowship with God was the fulfilment of human nature, that this resulted in a desired emotional state, and could only be acquired through emotional change, is explored. Thus, chapters one and two outline the category which Scottish Protestants focused on in their radical emotional reflexivity and the goal against which they judged the significance of their experiences.

The third chapter examines the ideological spine of public worship and private piety: the pilgrimage of the soul from misery to happiness. It argues that authors used the language of emotion sustained by communal ritual in their personal writings, which led them to categorise their emotions in the form of a spiritual journey. The extant narratives mapped the order of emotional change which constituted the pilgrimage of the soul. While no two spiritual journeys were the same, all authors located their subject's experiences within a sequence of emotion which can be schematized into six stages: love for devotion, the apprehension of sin, legal terror, repentance, a feeling of mercy, and communion with God. The conversion narrative of Mistress Rutherford (*fl*.1630/70?) is used as a vehicle to analyse the language and concepts associated with each phase of the spiritual journey.

Chapter four analyses the Scottish Protestant judgement that the emotional change experienced in a subject's spiritual journey was caused by God. It considers how Scottish Protestants assumed that God was the cause of 'supernatural emotions', that as the cause of these emotions God was somehow *inside* the subject's consciousness, and that particular supernatural emotions could be interpreted as perceptions of communion with God. As a result, the chapter answers why Scottish Protestants expressed judgements in their writings and religious rituals which presupposed that God had caused and was, somehow, in their emotions.

The fifth chapter analyses the process and purpose of radical emotional reflexivity in Scottish Protestant ritual and piety. It is explored how in public worship and private devotion there was an emphasis upon testing the sincerity of a subject's emotions. The discussion explores the nature of

the somatic evidence, particularly tears and groans, Scots looked for when they evaluated whether a subject had experienced supernatural emotions. The chapter addresses why the testing of the emotions caused many Scots to experience acute anxiety over their spiritual status. It identifies why they thought they had failed to have genuine supernatural emotions, and argues that, due to doctrinal commitments and the transience of feeling, scepticism was embedded into the practice of radical emotional reflexivity. Doubt, however, was not so much a problem as a crucial part of evaluating emotional sincerity. The purpose of practicing radical emotional reflexivity was to stimulate supernatural emotions, the focus of the final section. This was achieved either through failure, which moved the subject to repentance, or success, which evoked assurance in God's mercy. Through this process the examination of the emotions could evoke desired emotions. Moreover, because the activity could stimulate those feelings which advanced the spiritual journey, writing and reading narratives about a soul's pilgrimage was considered an experience of a divinely inspired step forward towards communion with God. Thus, the chapter explains why Scottish Protestants consciously examined their emotions and as a result produced spiritual narratives. It explores what self-examination of emotion consisted in, how it worked, and why it was undertaken.

Therefore, this thesis provides a comprehensive analysis of what judgements Scottish Protestants made about their emotions and why they made these evaluations.

It is important to establish the theory of emotion Scottish Protestants assumed from the outset. Without this knowledge, it is impossible to specify what aspects of an author's radical reflexivity were relevant to the claims the experiential dimension of Scottish Protestantism. Consequently, the theory of emotion Scottish Protestants presupposed must be analysed. This is the focus of the first chapter, to which the thesis now proceeds.

Chapter One: The Scottish Protestant Theory of Emotion

This chapter argues that Protestants in Scotland assumed that the nature of the emotions conformed to a modified Thomist interpretation. This meant that they ascribed to every emotion three basic qualities. First, that it was a passive experience caused by an external agent. Second, that the judgements of the understanding and will are necessary for an emotion to occur. Third, that emotions are psychosomatic, and can be distinguished with reference to their formal and material manifestations. These three aspects of the emotions were assumed by Scottish Protestants when they engaged in radical emotional reflexivity and provided the emotional logic that informed their identification and communication of emotion. This is because the theory of emotion Protestants in Scotland presupposed enabled them to determine what aspects of their experience constituted an emotion and, thus, interpret how that part of their experience came to be. Their more complicated assumptions about emotion were necessarily dependent upon the supposed nature of emotion. Consequently, this chapter analyses the basic category of emotion as understood by Scottish Protestants, which will establish the fundamental emotional logic which influenced important presuppositions, and as such the language Protestants in Scotland used about their emotions.

The vehicle for the analysis is the theological text *The Portraiture of the Image of God in Man* by John Weemes (*c*.1579-1636), minister of Duns from 1613.[1] Weemes's theory of emotion, expressed within this document, was the most comprehensive, sophisticated, and prominent philosophical work on the nature of the emotions developed in early seventeenth century Protestant Scotland. Its definition and categorisation of emotion was representative, though more refined, of the theories of emotions developed

[1] John Weemes, *The Portraiture of the Image of God in Man, in his Three Estates, of Creation, Restauration, Glorification* (Published in London unless otherwise stated: 1627; 2nd ed. 1632; 3rd ed.1636). This thesis uses the 1632 version as its primary source, as it has additional material to the 1627 edition. See *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020.

by other Scottish Protestants between 1590 and 1640.[2] Moreover, Weemes's theory of emotion has been identified as one of the earliest and most thorough, and thus formative, treatises on the topic in a British Protestant context.[3] His ideas about the nature of emotion could have had transatlantic influence given that John Bellamie (*c*.1596-1653), who published *The Portraiture* six times in total, sold many theological texts to those who travelled to New England.[4] Weemes's theological thought provided a learned and accessible system of thought which expressed many of the basic assumptions implicit in Protestant use of language about emotion across the anglosphere, even if most could not have articulated their concept of emotion as eruditely as Weemes had done. He expressed the values they used in their practice of radical emotional reflexivity. The representativeness of Weemes's thought perhaps explains the high demand for his works. All this makes Weemes's theory of emotion an ideal candidate for analysis as perhaps the clearest and most complete articulation of the theory of emotion that was assumed by Scottish Protestants.

Weemes's theory of emotion was, arguably, representative of Scottish Protestant views because it was a modified Thomist, and thus augmented Aristotelian, account of the emotions.[5] The intellectual thought-world of early modern Reformed Protestants has been identified by Richard Muller as 'Christian Aristotelianism'; an adherence to principles in Aristotle's philosophy filtered through Thomist, Scotist, Augustinian, Nominalist, and humanist debates within the late-medieval and early modern eras.[6] This was also the

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[2] John Abernethy, *A Christian and Heavenly Treatise Containing Physicke for the Soule* (London, 1630), 255-446; Alexander Ross, *The Philosophicall Touch-Stone: or Observations upon Sir Kenelm Digbie's Discourses of the Nature of Bodies and of the Reasonable Soule* (London, 1645), 52-55.

[3] David S. Sytsma, 'The Logic of the Heart: Analyzing the Affections in Early Reformed Orthodoxy' in *Church and School in Early Modern Protestantism: Studies in Honor of Richard A. Muller on the Maturation of a Theological Tradition*, eds. Jordan J. Ballor, David S. Stysma, and Jason Zuidema (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 473-475, 487-88.

[4] Henry R Plomer, *A Dictionary of the Booksellers and Printers who were at work in England, Scotland and Ireland from 1641-1667* (London: The Bibliographical Society, 1907), 20-21; Cohen, *God's Caress*, 34-35.

[5] Sytsma, 'Logic', 477, 481-483.

[6] Richard A. Muller, 'Reformation, Orthodoxy, "Christian Aristotelianism," and the Eclecticism of Early Modern Philosophy' in *Nederlands Archief Voor Kerkgeschiedenis / Dutch Review of Church History,* 81, no.3 (2001), 315: See Peter King, 'Emotions in Medieval Thought' in *The*

case in Scotland. The texts of Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), including his ethical philosophy, stood at the core of the Scottish higher educational system, even in humanist quarters.[7] Within this Aristotelian intellectual trajectory Thomas Aquinas's (1225-1274) theory of emotion, his so-called 'Treatise on the Passions' (questions 22-48 of the *Summa Theologiae*), became the dominant influence upon early modern philosophical and theological consideration of emotion.[8] However, many seventeenth century thinkers did not embrace Aristotelianism or Thomism wholesale. They amended the Aristotelian paradigm by expulsion of what they considered erroneous and included principles developed by other thinkers and traditions to improve their philosophical and theological theories. Protestant theologians likewise took an 'eclectic' approach, their intellectual thought influenced by a variety of sources, which helped them to develop new theories within the Christian Aristotelian paradigm.[9] In Scotland, the widespread influence of Duns Scotus's (1265/66-1308) thought, and how Scottish Protestants integrated it into their Aristotelian-Thomist worldview, exemplified the tendency to modify and combine ideas from a variety of ancient and medieval sources.[10] The predisposition to improve established belief through the integration of alien

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Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion, ed. Peter Goldie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 167, for recognition of the multiplicity of competing theories of emotion in a Medieval context.

[7] Steven J. Reid, 'On the Edge of Reason: The Scottish Universities between Reformation and Enlightenment, 1560-1660' in *Scottish Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century*, ed. Alexander Broadie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 36, 38; Giovanni Gellera, 'Reformed Scholastic Philosophy in the Seventeenth-Century' in *Scottish Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century*, ed. Alexander Broadie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 95; Christian Maurer, 'Human Nature, the Passions, and the Fall: Theme from Seventeenth-Century Scottish Moral Philosophy' in *Scottish Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century*, ed. Alexander Broadie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 177.

[8] King, 'Emotions in Medieval Thought', 174, 176; Simo Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon, 2004), 239; Nicholas E. Lombardo, O.P., *Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion* (Washington D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 1; Susan James, *Passion and Action: the Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 21-25, 47; Robert Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions A Study of Summa Theologiae, 1a2ae 22-48* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1.

[9] Richard A. Muller, 'Christian Aristotelianism', 308, 323; Richard A. Muller, *Divine Will and Human Choice: Freedom, Contingency, and Necessity in early modern Reformed Thought* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2017), 77

[10] J.-P. Anfray, 'Scottish Scotism? The Philosophical Theses in the Scottish Universities, 1610-1630' in *History of Universities*, XXIX, no.2 (2017), 110.

ideas also affected early modern theories of emotion. The views of Plato, Augustine, Scotus, and the Stoics supplemented Aristotle's and Aquinas's thought in seventeenth century studies on feeling.[11] That Weemes's account of the emotions was a form of modified Thomism was typical of the Protestant intellectual Christian and Aristotelian eclecticism of his period. Crucially, not only was Weemes's approach representative, but his alterations of Aquinas's theory with Scotist and Stoic ideas reflected the assumptions Scottish Protestants made about emotion when they engaged in radical emotional reflexivity. Consequently, Weemes's theory of emotion was situated within an eclectic Christian Aristotelian tradition, and his presentation of a modified Thomist interpretation of the emotions articulated the basic ideas Scottish Protestants had about the nature of emotion in a scholastic form. Thus, Weemes's theory of emotion was representative in its approach and conclusions of the prevalent intellectual attitudes and more popular thought about feeling in early modern Scotland.

The outline of the chapter follows the logical structure of Weemes's definition of emotion. Part one examines his idea that emotions are the effects of external agency. Part two analyses the role of the understanding and will in the process which evokes an emotion. Part three looks at the psychosomatic phenomena which constitute an emotion. In each section, the key concepts will be identified and reconstructed through analysis of Weemes's work and, for greater lucidity, the ideas of other thinkers insofar as they influenced or expand upon the ideas in Weemes's theory of emotion. The impact that these three assumed features of emotion, as expressed by

[11] Amy Schmitter has identified significant Augustinian, Platonic, Aristotelian, Thomist, Stoic, Epicurean, medical and contemporary influences in early modern thinking on the passions. Likewise, James has recognised that early modern philosophers had eclectic tendencies, drawing upon Aristotle, Aquinas, Augustine, and the Stoics as sources which could be 'amalgamated into a single complete and correct system'. In particular, she observes that Stoicism formed a significant dimension of the intellectual thought-world of the seventeenth century, being an alternative to Aristotelian categories as mediated through the medieval schools. Moreover, James has noted the profound effect Augustine had on Puritan writers, particularly shaping their ideas concerning the relationship of the emotions and the will. See Amy M. Schmitter, 'Passions and Affections' in *The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century*, ed. Peter R. Anstey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 446-452; James, *Passion and Action*, 24-25.

Weemes, had on the language about emotion Scottish Protestants used in public worship and private piety will be indicated in each section. Clues will also be offered as to how the nature of emotion influenced the identification of emotion by Scottish Protestants as a spiritual journey (chapter three), as caused by God (chapter four), and in how they inferred the presence of a supernatural emotion (chapter five). Thus, this chapter will point out the logical foundations of ideas that will be tracked throughout the thesis.

1. An External Agent Causes Emotion

Weemes argued that emotions are the experience of a subject that an agent has acted upon. This idea was implicit in the task he had set himself, which was to define and categorise the 'passions'.[12] 'Passion', along with 'Affection' and 'Perturbation', are the closest analogues to the modern conception of emotion that existed in early modern thought.[13] The difference in terminology indicates the conceptual differentiation which exists between seventeenth and twenty-first century mindsets. While 'passion' and 'emotion' both refer to 'feeling', they differ in the assumptions they apply to a subject's experience. In the case of Weemes, his decision to define passion (which he used synonymously with affection), was important because the concept of a passion presupposed an Aristotelian theory of change which, by implication, entailed that his topic was an experience caused by an external agent.

To understand why 'passion' has the tacit connotation of causation by external agency, an examination of Aristotle's account of change, an integral dimension of the Christian Aristotelian paradigm taught in Scottish universities, will elucidate the connection in the Scottish Protestant worldview. Aristotle defined change as the actualisation of that which is potential, or the potentialisation of that which is actual.[14] The categories of potential and actual refer to a substance's properties. If a substance has an attribute potentially, it has the capacity to have the relevant quality. If the

[12] Weemes, *Portraiture*, 139.
[13] Schmitter, 'Passions', 442-446.
[14] Aristotle, *Physics*, trans. Robin Waterfield, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), III.201a27.

substance has the property, it actually possesses that attribute. Change takes place when a substance's status in relation to a quality transforms from potentiality to actuality, or actuality to potentiality. Importantly for Weemes's theory of emotion, Aristotle argued that the process of the acquisition or loss of a property requires agency: 'everything that changes must be changed by something'.[15] Change must either be self-caused or be brought about by an external agent. In both cases, the agent of change must have the capacity to change the subject in the relevant way.[16] When contiguous with the subject of change, the agent of change actualises the substance's property *p* or *not-p* through the activity of its power to change the subject.[17] Importantly, 'subject' in this context does not refer to only the 'consciousness', as is typical of post-Kantian philosophy, but the substance which experiences change.

In the process of change, a 'passion' was identified as the transformation a subject undergoes when changed by an external agent. René Descartes (1596-1650) provided a succinct overview of this point.[18] He argued that whatever the agent does is called an 'action'. By contrast, what happens to the 'patient' of change is labelled a 'passion'. The terms 'action' and 'passion' refer to the one change but differ in relation to substance they denote within the process of change. The use of the words 'passion' and 'patient' to describe the substance which is changed is indicative of Aristotle's and Aquinas's idea that to be changed is to 'suffer'.[19] The idea that one suffers when acted upon by an agent characterises potentiality and the materiality of substance (that which is capable of change) as passive. Passivity is the potential to become, and activity the power to bring into being.[20] Thus, passive substances suffer change, while agents make

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[15] Aristotle, *Physics*, VII.241b34, VII.242a49.
[16] Aristotle, *Physics*, III.202a13-21.
[17] Aristotle, *Physics*, VII.243a32.
[18] René Descartes, *Passions of the Soul and Other Late Philosophical Writings*, trans. Michael Moriarty (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), I; Aristotle, *Physics*, III.202a21-31.
[19] Aristotle, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, trans. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon, 1924), 1019a20; James, *Passion and Action*, 33, 48, 56, 64; Summa, II-I.22.1a; James, *Passion and Action,* 56; Knuuttila, *Ancient and Medieval*, 239; King, 'Emotions in Medieval Thought', 177; Lombardo, *Desire*, 20, 35; Miner, *Aquinas*, 58; Rosenwein, *Generations*, 146.
[20] James, *Passion and Action*, 36.

change. Hence, the identification of a subject's transformation as a 'passion' implies that whatever it denotes is the effect of an agent's action upon a passive subject.

Therefore, when Weemes took as his topic the definition of the passions, he employed a category which applied, in its broadest sense, to a subject's passive experience of change. Thus, implicit in his theory of emotion prior to analysis was that whatever the nature of an emotion, it must be a passive experience of change caused by an agent. These features of change, as derived from Aristotelian metaphysics, delimited Weemes's theory of an emotion to that, at its most basic, of an agent's action upon a passive subject.

Whilst 'passion' had this general significance, it was more frequently used to refer to feeling. This is reflected in Weemes's definition of his topic: 'a motion of the sensitive appetite, stirred up by the apprehension either of good or evil in the imagination, which worketh some outward change in the body'.[21] In this more narrow sense, 'passion' denoted a process of change in the cognitive and appetitive faculties. Weemes's use of 'passion' in this way was not original. While Aquinas did use 'passion' to refer to the change which the substance suffers, in his 'Treatise on the Passions' he focused on psychological change.[22] Similarly, Descartes constrained his discussion to the 'passions of the soul', rather than change in general.[23] What Weemes, Aquinas, and Descartes shared was a basic assumption that 'passion' more regularly denoted a kind of change in the psychological faculties. Consequently, Weemes's theory of the passions is an attempt to identify the agent that actualises potentialities in the subject's faculties. As this more specific sense of the word 'passion' is that which Weemes employed in his theory of the emotions, the term will be used in this narrower sense from this point onwards in the thesis unless otherwise stated.

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[21] Weemes, *Portraiture*, 139.
[22] James, *Passion and Action*, 63-64.
[23] Descartes, *Passions*, II.

Weemes identified the agent of a passion as ‘a knowne object laid up in the imagination, appearing to us either pleasant or hurtfull’.[24] To understand what Weemes meant by this definition, it needs to be broken down into its constituent parts for analysis: ‘imagination’, ‘known object’, and ‘appearing to us either as pleasant or hurtful’. As Weemes did not define these terms formally, Aristotle and Aquinas’s thought, which was the main influence on Weemes’s position, will be expounded where necessary to make clear what Weemes had asserted.

The imagination was, in Weemes’s view, a faculty of the soul which had an epistemological function. While he did not formally define ‘imagination’, his use of the term indicates the assumed significance he ascribed to the concept. In a discussion of Adam’s ‘inbred knowledge’, he made a key distinction which involved the imagination.[25] Weemes argued that Adam was created with an innate knowledge of God. However, Adam’s knowledge of the ‘other sciences’ was received ‘from the senses’. These alternative modes of epistemology regard the understanding’s acquisition of ‘forms’. Initially, the understanding is void of forms, but can possess them. However, only an external agent can actualise the potentiality of the cognition to behold forms as its object. The means by which forms are received into the understanding is through the senses. Touch, taste, sight, sound, and smell, each in their own way, receive an object’s form. They communicate it to the ‘imagination’, which makes the form more ‘refined’. The imagination then passes the form onto the understanding, so that the subject ‘understands’ or knows the form. So, the imagination is, for Weemes, a mediator between sense perception and the intellect in its reception of forms.

Weemes’s concept of ‘imagination’ was inspired by Aristotelian and Thomist theories of knowledge. It relied upon the idea that objects have a ‘form’, a key component of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy, though in different ways. In Aristotle’s version, which is most relevant to Weemes’s thought, every substance is composed of matter, the stuff it is made from,

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[24] Weemes, *Portraiture*, 139-140.
[25] Weemes, *Portraiture*, 62-63.

and a form, the properties and qualities it possesses. So, on a crude interpretation, the marble of a human statue is its matter, and the statue's human shape is its form. A substantial form is the nature or essential qualities of what it means to be a certain kind of thing, whereas accidental forms are those attributes which can or cannot be held by the subject without the destruction of its substantial form. Crucially, more than one thing can possess the same form. For instance, all dogs possess the form of being a dog; all tables the form of tableness; all good actions the form of goodness. Thus, the identification of a thing's form enables the knower to categorise and classify the substance it has perceived. Importantly for Aristotle each form is a reality which, while dependent for its existence upon its possession by substances, is nevertheless the same across multiple realities.[26]

Weemes believed that knowledge consists in the reception of a form through the senses into the intellect. When he defined 'experimentall knowledge', Weemes characterised it as a kind of knowledge 'gotten from forms drawne from their singular objects', like the 'print in the waxe from the seale'.[27] Weemes's conception of knowledge was heavily influenced by Aristotle's epistemology on this point. Aristotle claimed that 'experimental knowledge' is acquired when a knower receives the form of the object into their mind without its matter. The form of dogness is communicated via the senses to the intelligence, which holds the form there. By implication, 'actual knowledge is identical with its object'.[28] This is because, in Aristotle's view, the form which the object of perception possesses is the same as that abstracted in the mind. Thus, knowledge is not 'representational', but rather a cognition of an object in the understanding.

The relevance of Weemes's theory of knowledge, influenced by Aristotle's epistemology, for the present analysis is this: Weemes argued that in the process of a passion the imagination is the faculty which receives the form, or 'known object' into the mind. It is that ability which can receive forms

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[26] Aristotle, *Physics*, II.194b26; Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Z.1032b1, Z.1032b14.
[27] Weemes, *Portraiture*, 85.
[28] Aristotle, *On the Soul*, trans. Fred D. Miller, Jr. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 430a20.

drawn from the senses and retain them, just as wax can retain an image. It is to Aquinas that Weemes's view is indebted.[29] Aquinas categorised the imagination as an internal power which animals, including humans, possess. In his view, the senses take in a form, and these sense perceptions are organised by the 'general root sensitivity'. These forms must then be 'stored' so that the animal can be aware of what has been sensed when the object is either present or absent. This power of retention is, for Aquinas, the imagination. It is, thus, distinct from sense perception, as the ability to perceive an object via the senses is not identical with the retention of the forms perceived. Hence, for Weemes and Aquinas a form is received and maintained in the subject's imagination prior to its entrance into the understanding.[30]

The known object received into the imagination, Weemes argued, should be distinguished from 'imaginations and phantasies' when it is related to the passions.[31] He defined imaginations and fantasies as an 'impression made in the soule of such forms and shapes as are let in by the senses, or by such as are imagined without any sight'.[32] Where the fantasy differs from the retentive power of the imagination is its ability to 'adde, divide, and compose'. Weemes explained by way of illustration. Just as a painter can amalgamate and modify images to create an image, so too can the fantasy alter received forms to 'make up diverse forms'. This is how the mind can conceive of mythical creatures which have not been apprehended by the senses, such as a 'Gyant' or a 'dwarfe'. Weemes's clarification assumed a Thomist identification of two functions the imagination can perform. First, the *imaginatio*, is an object's form derived from the senses. Second, the *imaginarius*, is the images stored in the mind, whether originally delivered by the senses or composed out of sense perceptions.[33] Weemes used

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[29] Aristotle, *On the Soul*, 414b33–415a3.
[30] James, *Passion and Action*, 54.
[31] Weemes, *Portraiture*, 139.
[32] John Weemes, *Observations, Naturall and Morall* (London, 1633), 84.
[33] Charles Sullivan, 'Aquinas on Imagination Part 2'. https://charlesasullivan.com/2337/aquinas-on-imagination-part-2/. Date accessed 18/05/2020.

Aquinas's distinction to articulate that the imagination functioned retentively, not compositionally, in the process of a passion, and thus the known object of a passion was not a fiction.

Weemes argued that in the process of a passion the form of an object, the known object, is received into the imagination with an apprehension of whether it is good or evil. He explained that when the object is 'laid up in the imagination', it does so 'appearing to us either pleasant or hurtfull'.[34] The appearance of the object as good or evil is a relational property ascribed to the form. It is not whether the object is good or evil in general, but whether it is beneficial or dangerous to the subject who apprehends it. Weemes's thought was, on this point, influenced by the Thomist theory of the passions. The form that is received into the imagination is, for Aquinas, by the 'estimative power' or what in humans is called the 'particular intellect'.[35] This power by 'some sort of collation' evaluates the 'intention' of an external object.[36] The intention of the object, whether it is good or evil in relation to the subject, is not a sensible quality and thus is not discernible through sense perception. Instead, the goodness or evilness of an object, that which helps or hinders its existence, maintenance, and perfection, is apprehended by the subject through the cogitative power of the sensible soul. This faculty critically compares memories about an object's properties, which then determines an appropriate response.[37] Through this power, the subject can apprehend the intention of the form received into the imagination.

The form received into the imagination, apprehended as good or evil in relation to the subject, was in Weemes's view the external agent of a passion, its 'formal object'.[38] He was emphatic that it was this 'knowne object' in the imagination which 'stirred up' the motion of the sensitive appetite.[39] He

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[34] Weemes, *Portraiture*, 140.
[35] Thomas Aquinas, *Summae Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas*, 22 vols. (London, 1825-1875), I.78.4a; James, *Passion and Action*, p.60; Knuuttila, *Ancient and Medieval*, 239; Lombardo, *Desire*, 24.
[36] Aquinas, *Summae*, I.78.4a; James, *Passion and Action*, 54; Lombardo, *Desire*, 24.
[37] James, *Passion and Action*, 54; Lombardo, *Desire*, 24; Miner, *Aquinas*, 77-79.
[38] Miner, *Aquinas*, 59; Rosenwein, *Generations*, 151; Lombardo, *Desire*, 49; Knuuttila, *Ancient and Medieval*, 242.
[39] Weemes, *Portraiture*, 139.

argued that the formal object of a passion must include an evaluation of its intention, for without this knowledge a form in the imagination, retained or composed, cannot cause 'alteration'.[40] Whether one could ever apprehend a form without its intention was not addressed by Weemes. For Aquinas, objects were always perceived under a particular aspect.[41] Nevertheless, Weemes believed, like Aquinas, that a form received into the imagination, with an apprehension of its intention, was the external agent which caused the actualisation of the sensitive appetite, the actor which acts upon the passive subject.

Crucially, because the agent of a passion is a form received into the imagination, it follows that for Weemes, emotions were assumed to be caused by objects which entered into and existed in the cognitive faculties of the subject. The Aristotelian theory of knowledge which Weemes presupposed identified that to know is to have received a form into the understanding. By implication, this means that 'actual knowledge is identical with its object', the form of the object and the form in the mind are the same thing.[42] As Taylor has recognised, this means that for Aristotle knowledge is not representational, as it was for René Descartes and John Locke (1632-1704).[43] It involves the entrance of external objects into consciousness, while simultaneously they remain existent outside the knower's subjectivity. The relationship between object and subject is permeable and flexible, which enables the knower to receive into herself the same property which an object possesses. The subject is not an isolated ego: it receives the other into itself. Consequently, when Weemes claimed that passions have as their external agent a formal object, he affirmed that emotions are caused by forms which exist simultaneously inside and outside of the mind. The external agent is present within the passive subject as it undergoes a passion.

Weemes's claim expressed important assumptions about emotion which were significant for the language and concepts Scottish Protestants

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[40] Weemes, *Observations*, 89.
[41] Lombardo, *Desire*, 25.
[42] Aristotle, *On the Soul*, 430a20.
[43] Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 186.

used about their emotions. It meant, first and foremost, that they believed their emotions were caused by realities outside of themselves. This apparent feature of emotion provided the conceptual basis for the belief that God (and the devil) could be identified as the cause of emotions. God could play the role of the external agent who acts upon the passive subject's sensitive appetite. The passive nature of emotion, as it was conceived, was foundational for Scottish Protestant claims that those experiences they identified as emotions caused by God were fundamentally passive. Additionally, given that emotions were assumed to involve the entrance of the external agent into the subject's consciousness, so too Scottish Protestants judged that when God caused their emotions, God was inside their subjectivity. Therefore, how Weemes, and by extension Scottish Protestants, understood the causation of emotion was integral to their judgements about how God could cause emotion. This feature of emotion provided the emotional logic by which such claims, that God had caused an emotion and was inside the subject, could be made coherently. That Scottish Protestants identified God as the cause of their emotions is a topic analysed in chapter four.[44]

2. Judgements of the Understanding and Will are Necessary for Emotion

A second feature of emotion that Weemes identified was that it necessarily involves the action of two faculties: the intellect and volition. He argued that:

> the imagination stirreth up the senses, then the understanding faculty, judgeth them to be true or false, and the will considereth them as good or evill. As the understanding judgeth them to be true or false, it stirreth up not the appetite, but as the will judgeth them to be good or evil; yet not absolutely, but as good or evill to us, or ours; and these faculties are rightly joyned together, for the sensitive faculty of it selfe is blind, neither could it follow or decline anything unlesse the understanding faculty directed it: so the understanding facultie were needlesse, unlesse it had these passions joyned with it, to prosecute the truth, and to shun falsehood.[45]

[44] Chapter Four, 123-149.
[45] Weemes, *Portraiture* 140.

In this passage, Weemes claimed that passions involve two judgements. In his view, the understanding evaluates whether the intention of the formal object as held in the imagination is a true or false representation of the object's intention. The will then determines whether to choose, refuse, or suspend judgement on the intention of the formal object of a passion. These functions correspond to the nature of each faculty as conceived by Weemes.

> The understanding, *is an essentiall facultie in the Soule, whereby it knoweth, judgeth, and diserneth naturally truth from falsehood*.
> The will, *is an essentiall facultie in the Soule working freely, having liberty to chuse, refuse, or suspend, not determinate to one thing*.[46]

Weemes's definitions of the understanding and will are almost identical with those of Franciscus Junius (1545-1602), Weemes's teacher in Leiden.[47] In his 1592 theses, Junius argued that the intellect is free insofar as:

> The choice of the intellect… is a mental act by which a mind-gifted nature distinguishes between intelligible objects and after deliberation judges which of those objects are *true or false*.[48]

Junius then claimed that the will is free in that:

> The choice of the will… is likewise the act, by which the will either chooses, because it is *good*, or rejects, because it is *bad*, the things distinguished, judged and set before the will by the intellect.[49]

Junius's claim that the intellect's function is to judge whether objects are *true or false* and that the will's role is to choose or to reject objects in relation to whether they are *good or bad* is almost the same as Weemes's formulation, *true or false* and *good or evil*.[50] This characterisation of the understanding

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[46] Weemes, *Portraiture*, 96. Weemes explained the freedom of the will was twofold: 'the *liberty of contrariety*', the power to choose good or evil, and 'the *liberty of contradiction*', to do or not to do. See Weemes, *Portraiture*, 128.
[47] Sytsma, forthcoming publication. I am grateful to the author for sharing this information.
[48] Franciscus Junius, *Theses Theologicae, quae in inclyta academia Lugduno-batava ad exercitia publicarum disputationum, praeside D. Francisco Junio variis temporibus a theologiae candidatis adversus oppugnantes propugnatae sunt* (Leiden, 1592)., XXII.4. Italics added for emphasis.
[49] Junius, *Theses*, XXII.5. Italics are mine.
[50] Weemes's threefold model of free choice, to choose, refuse or suspend, is an amalgamation of Zacharias Ursinus's (1534-1583) and Junius's discussions on the will, Junius's two second order options (to not will *p* and to not will not-*p*) integrated under Ursinus's notion of 'suspending' action, the-will-to-not-to-will. Weemes's definition of free will was almost identical with that of a fellow student at St Andrews, Jean Masson (*fl*.1597). In

and will can also be found in Aquinas, which suggests his influence on Junius's and Weemes's consideration of these faculties.[51]

However, Weemes significantly departed from Aquinas in his theory of emotion by his claim that it is the understanding and volition which judge the formal object of a passion. Inspired by Aristotle, many theologians, including Aquinas, divided the soul's functions into three spheres. The vegetative, which belongs to all living beings, contained the powers of growth and nutrition. The sensitive part of the soul related to the powers of perception and motion, which all animals possess. Finally, the rational part of the soul, possessed only by humanity and immaterial beings like angels, consists in the powers of the understanding and the will. Aquinas argued that passions belong solely to the sensitive part of the soul. The formal object of a passion, and its intention, is evaluated by the practical intellect whose judgement moves the sensitive appetite.[52] The rational part of the soul does not interfere at all. By contrast, Weemes, believed that rational cognition and appetition are necessarily involved in the passions. Thus the faculties of the understanding and will, in Weemes's theory of emotion, replaced the role of the practical intellect in Aquinas's account of the passions. Through integration of the rational cognition and appetition into the processes that cause a passion, Weemes collapsed the rigid Thomist distinction between the sensitive and rational parts of the soul in his theory of emotion.

Weemes's manoeuvre to integrate the rational and sensitive faculties in the processes that make a passion was influenced by John Duns Scotus's philosophy of the passions. For Scotus, the faculties of the soul are only 'formally' distinct, so that they are only distinguished in terms of their formal

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his disputation, Masson defined freewill as 'a faculty of human will which either chooses, or rejects, or suspends either way, behind the judgement of the mind'. This suggests the possibility that either Masson had studied in Leiden too, or, more likely, that Andrew Melville (1545-1622) taught the theology of Ursinus and Junius on the freedom of the will to his students. See Zacharias Ursinus, *Opera Theologica quibus orthodoxae religionis capita perspicue & breviter explicantur*, ed. Quirinius Reuter, 3 vols. (Heidelberg, 1612), I, col.77; Jean Masson, *De Libero Arbitrio Theses Theologicae* (Edinburgh, 1597), IX.

[51] Aquinas, *Summae*, II-I.22.2a.

[52] Knuuttila, *Ancient and Medieval*, 246; James, *Passion and Action*, 54; Miner, *Aquinas*, 16, 47.

objects.[53] Consequently, the powers of the rational appetite and the sensitive appetite are not distinct in terms of their nature, but only in terms of what causes them to be actualised. This is also true for the passions which, in Scotus's view, are produced by acts of the will.[54] Rational cognition and appetition are, thus, necessary for emotion from a Scotist perspective, just as Weemes alleged. The widespread and mostly positive engagement with Scotist principles in early seventeenth-century Scotland, and the tendency of Protestant divines to modify Thomism with Scotist ideas, support the notion that Weemes's integration of the understanding and the will into his theory of the emotions was influenced by an engagement with Scotist faculty psychology.[55]

Moreover, Weemes's identification of the understanding and volition as the faculties which evaluate the intentions of formal object was probably influenced by Stoic philosophy. Within the *Portraiture* Weemes engaged with Stoic ideas, and significantly for his theory of emotion, with Seneca's *On Anger*.[56] In this text, Seneca (*c*.4 B.C.- A.D. 65) outlined his view of the passions as follows:

> there's an initial involuntary movement – a preparation for a passion, as it were, and a kind of threatening signal; there's a second movement, accompanied by an expression of will not stubbornly resolved, to the effect "I should be avenged, since I've been harmed" or " this man should be punished, since he's committed a crime." The third movement's already out of control, it desires vengeance not if it's appropriate but come what may, having overthrown reason.[57]

The first and second movements are the most important for understanding Weemes's theory of emotion. The first movement, a pre-passion, is a kind of

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[53] King, 'Emotions in Medieval Thought', 181; Ian Drummond, 'John Duns Scotus on the Passions of the Will' in *Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy*, eds. Martin Pickavé and Lisa Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 67.
[54] Drummond, 'Passions', 66.
[55] Anfray, 'Scottish Scotism?', 107, 110; Muller, 'Christian Aristotelianism', 323.
[56] Weemes, *Portraiture*, 229.
[57] Lucius Annaeus Seneca, *On Anger*, trans. Robert A. Kaster, in Lucius Annaeus Seneca, *Anger, Mercy, Revenge*, trans. Robert A. Kaster and Martha C. Nussbaum (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 2.4.1.

shock or jolt, an involuntary reaction to how things appear to the subject.[58] Seneca argued that this involuntary response is *not* a passion.[59] Rather, a passion is an evaluative judgement to accept, rather than reject, an impression.[60] In Sorabji's view, this judgement is, for Seneca, twofold. First, there is a decision made as to whether there is a good or bad object in relation to the subject. Second, there is a determination formed as to the appropriate reaction the subject should have in relation to the good or bad object.[61] Seneca believed these judgements are the product of the mind and will: an act of mind judges whether there is a good or bad, present or future object, while a subsequent act of will deliberates how to respond.[62] The acts of mind and will, thus, engage in a syllogistic exercise to determine whether to assent, reject, or suspend judgement in relation to a formal object.[63] Given Weemes's familiarity with Seneca's *De Ira* and their apparently similar notion that the understanding and will make judgements which cause emotion, it is reasonable to conclude that Seneca's theory of the passions influenced the inclusion of the understanding and will in Weemes's analysis of emotion. Weemes's integration of Stoic philosophy in his theory of emotion was indicative of his humanist education under Andrew Melville (1545-1622) throughout his time at the University of St Andrews; an education which

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[58] Seneca, *On Anger*, 2.2.2; Richard Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind: from Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 66-68.
[59] Seneca, *On Anger*, 2.3.1.
[60] Knuuttila, *Ancient and Medieval*, 53, 47; Martha C. Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought: the Intelligence of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 22, 37; John Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 36; Sorabji, *Emotion*, 29, 35; Tad Brennan, *The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duties, and Fate* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 94; Margaret Graver, *Stoicism & Emotion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 38. I am favouring this interpretation, developed by Ledbetter, against Frede's reading that Stoics viewed the passions as mind non-evaluative propositions, as it makes the most sense of Weemes's use of Seneca, even if, for argument's sake, it is a departure from a classical reading of Stoicism. See Michael Frede, *Essays in ancient philosophy*, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987); Grace Ledbetter, 'The Propositional Content of Stoic Emotions' in *Hellenistic Philosophy*, ed. K. Boudouris (Athens: International Center for Greek Philosophy and Culture, 1994), 107-113.
[61] Sorabji, *Emotion*, 29, 42; Knuuttila, *Ancient and Medieval*, 51; Graver, *Stoicism & Emotion*, 43; Seneca, *On Anger*, 2.4.1.
[62] Sorabji, *Emotion*, 42; Seneca, *On Anger*, 2.4.1.
[63] Kaster, *Emotion*, 34; Graver, *Stoicism & Emotion*, 45.

emphasised the use of a variety of ancient pagan sources, in their original language, as opposed to engagement solely with Aristotelian literature.[64]

The salient feature of Weemes's theory of emotion, and of Scottish Protestants in general, was that they believed the understanding and will made judgements which caused a subject's passions. It meant Protestants in Scotland presupposed that radical emotional reflexivity involved self-examination of the cognitive faculties insofar as they related to the passions. Thus, naming the emotions in the form of a spiritual journey involved the identification of how the judgements of the understanding and will changed. Moreover, Scottish Protestants believed that God altered the judgements of their rational cognition and appetition to cause their supernatural emotions. The kinds of determinations God caused the intellectual faculties to make were used by Scottish Protestants to identify the type of 'supernatural' emotion they had experienced. Consequently, the identification of the understanding and will's judgements about a formal object were considered key indicators, by Scottish Protestants, for the categorisation of experience in relation to socially learned emotion types. In other words, Weemes's integration of the understanding and will into his theory of the passions expressed a significant assumption integral to the way Scots used language about emotion. It provided an important component of the logical structure of the Scottish Protestant identification of emotion in the form of a spiritual journey, caused by God, which consisted in experiences that could be categorised in accordance with supernatural emotion types. The impact of this assumption about emotion on Scottish Protestant radical emotional reflexivity will be analysed across chapters two, three, four, and five.[65]

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[64] Steven J. Reid, *Humanism and Calvinism: Andrew Melville and the Universities of Scotland, 1560-1625* (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2011), 271; Ernest R. Holloway III, *Andrew Melville and Humanism in Renaissance Scotland, 1545-1622* (Boston: Brill, 2011), 29-31; David Allan, '"For the Advancement of Religion and Learning": University and Society in Seventeenth-Century Scotland' in *Scottish Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century*, ed. Alexander Broadie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 13; Reid, 'Edge of Reason, 36-37; *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2010.

[65] Chapter Two, 60-72; Chapter Three, 89-120; Chapter Four, 123-149; Chapter Five, 199-200.

3. Emotions are Psychosomatic

Weemes argued that a passion is a 'motion of the sensitive appetite', a kind of psychosomatic change.[66] While this alteration in the faculties could only take place when an external agent's intentions were judged by the understanding and will, these processes were considered a precondition that had to be fulfilled for a passion to take place. They were not the passion itself. Rather, their effect, a motion of the sensitive appetite, was what Weemes defined as a passion. His identification of a passion's nature can be divided into two parts: 'the sensitive appetite' and 'motion of'. This final section analyses these two concepts, and how they relate in Weemes's definition of a passion, to show that in his theory emotion is constituted by a combination of psychological and physiological change.

The sensitive appetite was, in Weemes's view, the location of the passions because they involved bodily alteration. Weemes explained that the passions 'are placed in the sensitive part, and not in the reasonable' because passions 'imploy corporall organs'.[67] This characterisation of the sensitive appetite assumed the medieval psychological framework of the soul inherited from Aristotle. The sensitive sphere, which was common to all animals and thus was considered corporeal, and rational part of the soul, which is unique to humanity and as such immaterial, were both capable of two functions: cognition, the power to acquire knowledge, and appetition, the power to act.[68] These distinctions were combined by medieval theologians to categorise four fundamental parts of the human soul: the rational cognitive, which is the intellect or understanding, which is able to have knowledge of universals and abstract objects; the sensitive cognitive, which is the power of sensation, which through the particular understanding is able to have knowledge of concrete particulars; the rational appetitive, which is the will or intellectual appetite, the ability to choose or do; and the sensitive appetite, the faculty of

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[66] Weemes, *Portraiture*, 139.
[67] Weemes, *Portraiture*, 140.
[68] Peter King, 'Aquinas on the Passions' in *Aquinas's Moral Theory: essays in honor of Norman Kretzmann*, eds. Scott Macdonald & Eleonore Stump (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), 101; Peter King, 'Emotions' in *The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas*, ed. Brian Davies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 210-211.

emotion.[69] As the passions involved material change they could not belong to the rational dimension of the soul, which was considered immaterial. Hence, they must be a kind of change in the sensitive faculties. As they are not a form of knowledge, they cannot be a change in cognition. By logical implication, then, the passions must be the actualisation of the sensitive appetite. This categorisation of the passions as the product of the sensitive appetite was common among British Protestants. This was probably due to the influence of Aristotle and Aquinas, who similarly placed 'the affections in the sensitive appetite'.[70] So Weemes was typical in his identification of a passion as a change in the sensitive appetite.

A passion, Weems argued, is a kind of movement. He did not explain how a passion is a motion of the sensitive appetite. However, his idea assumed Aristotle's notion of change and Aquinas's theory of emotion, examination of which will elucidate Weemes's claim that a passion is a motion. Aristotle argued motion is a type of change.[71] It is a change of place, and it can happen in four ways. A thing can, by an agent, be pulled, pushed, carried, or rotated. All motion, Aristotle, claimed, is reducible to these four changes of place. Aquinas was the first to adapt this account of movement as an explanatory model for the passions. He defined the emotions as motions of the sensitive appetite in relation to their formal objects. The agent, Aquinas claimed, either inclines the appetite towards or away from itself, just as an agent can pull towards or push away an object.[72] His claim made sense in relation to the 'appetite', which for Aquinas was a compound of the Latin 'ad' (towards) and 'petere' (to aim that).[73] Thus, implicit in the concept of 'appetite' was the idea that it is a faculty which aims towards an object – it is

[69] Whether these parts of the soul were substantially distinct, as Aquinas believed, or only formally distinguished, as argued by Scotus, medieval scholastics and their early modern counterparts inherited and utilised these categories in their accounts of faculty psychology. Thomas Aquinas, *Summae*, I.78.1a; King 'Emotions in Medieval Thought', 174-175; James, *Passion and Action*, 53-54; Lombardo, *Desire*, 31; Miner, *Aquinas*,15; Barbara H. Rosenwein, *Generations*, 146.
[70] Sytsma, 'Logic', 477.
[71] Aristotle, *Physics*, VII.243a32-245a16.
[72] King, 'Emotions in Medieval Thought', 177-179; Knuuttila, *Ancient and Medieval*, 246; James, *Passion and Action*, 54; Miner, *Aquinas*, 16, 47.
[73] Miner, *Aquinas*, 16; Lombardo, *Desire*, 26.

attracted or repelled by its object.[74] Though it is debated whether Aquinas meant by these claims that there was an actual motion in the appetite, there is a consensus in the literature that Aquinas understood the formal dimension of a passion to consist in an alteration in the subject's proclivity in relation to the agent of change.[75] Thus, when Weemes defined a passion as a motion, he was borrowing a thoroughly Thomistic account of emotion.

Though Weemes acknowledged that other taxonomical schemes existed, he argued that there are eleven fundamental types of movement the sensitive appetite can make in response to a formal object, and the identification of these eleven passions constitutes a taxonomy of emotion.[76] These movements are directed by the judgements of the understanding and will in relation to whether the formal object is good or bad in relation to the subject. He argued that there are six in the 'concupiscible appetite' and five in the 'irascible faculties'. The first and most foundational of the concupiscible (first order) emotions is love, which is an inclination for good 'considered absolutely'. This is mirrored by hatred, which is a consideration of evil absolutely. If a good which is loved is to be obtained and moved towards, then it is desired. If an evil which is to be shunned is imminent, then it is an 'abomination', something to pull away from. If the good that is desired is acquired, the appetite comes to rest in its formal object, which is joy. If an evil formal object is present, then it causes the appetite to rest in sadness.

The irascible passions, which are second order, are five in number. If there is a formal object apprehended as good which it is possible but difficult to obtain, it moves the appetite to hope. If a good object can be easily obtained while the subject is in a present state of evil, it evokes audacity, a motion to overcome the evil the individual endures. If it is impossible to obtain

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[74] Summa II-I.22.2a; James, *Passion and Action*, 55; Knuuttila, *Ancient and Medieval*, 241; Lombardo, *Desire*, 38; Miner, *Aquinas*, 16, 47.

[75] For the view that Aquinas is discussing local motion, see Eric D'arcy, 'Introduction' in *Summa theologiae. Volume 19, The emotions (1a2ae. 22-30)*, ed. Eric D'arcy (London: Blackfriars in conjunction with Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1967), xxvii–xxviii; Knuuttila, *Ancient and Medieval*, 247-251. For the position that Aquinas is advocating merely an alteration of the appetites, see Miner, *Aquinas*, 39-40; Aristotle, *Physics*, III.201a27.

[76] Weemes, *Portraiture*, 142-144. Weemes's discussion of another scheme takes place in Chapter Two, 51.

a good, this moves the soul to desperation. Alternatively, if evil be imminent it evokes fear. Finally, if the evil be present and cannot be avoided, it evokes anger. These distinctions, which Weemes used to delineate the basic kinds of motion the sensitive appetite can make, are identical to those in Aquinas's taxonomy of the passions, a clear demonstration of Thomistic influence on Weemes's thought.[77]

The formal movement of the appetite, Weemes argued, manifested itself in bodily change. This does not mean that the motion of the sensitive appetite caused physiological alteration. In the early modern worldview, the material plane could embody the psychic. The physical had an 'ontic-logical' relationship with the mind, so that bodily and corporeal processes are not merely caused by the psychological: they are the material manifestation of the psychological, and vice versa.[78] What is important is that the formal and material dimensions were considered two dimensions of the same reality; just as a change is simultaneously both an action and a passion, the terms are distinguished only in relation to the object they refer to in the process of a change. Thus, the formal dimension of a passion relates to the directionality of the appetite in relation to the passion's formal object; the material dimension is its embodied expression. This idea had a significant influence upon how Scottish Protestants identified the presence of an emotion, explored in chapter five.[79]

Weemes explained that passions are changes to 'the spirits in the body' which are located in the blood.[80] He argued that the abundance of blood in particular organs or the withdrawal of blood to the heart, and thus the movement of the spirits, is the 'occasion' for passions to be 'stirred up'.[81] He gave examples: fear is the withdrawal of blood to the heart; the abundance of blood in the liver stirs up the passion of love, melancholy in the spleen, and anger in the gall.[82] Thus, the formal motion of the appetite had a

[77] Knuuttila, *Ancient and Medieval*, 243-246.
[78] Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 188-189.
[79] Chapter Five, 170-175.
[80] Weemes, *Portraiture*, 141.
[81] Weemes, *Portraiture*, 21.
[82] Weemes, *Portraiture*, 21.

parallel bodily manifestation: just as fear is a formal motion away from an object, so the blood recoils towards a person's centre. By contrast, love and joy is the blood rushing through the body, just as they are, formally, an inclination towards an object. Weemes's views would have been influenced, directly or indirectly, by two prominent medical practitioners in seventeenth century Scotland: Peter Lowe (*c*.1550-1610), surgeon to Henri IV of France and founder of the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Glasgow; and John Makluire (*fl*.1630), who petitioned Charles I to establish medical education in Edinburgh.[83] Both Lowe and Makluire, like Weemes, identified the passions as the expansion and contraction of blood within the body, and by this passions were the moving of the vital spirits, and thus heat, in the body. Joy or mirth was the 'dilation of the heart', the blood and spirits 'sweetely spread' around the body, in order to 'imbrace its object'. Sadness was the opposite, as the blood would 'shoote up or draw together the heart', the natural heat drawn towards 'the center of the body'.[84] The similarity of Weemes's view with Lowe's and Makluire's physiological account of the passions suggest their influence, or at least the dominance of the Galenic theory of the body they articulated in early modern Scotland, on Weemes's definition of the passions.[85]

It was the dispersion or retraction of blood that was considered, by theorists of the human body, the cause of those feelings associated with a passion. This idea can be seen clearly in early modern views of orgasm.[86] In Aristotelian, Hippocratic, and Galenic accounts of reproduction, which dominated early modern physiological theory, orgasm was the product of

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[83] *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 13/05/2020; James F. McHarg, *In Search of Dr John MakLuire: Pioneer Edinburgh Physician, Forgotten for over Three Hundred Years* (Glasgow: Wellcome Unit for the History of Glasgow, University of Glasgow, 1997).

[84] Peter Lowe, *The Whole Course of Chirurgerie* (London, 1597), II.6; John Makluire, *The Buckler of Bodilie Health* (Edinburgh, 1630), 59-62.

[85] Noga Arikha, *Passions and Tempers: A History of the Humours* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2008), 179-191; Daniejela Kamabskovic, 'Humoral Theory' in *Early Modern Emotions: An Introduction*, ed. Susan Broomhall (New York: Routledge, 2016), 39-41.

[86] The feeling of orgasm has been selected because, like forthcoming cases of how bodily change was thought to manifest motions of the sensitive appetite, the physiological nature of sexual ecstasy was an important presupposition in the practice of radical emotional reflexivity as used by Scottish Protestants in the early modern era.

excessive heat. In copulation, the emission of semen was only possible if there was a build-up of heat in the body, produced through friction of the genitals. As heat was stored in the vital spirits contained in the blood, a build-up of heat was a dilation of the blood throughout the body. When an excessive amount of heat had been generated, to rebalance the body's temperature, heat would be transformed into (male or female) semen and expelled from the body.[87] This increase in the body's warmth, caused by the dilation of the blood, was identified as the feeling of pleasure. Thus, the rapturous feelings experienced in orgasm were the subjective experience of this intense heat.[88] The intriguing parallel of the formal and material dimensions, then, had an impact on the kind of feeling the subject experienced. If the appetite moved towards the formal object, the blood expanded, which raised the temperature of the body. If the appetite recoiled from its formal object, the blood contracted, which made the body cooler. Thus, the modulation of the body's temperature caused the subjective dimension of the sensitive appetite's motion. Through it, the subject could 'feel' their inclination, materially manifest in their blood, move towards or away from a formal object. Consequently, the physiological dimension was considered integral to the psychological experience of a passion.

The withdrawal or communication of heat, and by extension of the blood, was assumed by early moderns to cause the expression of emotion in visible bodily behaviours. For example, the passions of sorrow or fear, associated with the cooling of the body, were often believed to manifest in the release of tears. While there was no uniform physiological theory of crying, Manfred Horstmanshoff and Bernard Capp have shown how some physicians believed that, when the appetites are moved to sorrow and fear, the vital spirits or pneuma are sent in vaporous form to the brain. In the head

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[87] While Hippocrates and Galen thought that both the male and female emit semen in orgasm, for Aristotle only the male can do this. However, in the early modern period the views of Hippocrates and Galen were favoured against Aristotle's on this matter. See Elizabeth D. Harvey, 'Anatomies of Rapture: Clitoral Politics/Medical Blazons' in *Signs*, 27, no.2 (2002), 323.

[88] Thomas Laqueur, 'Orgasm, Generation, and the Politics of Reproductive Biology' in *Representations*, 14, no.1 (1986), 5-10.

these spirits are compressed, changed, and cooled into a serum - a tear - which was excreted to relieve the physical tension.[89] Alternatively, an increase in bodily temperature was thought to cause the subject to groan, an expulsion of excess heat to maintain the body's health while simultaneously the breathing in of air, like bellows, sustains the higher and more pleasurable warmth.[90] Thus, a passion's physiological dimension, the retraction or dilation of blood, was understood as the cause of bodily effects which were the unique consequence of an emotion's material manifestation, and by extension its parallel formal dimension.

The physiological makeup of a person was thought, in the Galenic physiological paradigm, to determine the predisposition of a subject to experience certain kinds of passion more frequently. Humoural theory was the dominant explanation of emotional predisposition in early modern Scotland. For brevity and clarity, Makluire's *Buckler of Bodilie Health* (1630) – written for a lay audience – provides the framework here. Makluire defined a physiological 'complexion' as the proportion in which four substances called 'humours', which were located in the blood, related to each other.[91] The complexion can be temperate, when the humours are perfectly balanced in their relationships to one another, or intemperate, when one humour excessively dominates the rest.[92] Crucially, the preponderance of a humour alters the predisposition a subject has towards a passion, so that they are more or less likely to have an emotion in relation to a formal object. Makluire outlined how humours influenced the emotions in his discussion of the four

[89] H.F.J. Horstmanshoff, 'Tears in Ancient and Early Modern Physiology: Petrus Petitus and Niels Stenson' in *Conjunctions of Mind, Soul and Body from Plato to the Enlightenment*, ed. Daniejela Kamabskovic (Dordrecht: Springer, 2015), 312; Bernard Capp, '"Jesus Wept" but did the Englishman? Masculinity and Emotion in Early Modern England' in *Past & Present* 224, no.1 (2014), 76-77.
[90] John Craig, 'Psalms, groans and dogwhippers: the soundscape of worship in the English parish church, 1547-1642' in *Sacred Space in Early Modern Europe*, eds. Will Coster and Andrew Spicer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 109-110; Richard Sugg, 'Flame into Being: Spirits, Soul, and the Physiology of Early Modern Devotion' in *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies*, 46, no.1 (2016): 141-165; George Wither, *A Collection of Emblemes, Ancient and Modern* (London, 1635), 91.
[91] Makluire, *Buckler*, 75.
[92] Makluire, *Buckler*, 75.

basic temperaments, which correspond to the dominance of a humour in the blood.

'Sanguineans' are 'filled with blood'.[93] Created from the element air, blood, in this context not the same as that which carries the four humours, is hot and wet. Produced in the liver, *haima* can produce a healthy body 'mixed of red and white', an optimistic, merry, peaceable, honest, and romantic character. Thus, the sanguineans's exuberant and joyful natures are a direct consequence of their higher bodily temperature. However, when blood is generated in excessive amounts, it has a detrimental effect on the body and soul. Fleshy and ruddy, the sanguinean is a 'simple spirit' given to delighting in superficial things.[94] To cure this, Makluire recommended that sanguineans should eat cold and dry things, to offset their excessively hot and wet constitutions.

'Cholericks' have a predominance of yellow bile within their bodies. Created in the spleen, the hot and dry nature of this bile corresponded to and was formed from the element of fire. Makluire argued that, as a result of its hot and dry quality, people with this temperament tend to be hasty 'in all their actions', impatient, quick to anger, rash, and unable to endure hardship.[95] The intensity of their bodily heat is directly related to their propensity for anger, as this passion is a boiling of the blood. To counteract their hot and dry natures, the cholerick should seek cold and wet climates and eat fresh meat and fruit.[96]

'Melancholicks' have a dominance of black bile within their blood. Stored in the spleen and created in the gallbladder, black bile was considered cold and dry, like the earth. Those with this temperament were most fit for leadership, because they were diligent, quiet, introspective, content in isolation, fearful of danger, constant in their opinions, slow to anger, faithful spouses, and courageous in all things.[97] However, they tend to

[93] Makluire, *Buckler*, 76.
[94] Makluire, *Buckler*, 77.
[95] Makluire, *Buckler*, 78.
[96] Makluire, *Buckler*, 78-79.
[97] Makluire, *Buckler*, 80-81.

be sad, and when they have an excess of black bile in their blood can experience suicidal dread and despair; the condition of *melancolia*.[98] The cooler temperature of the body made them naturally sorrowful. Makluire suggested that melancholics ought to seek hot and wet foods to balance their cold and dry dispositions.

Finally, 'Flegmaticks' have a body predominated by phlegm. This cold and wet substance, associated with water, is mainly in the lungs. Makluire described those with this disposition as 'lumpish', stupid people who are cowards, sluggish, those who tend towards a pale and sickly constitution.[99] As heat was that which supplied motion to the body, it was the logical implication that those with a cooler physiology would be more slothful. Makluire recommended that the phlegmatic needs hot and dry temperatures and foods to moderate their cold and wet bodies.

Temperament was not static. Makluire argued that the age of the subject, their environment, and their sex could impact the balance of their humours.[100] Sanguineans were associated with spring and childhood, cholerics with summer and adolescence, melancholics with autumn and maturity, phlegmatics with winter and old age. Thus, temperament changed over time, and required different techniques to remain balanced throughout life. Biological sex was also thought to have an impact. For Aristotle, whose analysis of gender differences was embedded in early modern thought, the 'female is a deformed male', colder and thus weaker than their masculine counterparts.[101] This view, that women were colder than men, was shared across the ancient, medieval, and early modern western world.[102] As they are colder, women cannot emit the active principle in copulation, as motion relies upon an excess of heat.[103] Thus, the male, due to his hotter nature, is the

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[98] Erin Sullivan, *Beyond Melancholy: sadness and selfhood in Renaissance England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 87-110; Arikha, *Passions*, 113-120.
[99] Makluire, *Buckler*, 82.
[100] Makluire, *Buckler*, 83.
[101] Aristotle, *Generation of Animals*, trans. A. L. Peck (London, 1943), 737a.
[102] Thomas Laquer, 'Orgasm', 5; Margaret R. Sommerville, *Sex and Subjection: Attitudes to Women in Early-Modern Society* (London: Arnold, 1995), 10; Mullan, *Scottish Puritanism*, 142-143.
[103] Aristotle, *Generation*, 741a.

active partner who contributes form, while the female, the cooler participant, is the passive partner who provides the matter which needs to be acted upon.[104] Put another way, as heat is the key to agency, women are by default passive creatures given their cooler bodies. Their physiology meant, among other things, that women were deemed less able to control their emotions, and thus were more prone to inappropriate public displays of emotion (like crying).[105] This was because women were considered more susceptible to the effects of an external agent in moving their appetites, which was due to their cooler natures making them passive, and so more easily acted upon than their male counterparts.[106] Consequently, there were a variety of factors which early moderns believed could alter the physiology of an individual, and as such their predisposition to have emotions.

The importance of this section is that Weemes's theory of emotion, and by extension the nature of emotion assumed by early modern Scottish Protestants, conceived of passions as psychosomatic. Emotion was a motion of the sensitive appetite manifested in formal and material change. It produced a psychological feeling which was the subjective experience of the appetite's movement towards or away from its object as translated into the dilation or contraction of the body's blood, and thus modulation of the subject's temperature. The psychosomatic conception of emotion, as articulated by Weemes, was integral to the judgements made by Scottish Protestants engaged in radical emotional reflexivity. It meant that when they attempted to categorise their experiences, they examined the felt and physiological changes they had undergone to determine what kind emotion they had experienced. In other words, when Scottish Protestants concluded that they had experienced a God-caused supernatural emotion, they did so because the experience had psychosomatic qualities which corresponded to a concept of supernatural emotion they had been taught. Thus, the Scottish Protestant conception of an emotion as a motion of the sensitive appetite

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[104] Aristotle, *Generation*, 729a-730b.
[105] Yeoman, 'Heart-work', 196.
[106] Aristotle, *Generation*, 729a-730b.

was crucial for the language and concepts they used about their emotions. This psychosomatic conception of emotion provided the fundamental logic which characterised the nature of all emotion, and as such delineated the characteristics by which all experiences could be identified. This idea will be important in chapter five.[107]

To sum up the argument so far, this chapter has analysed the theory of emotion Scottish Protestants assumed in their identification and mobilisation of their emotions. It used Weemes's definition of a passion as representative of the modified Thomist account of emotion, which was dominant in the early modern anglosphere and, as will be seen later in the thesis, assumed in Scottish Protestant judgements about their emotions. Three features of emotion were identified as significant for the emotional logic which informed the presuppositions Protestants in Scotland used to evaluate their emotions. First, that an emotion is caused by an external agent who acts upon a passive subject. Second, that emotions require the judgements of the understanding and will. Third, that psychological and physiological change are the integral features of an emotion. It was suggested throughout the chapter that these aspects of emotion provided the framework which made coherent Scottish Protestant claims that their emotions took the form of a spiritual journey, caused by God, in which they experienced supernatural emotions. That is, the presupposed nature of emotion was important in the ways Scots used language about their emotions. To reinforce the fundamentality of the theory of emotion for the practice of radical emotional reflexivity, in future chapters the influence of the three features that Weemes ascribed to a passion will be noted.

As was argued above Weemes, like Aquinas, believed that the apprehension of a formal object was not enough to cause a passion. Its intention had to be evaluated by the understanding and will for the

[107] Chapter Five, 170-175; 180-182.

actualisation of the sensitive appetite. In a similar way, categorisation of an emotion is not enough to mobilise a desired experience. The significance of the identification must be evaluated. This can only be done in relation to a goal, with the emotion's value determined by its approximation to the ideal. The relative success or failure of the emotion is then a spur for an appropriate emotional response for the attainment of the goal. Thus, Scottish Protestant attempts to mobilise their emotions through the identification of their emotions, a process analysed in chapter five, would not be possible if they did not have a goal(s) by which they could judge the significance of their emotions.[108] Therefore, an examination of what Protestants in Scotland understood as the emotional standard they were to aspire too is examined in the next chapter.

[108] Chapter Five, 189-203.

Chapter Two: The Enjoyment of God is the Meaning of Life

'Religion was instituted by God to serve as a pathway to guide us to our chief felicity'.[1] In this remark, the influential Presbyterian minister Robert Bruce of Kinnaird (1554-1631) conveyed to his congregation that the purpose of Scottish Protestantism was the pursuit of human happiness.[2] The rationale behind the doctrine, worship, and discipline of the Kirk was, in Bruce's view, put in place by God in Scotland to facilitate the spiritual fulfilment of the nation's inhabitants. This religious tradition was able to do this because it was the means God had appointed for souls to have communion with God, and thus, the instrument by which they could have everlasting and infinite joy. As it was believed the acquisition of eternal and abundant happiness was the goal of human nature, given that this was considered 'our chief felicity', it followed that the acquisition of fellowship with God was identified by ministers, such as Bruce, as the objective of life, which could only be gained through adherence to the theology and piety of Scottish Protestantism. Defined as the goal which all people should strive for, the pursuit of happiness became an important standard by which individuals were expected to evaluate, among other things, their emotions. The emotions that were identified through the practice of radical emotional reflexivity received their significance in relation to their advancement or obstruction of communion with God. Through recognition of an emotion's relationship to the pursuit of happiness, its 'meaning' could, thus, be identified by the subject. This, in turn, could evoke an appropriate emotional response or course of action to further the quest for fellowship with God. Consequently, 'happiness', defined as communion with God, was a central concept in Scottish Protestant radical emotional reflexivity. Happiness was the standard used to identify an experience's significance and, through this process, mobilise right emotion.

Therefore, this chapter analyses the concept of 'happiness' that was assumed by Scottish Protestants in their practice of radical emotional

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[1] Bruce, *Lord's Supper*, 194; *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020.
[2] Mullan, *Scottish Puritanism*, 17-18.

reflexivity. It argues that they presupposed that happiness consisted in communion with God, which could only be acquired through the possession of faith and love, which was impossible to attain by mere human volition. A four-stage structure has been adopted to defend this hypothesis. The first section argues that Scottish Protestants believed that human nature was predisposed to seek happiness, an everlasting and infinite joy. The second, that they identified communion with God as that which fulfils the human desire for happiness. The third part engages with the Scottish Protestant claims that fellowship with God can only be possessed through faith in and love of God. The final segment analyses the Scottish Protestant consideration of humanity's natural predisposition in relation to this goal. It is claimed that intrinsic to the language Scottish Protestants used about their emotions was the notion that all humans are totally depraved, and as such they cannot, by their own power, have communion with God. Hence, this chapter examines the ideal by which Scottish Protestants judged the significance of their emotions, and their presuppositions about how they related to this goal prior to their God-caused spiritual journeys (which will be analysed in chapter three).[3] In this way, it outlines key aspects of the linguistic-conceptual framework from which the source material could be born.

The focus of the chapter, then, is on the assumptions which informed the language Scottish Protestants used about their emotions in public worship and private piety. Consequently, the source material which is examined consists of articulations of these fundamental presuppositions. Thus, sermons and theological treatises are a primary form of evidence, as happiness was an important theme in the spoken and written teaching of ministers. To ensure that the treatment of the topic under review is representative of Scottish Protestant beliefs, relevant works produced by an ecclesiologically and geographically diverse range of ministers is examined. So that it is clear the interpretations of happiness the clergy articulated were

[3] Chapter Three, 89-120.

resonant with how the concept was used more widely by Scots, or at least those who were more zealous in their adherence to the faith, the chapter will also interact with Scottish Protestant religious poetry. Scottish Protestants, across the ecclesiological and political divide regularly used poetry as a form of prayer to God, as a mode of meditation on Christian doctrine, and as a means to mobilise in their reader desired emotions through the identification of the narrator's emotions.[4] Yet as a work of literature, poems could present idealised and fictionalised renditions of radical emotional reflexivity to impress upon the reader values prioritised by the author. Poetry, thus, could be a form of embellished radical emotional reflexivity that expressed the assumptions authors and readers shared when they used language about their emotions. Hence an analysis of poetical assertions can indicate that the teachings of ministers in the pulpit corresponded to the linguistic-conceptual framework Scottish Protestants used when they engaged in radical emotional reflexivity.

1. Happiness is the Fulfilment of Human Nature

> I have a heart for love, and love
> I cannot choose but have,
> A love that can give full content,
> The least is I can crave.[5]

In the opening stanza of *True Christian Love*, Presbyterian minister David Dickson (*c*.1583-1662), expressed the idea that human nature is compelled to love.[6] This predisposition is not volitional: one cannot but help have it. Moreover, the scope of this love is vast. It craves to be fully contented. Thus, in this short extract, Dickson articulated the view that humanity, because of its nature, has an innate desire for complete satisfaction, a motivation which drives all human activity as an end in itself. His characterisation of the human condition was similarly articulated by other Scottish Protestants. The

[4] Introduction, 5; Chapter Five, 189-203.
[5] David Dickson, *True Christian Love* (Glasgow, 1634), Stanza 1.
[6] *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020.

aforementioned Robert Bruce claimed that humans 'thirst' for deep 'satisfaction and contentment'.[7] The Scottish poet William Drummond of Hawthornden (1585-1649) lamented that he had an instinctive 'Desire' which he could not satisfy with temporal pleasure, and was determined to find that which 'canst grant what I doe craue'.[8] In a reworked version of Psalm 42, the Presbyterian poet Elizabeth Melville (*fl*.1599-1631) characterised herself as one who has a love which made her yearn for its fulfilment.[9]

> As hairts full fant
> Doth braith and pant
> For rinning rivers cleir…
> …My hairt doth brist
> my saull doth thrist
> for thee the well of lyfe.[10]

The idea that humans have an innate propensity to love was intrinsic to the taxonomy of the passions assumed by Scottish Protestants, outlined in chapter one.[11] Love, it was argued, was considered an inclination of the appetite towards an object the understanding and will had judged as good for the subject. John Weemes recognised that one could reduce all the passions as subtypes of 'love and desire', which some 'moralists' did, because love is the orientation one has to an object identified as absolutely good, and desire is the means of union with that object. All other passions are derivative. For example, hatred is a repulsion against an object apprehended as evil, the judgement that it is evil determined by what the subject assumes is its absolute good. Put another way, the subject hates what is opposed to that which it loves. Consequently, love of that which is judged as absolutely good for human nature is the fundamental orientation of the sensitive appetite, and, thus, of the human condition.[12] Such logic led Bruce to declare that

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[7] Bruce*, Lord's Supper*, 195-196.
[8] William Drummond, *Flowers of Sion* (Edinburgh, 1623), 4; *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020.
[9] *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020.
[10] Elizabeth Melville, Lady Culross, *Poems of Elizabeth Melville, Lady Culross*, ed. Jamie Reid Baxter (Edinburgh: Solsequium, 2010), 8.
[11] Chapter One, 38-39.
[12] Weemes, *Portraiture*, 143-144.

'there is nothing more profitable, more agreeable, and congruous to nature, than to love'.[13]

The absolute good of human nature, to which love is directed, was identified by Scottish Protestants as the 'supreme good' or '*summum bonum*'. This is that which Edinburgh minister William Struther (*c*.1578-1633) argued is the 'last end', that which is worth loving as an end in itself.[14] While humans may love other things, these are only to be loved instrumentally, insofar as they facilitate possession of that which is worth loving in its own right. An example of instrumental love is money: typically, money is not loved as an end in itself, but is only adored insofar as it is an instrument for the purchase of some other good. The purchased good may itself be only a means to what is considered an absolute good, through its facilitation of some benefit which is the true motivation for loving money, such as the experience of pleasure. Thus love is only evoked by that which is considered an absolute good, and love is extended to other objects insofar as they direct the subject towards the determined end. Bruce put the point as follows: whatever one sets up 'on the throne of your heart… you bestow the devotion of your whole heart and mind and soul and body'.[15] Desire for what is perceived to be the supreme good, set on the throne of the heart, was interpreted as the impulse which motivates all human thought, emotion, and action. It is this kind of love, the unconditional desire for the supreme good, which Dickson lyrically expressed when he claimed he had an innate love which made him yearn for satisfaction.

Scottish Protestants were taught to believe that no created thing could satisfy the absolute love of the soul for the supreme good. Put another way, no finite or temporal being should be the object of unconditional desire, as its possession cannot leave the subject contented; it cannot be the supreme good of human nature. Robert Bruce articulated this idea when he argued that 'our affection is so insatiable that no finite being will ever satisfy it', and

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[13] Bruce, *Lord's Supper*, 197.
[14] William Struther, *True Happiness, or, King Davids Choice* (Edinburgh, 1633), 2; *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020.
[15] Bruce, *Lord's Supper*, 162.

David Dickson likewise contrasted the chief good with creatures that 'doe lacke and cannot have, because they finit be.'[16] Because of their finite nature, creatures not only are incapable of sating the infinite desire intrinsic to human existence; they actually fuel its hunger for the real supreme good.[17] Principal of the University of Edinburgh John Adamson (1576-1651?) made this point in relation to thirst: the more one with dropsie drinks water, the more thirsty they become so that, far from quenching their thirst, drinking water increases their desire for water.[18] The constant drive for more of a finite thing is indicative of the perceived futility of finite things as a source of happiness, as the appetite cannot rest in them. Rather, it is kept in motion, inclined towards something which is unqualified and thus provides a permanent place of rest. Temporality has a similar effect: even if a substance is infinite its being in time means it is subject to change, and thus cannot be a stable source of joy. Bruce expressed this idea when he taught that there is no 'permanent contentment with [a] thing that is transitory'.[19] Similarly, Bruce's friend Elizabeth Melville articulated this thought in her poem *A Call to Come to Christ*:

> Should pleasures false posesse thy heart
> Since thou and they with *pain must part*
> Then think upon these pleasures pure
> That shall *for ever more endure*.[20]

Likewise, William Drummond inquired of his audience why they leaned upon 'guilted Glories which decay?', and lamented 'the strange Endes we toyle for heere below', 'A Pleasure passing' and an 'Honour that more fickle than the winde'.[21] Melville's and Drummond's points, echoing verses in Ecclesiastes and the Gospels, was that it is futile to love what is temporal as an end in itself because such an object is subject to change and thus can provide a

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[16] Bruce*, Lord's Supper*, 197; Dickson, *True Christian Love*, Stanza 5.
[17] Struther, *Happiness*, 9.
[18] John Adamson, *The Travellers Joy* (London, 1623), 15; *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020.
[19] Bruce*, Lord's Supper*, 197.
[20] Melville, *Poems*, 36. Italics added for emphasis.
[21] Drummond, *Flowers*, 20, 2.

place of rest for a limited amount of time.[22] Consequently, possession of anything finite and temporal cannot be the supreme good of the soul, so Scottish Protestants thought; because a creature's finite nature was believed to entail that they could not exhaust the inexhaustible desire of the appetite's unconditional love for what the subject believed was an end in itself.

By implication, Scottish Protestants were educated to think that an object must be infinite and eternal if it is to satisfy the unconditional love and desire of the human heart. Minister Ninian Campbell (*fl*.1630) expressed this idea in a sermon when he argued that the supreme good alone could fulfil 'our illimited desires, and infinite appetites'.[23] He explained that not even 'ten thousand worlds' could satisfy human nature's innate love for the supreme good because the object of desire would only be finite. Campbell's idea was rooted in the ancient and early modern cosmological, physiological, and theological principle that 'like attracts like'.[24] Because the appetite has an unconditional love for what is judged by the will to be its absolute good, that which it seeks to rest in permanently must be without qualification if it is to satisfy the illimited desire of the soul. Consequently, only an eternal and infinite being, a reality which exists without any conditionality in its nature (the mark of finitude) can be the real supreme good of human nature.

John Adamson provided another reason for why the supreme good must be 'eternall and heavenly'.[25] He argued, that 'nothing can rest but in the owne place whence it hath its beginning, and on things suitable to its nature'.[26] In support of this claim, he claimed that stones and metals fall towards 'their originall earth again', whereas fire continues to rise towards 'its natural place', both elements tending towards their natural place of rest: a location, their place of origin, which consists in what these substances are made from. By implication, the human appetite can only rest in something like itself, its cause. As humanity was created by God and is made in the

[22] Ecclesiastes 3:1-8; Matthew 6:19.
[23] Ninian Campbell, *A Treatise Upon Death* (Glasgow, 1635), D7r.
[24] Van Engen, *Sympathetic Puritans*, 27-55.
[25] Adamson, *Travellers Joy* (London, 1623), 15.
[26] Adamson, *Travellers Joy*, 15-16.

image of God, the appetite can only find rest in ‘things above’. Implicit in Adamson’s argument was the Aristotelian notion that every natural motion a substance undertakes, that which is unimpeded by an obstacle or external agent, is towards its origin and, thus, place of rest.[27] As such, given that the infinite and eternal reality which is called God created humanity, so humanity can only find its rest in the everlasting and illimited object: God.

Scottish Protestants assumed that when the love of the sensitive appetite rests in the supreme good, the subject is in a state of ‘happiness’. Happiness was not, in the early modern Protestant view, just a feeling. Rather, it consisted in the ‘perfection’ of the subject’s nature.[28] This idea was rooted in the *eudaimonistic* or *teleological* view of humanity that Scottish and other Reformed Protestants embraced.[29] ‘Eudaimonia’, a term which originated in ancient Greek philosophy, is often translated as ‘happiness’ or ‘the happy life’, though in Nicholas Wolterstorff’s view it would be more appropriate, in relation to Greek thought, to translate it as ‘the estimable life’.[30] The notion that life could be ‘estimable’ implied that it had a purpose and that happiness was the attainment of this goal. For Aristotle, every substance has such a function, or *telos*, which when fulfilled is the perfection of that substance. The function of a substance, then is such an end for ‘which everything else is done’, as ‘we always choose it for itself and never for any other reason’.[31] In other words, it is the supreme good of the soul, the absolute end for which it exists. Aristotle argued that, for humans, the possession of virtue fulfils the purpose of human life; and thus is the state of

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[27] Helen S. Lang, ‘Why Fire Goes up: An Elementary Problem in Aristotle’s “Physics”’ in *The Review of Metaphysics*, 38, no.1 (1984), 80.
[28] Drummond, *Flowers*, 66.
[29] Nathaniel Warne, ‘Emotions and the Development of Virtue in Puritan Thought: An Investigation of Puritan Friendship’ in *Puritanism and Emotion in the Early Modern World*, eds. Alec Ryrie and Tom Schwanda (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 195.
[30] Nicholas Wolterstorff, ‘Happiness in Augustine’s Confessions1' in *Augustine’s Confessions: Philosophy in Autobiography*, ed. William E. Mann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 47.
[31] Aristotle, *The Ethics of Aristotle*, trans. J. A. K. Thomson (London: Penguin Books, 1976), I.1097a15-b21.

happiness which is what makes a person good and perform their function.[32] Happiness, then, was primarily an objective state of being which consists in the possession of virtue.

For the views of early modern Scottish Protestants, Augustine (354-430) had importantly argued that virtue was not an end in itself, but the means by which one could have possession of the supreme good: communion with God. Augustine redefined the Platonic, Aristotelian, and later Stoic, conceptions of virtue to situate them within a Christian theological framework. While he affirmed with his pagan counterparts that virtue was an important aspect of happiness, he challenged their view of what a virtue is and its exact relationship with the soul's perfection. He argued that true virtue is a love for God, and that its value came through its facilitation of communion with God, which is the supreme good of the soul.[33] Augustine characterised the happiness which came through communion with God in two Latin words: *beatitudo* and *felictas*.[34] First, *beatitudo* or 'blessedness', is the perfected state of the soul in communion with God. This is the objective rest of the soul in the object of its love: God. The soul at rest no longer needs to move, and thus is in a state of perfection: it has reached the end of its journey, having returned to its origin. This was the idea Augustine articulated powerfully at the beginning of the *Confessions*:

> The thought of you [God] stirs him [humanity] so deeply that he cannot be content unless he praises you, because you made us for yourself and our hearts find no peace until they rest in you.[35]

The second term, *felicitas* or 'felicity', is the episodic attainment of the good, and as such the experience of joy. This is a phenomenological state which Augustine frequently identified with 'true happiness'.[36] Augustine's idea of

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[32] Aristotle *Ethics*, I.1098a8-27; Christian Tornau, 'Happiness in this Life?: Augustine on the Principle that Virtue is Self-sufficient for Happiness' in *The Quest for the Good Life: Ancient Philosophers on Happiness*, eds. Øyvind Rabbås, Eyjólfur K. Emilsson, Hallvard Fossheim, and Miira Tuominen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 272.
[33] Tornau, 'Happiness', 272-273.
[34] James Henry Thomforde, 'Defending Happiness: Jonathan Edwards's enduring pursuit of a reformed teleology of happiness' (PhD, The University of Edinburgh, 2018), 29-30.
[35] Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (London: Penguin Books, 1961), I:1.
[36] Wolterstorff, 'Happiness', 52-53.

happiness, then, corresponded to the Scottish Protestant conception of joy, analysed in chapter one, as a resting of the appetite in an object of its love, which produces pleasurable feelings.[37] It was both an objective state of being and a subjective experience of that ontological situation. Thus, when Scottish Protestants identified communion with the infinite and eternal as happiness, given it was that which would satisfy their desires, they articulated an Augustinian interpretation of happiness. Augustine's influence on their ideas about human teleology was so important that some Scottish theologians directly cited him as the source of their thought on the matter.[38]

The important point to be drawn out of the analysis here is that Scottish Protestants assumed that they had a deep-rooted desire for happiness. They believed that all people had an infinite and eternal love which could only be satisfied by possession of their supreme good. They believed the *summum bonum* was that in which their appetite could rest, accompanied by a subjective experience of elation. Influenced by Augustinian eudaimonism, they held that such a condition was the state of 'happiness'. Thus, Scottish Protestants were taught that happiness was the goal of *their* life, and this presupposition was supposed to be integral to their practice of radical emotional reflexivity.

What Protestants in Scotland identified as the supreme good was just as fundamental as their belief that there is a *summum bonum*, as it was the thing which they assumed would bring them into a state of rest and enjoyment. This is the subject of the next section.

2. Communion with God is Happiness

Scottish Protestants were taught and believed that the chief good of human nature is communion with God. This was because, in their view, God's infinite and eternal nature can alone bring the appetite to rest and thus joy.[39] John Adamson explained that 'we hath good reason to rest on him

[37] Chapter One, 38-39.
[38] Struther, *Happiness*, A3*v*; Campbell, *Treatise*, D3*v*; Mullan, *Scottish Puritanism*, 51-52.
[39] Chapter One, 38-39.

(Christ)' considering God's properties: Christ has within himself 'all perfection and beauty', 'all sufficiency both for himself and for us', in him are 'hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge'.[40] Because of God's infinite nature, William Struther claimed that possession of God is sufficient for 'all persons, of whatsoever sex, qualitie, or condition', communion with the Almighty supplies the 'necessities both of the soul and bodie'.[41] Moreover, as God was thought to be eternal, without beginning or end, his attributes exist forever.[42] Thus, the welsh puritan bishop Lewis Bayly (*c*.1575-1631), whose work was popular in Scotland, could claim that the people of God will have an 'unspeakable joy' and this will be 'for evermore'. God's attributes were understood, then, to be as such that they can satisfy the absolute love of human nature.

Importantly, it was *communion* with God which was considered the supreme good of human existence. God's properties, so it was assumed by Scottish Protestants, could only sate the innate desire of the human soul if the subject, in some sense, possesses or has God. The point was eloquently put by a contemporary Scottish Roman Catholic named William Chalmers (1596-*c*.1678) who, it has been indicated in recent scholarship, had an influence on some Reformed Protestant thinkers in Scotland.[43] Chalmers distinguished between the object of happiness, that which needs to be possessed to be happy (God), and 'formal happiness', in which one possesses the object that will make them happy. Formal happiness is superior to objective happiness, Chalmers argued, as someone is not properly called happy unless they have the object which makes them happy. Struther framed the idea in his own way, that 'God is happinesse in himself without us, and wee are miserie in our selves without him'.[44] God is the object of happiness, but unless one has God, the human soul cannot be

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[40] Adamson, *Travellers Joy*, 14.
[41] Struther, *Happiness*, 5.
[42] Lewis Bayly, *The Practice of Pietie* (London, 1616), 38, 164-165; *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020.
[43] Alexander Broadie, 'William Chalmers (Guliemus Camerarius) (1596-*c*.1678): A Scottish Catholic Voice on the Best and the Worst' in *Scottish Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century*, ed. Alexander Broadie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 193.
[44] Struther, *Happiness*, 120.

happy, so the argument goes. Consequently, while God was considered the supreme good of the soul, it was communion with God that was thought to constitute happiness, as it was only in this relationship that God's attributes could satisfy the deepest desires of the human heart.

Scottish Protestants typically used three words to describe the experience of happiness produced by fellowship with the divine: contentment, rest, and joy. Robert Bruce used such language when he claimed that love of God results in 'permanent contentment'.[45] The sight of God's face, wrote William Drummond, 'It a contentment is, a quiet peace', while another author thought that only God 'can me content'.[46] Likewise, David Dickson described Christ's love as a 'contenting love'.[47] Communion with God was contentment (or happiness) because it was, as discussed above, the rest of the appetite in its supreme good.[48] Thus, Scottish Protestants like Bruce called the happiness produced by having God 'complete rest', 'reliefe and rest perfite', 'a constant rest'.[49] As this was nothing other than the state of joy, Protestants such as Adamson characterised communion with God as an experience in which a subject 'injoyeth the sweetnesse' of its chief good, 'perfect joy', 'A Pleasure voide of griefe… Eternall Joy, which nothing can molest'.[50] The Presbyterian minister Robert Blair (1593-1666) wrote a hymn which locates the Christian's joy in dwelling (or resting) in God.[51] The second and third verse read:

> An orphan to his father's house
> Is come, where Christ I see,
> With arms stretch'd out, as on the cross,
> Me to embrace sweetly.
>
> I'm call'd, I run with haste and joy,
> To thee O Christ I cleave;
> Such pleasure is thee to enjoy,

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[45] Bruce*, Lord's Supper*, 196.
[46] Drummond, *Flowers*, 19; Melivlle, *A Spirituall Propine of a Pastour to his People* (Edinburgh, 1589), 52.
[47] Dickson, *True Christian Love*, Stanza 4.
[48] Chapter Two, 57-60.
[49] Bruce*, Lord's Supper*, 197; Melville, *Propine*, 52; Adamson, *Travellers Joy*, 13-14; Drummond, *Flowers*, 19.
[50] Adamson, *Travellers Joy*, 30; Bruce*, Lord's Supper*, 197; Drummond, *Flowers*, 19.
[51] *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020.

I can thee never leave.[52]

Communion with God, then, was enjoyment of God: a rest of the appetite in the object of its absolute love, and a feeling of unbounded pleasure and contentment.

The significant point arising from this section for this study of radical emotional reflexivity is that Scottish Protestants assumed communion with God is the supreme good of human nature. It meant that they identified it as the purpose of existence, given that fellowship with God was identical with happiness. As the pursuit of happiness was the standard by which the meaning of their emotions was judged by Scottish Protestants, it follows that this meant that they evaluated their emotions in relation to their obstruction or facilitation of communion with God. They assessed whether their emotions enabled or got in the way of their everlasting and ecstatic enjoyment of God. Thus, the belief that communion with God was the essence of happiness was a critical aspect of radical emotional reflexivity as practiced by Scottish Protestants. It provided the concrete standard which they used to ascribe significance to their emotions. In other words, it gave their experiences meaning.

The key then, was to have emotions which facilitated communion with and enjoyment of God. What Scottish Protestants identified as the desired emotions for the attainment of this state is the focus of the next part of the chapter.

3. Faith and Love Facilitate Communion with God

Scottish Protestants believed that the enjoyment of God was made possible by two things: faith and love. The chapter will take each concept in turn to understand what they were for Scottish Protestants and why they believed faith and love facilitated fellowship with God and, thus, happiness.

John Calvin's (1509-1564) definition of faith as 'a firm and sure knowledge of the divine favour toward us' was embraced by Scottish

[52] Robert Blair, *The Life of Robert Blair, with Supplement by William Row*, ed. T. M'Crie (Edinburgh, 1848), 122-123.

Protestants.[53] John Craig's (*c*.1512-1600) shorter catechism, which replaced Calvin's as the standard for the examination of potential communicants in Scotland prior to the Westminster Assembly, defined faith as 'a sure persuasion that He [Jesus] is the only Saviour of the world, but ours in particular, who believe in Him'.[54] Likewise, a catechism produced by Presbyterian minister James Melville (1556-1614) claimed that faith is 'My sure beliefe that God baith may and will saue me in the bloud of Iesus Christ, because he is almightie, and hes promised sa to do.'[55] The first Principal of the University of Edinburgh Robert Rollock (1555-1599) explained the logic of these definitions of faith in his examination of faith's object and subject. He identified the object of faith as the gospel.[56] He understood the good news to consist in 'Jesus Christ and his benefits' as presented in the Word and Sacraments. This was the propositional content of faith, the idea that the death of Jesus Christ is efficacious for the forgiveness of sins and that God is favourable towards the elect. The subject of faith, Rollock argued, consisted in a judgement of the understanding and a judgement of the will. The Holy Spirit, in the creation of faith, first causes the understanding to apprehend the proposition of the gospel in the preaching of the Word, so that it apprehends the claim, made in the right preaching of the Word and administration of the Sacraments, that whoever believes in Christ will be justified and receive eternal life.[57] In the apprehension of this idea, via the senses of sight (sacraments) and hearing (preaching), Rollock believed the rational cognition makes two judgements: that the proposition of the gospel is true, and that it is good for the subject.[58] This is followed by a judgement of the will, made possible by the power of the Holy Spirit, to 'apply' the gospel's truth to the subject in particular. As a result, the subject is led to affirm the conclusion of

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[53] Jean Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, (London: James Clarke, 1949). 2:2:7.
[54] Thomas F. Torrance, *The School of Faith: The Catechisms of the Reformed Church*, (London: The Camelot Press Ltd., 1959), 246; *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020.
[55] Melville, *Propine*, 44; *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020.
[56] Robert Rollock, *A Treatise of Gods Effectual Calling*, trans. Henry Holland (London, 1603), 178-181; *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020.
[57] Rollock, *Effectual Calling*, 182.
[58] Rollock, *Effectual Calling*, 182.

the ‘evangelical syllogism’: ‘Whosoever beleeveth, shall be justified and live: But I beleeve: therefore, I shall be justified; and live’.[59] Hence faith is a persuasion, an affirmation of the understanding and will, that the gospel is true, good for the subject, and possessed by the subject. Notably, Rollock’s analysis of faith corresponds to the processes which were assumed to cause a passion, examined in chapter one.[60] Faith is the apprehension of the gospel, the formal object, received into the imagination via the senses, which is then judged by the understanding and the will in the right way. The theoretical underpinnings of what a passion’s nature is, thus, made Rollock’s analysis of faith plausible, and situated it within a theoretical framework assumed in the Scottish Protestant worldview. That the theory of emotion outlined in chapter one provided the inner logic of the Scottish Protestant conception of faith is further attested by Struther’s identification of faith as a ‘double perswasion’ of the rational faculties in response to the gospel.[61]

Faith was the means by which the Holy Spirit united the soul with God.[62] Craig’s catechism claimed that the ‘fruit’ of faith is ‘our inseparable union with Christ and His graces’.[63] Similarly, in Bruce’s view faith is the only ‘means’ by which ‘we can apply Christ in our souls’, as ‘faith conjoins us with the God of heaven’.[64] Struther explained that ‘our happiness is in union with God’ which is made possible by faith.[65] Many Scottish Protestants used the language of the Song of Songs and Ephesians to describe this union as a marriage union between a husband and wife.[66] The Presbyterian minister Samuel Rutherford (*c*.1600-1661) declared that ‘He [Christ] is my Husband, and I am His Wife’, while minister of Logie Alexander Hume (*c.*1557-1609) clarified that ‘Iesus Christ is the bridegrome, and his Church (that is to say,

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[59] Rollock, *Effectual Calling*, 179. A fuller discussion of the syllogism takes place in Chapter Three, 110-115.
[60] Chapter One, 30-35.
[61] Struther, *Happiness*, 120.
[62] Calvin, *Institutes*, 3:1:1.
[63] Torrance, *School of Faith*, 246.
[64] Bruce*, Lord’s Supper*, 159.
[65] Struther, *Happiness*, 119-120.
[66] They used texts such as Song of Songs 1:2-5, 1:16, 2:14-17, 5:10, 8:4; Ephesians 5:22-23.

the number of his elect) is called the bride.'[67] The mathematician John Napier of Merchiston (1550-1617) stated that marriage symbolises the 'Sacrament of the union of Christ and his Church: whereby the husbande representeth Christ, and the Woman espoused representeth the Church'.[68] Thus, faith was considered an instrument which united the soul to God in Christ, as marriage did a husband and wife.

While union with God was, in some sense, possession of God, the appetite still needed to rest in God for the subject to experience happiness. This was achieved by the second instrument for possession of God, which was called 'fruition'. This was defined by Scottish Protestants as the love and enjoyment of God. Love of God was, for Struther, the first part of fruition.[69] He claimed that 'love uniteth us to God'. It does so as it makes the soul 'rest sweetly on a present and eternal good'. Struther's position was strongly influenced by his interpretation of Augustine. When a subject's appetite rests in God, they are moved to joy, the second stage of fruition. The love of God satisfied by the possession of God leaves the 'the soul overjoyed with God'.[70] Joy follows an 'infusion of his love' in the soul, 'the rest of our soule resting sweetly in the possession of him whom it loveth'.[71] This spiritual joy is called by Struther 'spirituall saitetie', the 'inebriation of grace'.[72] His understanding of fruition corresponds to the definition of love outlined in chapter one.[73] Love is the orientation of the appetite towards that which the understanding and will have identified as absolutely or instrumentally good for the soul. Without the motion of the appetite inclined towards God caused by love, fellowship would be impossible, as the appetite would not move towards rest in God. Love for God causes desire, and thus directs the appetite to rest in God.

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[67] Samuel Rutherford, *Christ and the Doves Heavenly Salutations, with their Pleasant Conference Together: or A Sermon before the Communion in Anwoth. Anno 1630.* 1660), 17; Alexander Hume, *A Treatise of the Felicitie, of the Life to Come* (Edinburgh, 1594), 47; *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020.
[68] John Napier of Merchiston, *A Plaine Discovery of the Whole Revelation of Saint John* (Edinburgh, 1593), 33; *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020.
[69] Struther, *Happiness*, 124.
[70] Struther, *Happiness*, 125.
[71] Struther, *Happiness*, 125.
[72] Struther, *Happiness*, 126.
[73] Chapter One, 38-39.

Hence love is that which brings a subject into communion with God and thus is the means to their everlasting and bounteous joy.

Scottish Protestants believed faith was that which caused the subject to love God, and thus have communion with God. As established earlier in the chapter, Robert Rollock believed that faith consisted in a judgement of the understanding and a judgement of the will in relation to the gospel.[74] He argued that faith, a double judegement of the rational part of the soul, moves the sensitive appetite (a view based on the theory of emotion outlined in chapter one).[75]

> The knowledge and apprehension of Christ… is effectual also in the lower heart, that is, in all the affections: and there is not anie of al the affections, but is affected some way or other by this knowledge and apprehension, being not only sanctified by it, but also rapt up above itself & the nature therof. For as we said of faith, it is a supernatural knowledge and apprehension, the same is true also of the functions of all the affections: for they are al not onely made holy, but also supernatural, by a certaine supernatural facultie put into them by the Spirit of Christ.[76]

As the 'lower heart' was a synonym for the motions of the sensitive part of the soul, Rollock claimed in this passage that faith, which consists in the judgements of the understanding and will, causes emotional change. Once Christ was known and apprehended, the sensitive appetite was moved to 'an hope of good to come, & a feare of evill to come, the love of Christ, and the desire of him, and joy & gladnesse'. In all, because of faith 'the whole heart burnes to Godward'. Thus, as faith causes love and enjoyment of God it is a necessary feature for communion with God. At the same time, love enables the subject to 'feel' the truth of faith. Robert Bruce put the point eloquently:

> When the heart gets hold of God, and is possessed with the love of God, and the mind is occupied with the true knowledge of God, then, as soon as the heart and mind are full of God, the heart is quiet, and the mind is satisfied… in the infinite God, rightly known and earnestly loved, the mind will find complete rest, and the heart will have perfect joy.[77]

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[74] Chapter Two, 60-63.
[75] Chapter One, 30-35.
[76] Rollock, *Effectual Calling*, 186.
[77] Bruce, *Lord's Supper*, 196-197.

Faith and love of God, therefore, complemented one another: faith caused love of God, while love translates faith into the subject's emotions.

The interpretation of what was required for the acquisition of happiness, faith and love, represented an integration of Thomist and Scotist positions in the Scottish Protestant mindset. For Aquinas, happiness consists in an act of the intellect which facilitates communion with God. For Scotus, it is an act of the will which can bring the subject into fellowship with God. A third way, represented by Bonaventure, and also Scottish theologians and philosophers like John Mair (*c*.1467-1550), was that happiness was an act of both faith and love, the intellect and will.[78] The positions of Rollock, Bruce, and other Scottish Protestants, was closer to Bonaventure's than those of Aquinas and Scotus. They believed that the rational cognition judged the gospel to be genuinely good for the subject, and that the will chose to apply the gospel to the subject, a position which integrates the views of Aquinas and Scotus. However, Scottish Protestants also added that this moved the sensitive appetite to love and joy. Their adaption of Thomist and Scotist ideas into their understanding of happiness not only reflected the eclectic nature of Protestant intellectual culture, as discussed in chapter one.[79] It was also the logical consequence of the theory of emotion, analysed in that chapter, which they assumed. As the judgements of the understanding and will were considered necessary for the motion of the sensitive appetite, and as happiness was interpreted as the evocation of joy through communion with God, it followed that both rational faculties were integral to the procurement of happiness.[80] Thus, the integration of Thomist and Scotist ideas in their assumptions about the nature of emotion led Scottish Protestants to bring the two positions together in their presuppositions about happiness: that through love for God, evoked by faith in the gospel, the subject could have communion with God.

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[78] Broadie, 'William Chalmers', 195-196; *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020.
[79] Chapter One, 19-21.
[80] Chapter One, 30-35.

What is important in the forgoing analysis is that Scottish Protestants believed faith and love for God were the means by which one could have communion with God. As fellowship with God was the goal by which the significance of the emotions was to be judged, as it was considered the essence of happiness, so the acquisition of faith and love were the ideal Scottish Protestants were to aim for intellectually and emotionally. They provided the standard to which the faculties should operate if the subject was to have communion with God. Thus, the meaning of an emotion was determined by whether the judgements which caused it were those that belonged to faith, and whether these evaluations of the formal object resulted in love and enjoyment of God. The emotional requirement for communion with God, faith and love, was therefore presupposed by Scottish Protestants in their attempts to mobilise desired emotions and consequently informed their identification of their emotions. The importance of having faith and love significantly influenced the practice of radical emotional reflexivity in public worship and private piety, a theme which will be fully discussed in chapter five.[81]

However, Protestants in Scotland presupposed that the gap between ideal emotion - the cognitive and subsequent appetitive states of faith and love - and the actual ability of humans to have these emotions, was not so much a gap as a chasm. While they assumed that they should have faith and love so that they could have communion with God, they believed from the outset of their practice of radical emotional reflexivity that this was a far-off goal. This feature of their linguistic-conceptual framework is analysed in the final part of this chapter.

4. Human Nature's Inability to Acquire Happiness

Scottish Protestants believed that they were incapable, by their natural powers, to have faith in and love for God. Thus, they assumed they could not, without outside help, be happy. Protestants in Scotland held to this grim

[81] Chapter Five, 160-179.

view of human nature because of their interpretation of the doctrine of the Fall. Robert Rollock represented the Scottish Protestant view in his analysis of the subject, inspired by thinkers such as Augustine and Calvin. He argued that the original sin of Adam was the first non-conformity with God's will or law.[82] This had three principal effects, passed onto every human by their creation through sexual intercourse. First, the guilt of Adam's apostasy had been passed onto the whole human race, his descendants. What this meant was articulated by the *Scots Confession*: 'he and his posteritie of nature become enemies to God'.[83] The human race, therefore, is guilty of Adam's original sin. Second, Adam's guilt had led to a defect within human nature, whereby human nature lacks its 'original justice and image of God'. Third, human nature had been totally corrupted, with both the operations of the body and soul contrary to the justice of God. Original sin had perverted all the faculties, so that they do no good and seek only evil. The wrongdoing of the faculties, what Rollock called 'the flesh', manifests itself in sin.[84] Thus, the corruption of the faculties resulted, so argued the *Scots Confession*, in all humanity becoming 'slaves to Sathan, and servandis unto sin'.[85] This negative view of human nature, that of its 'total depravity', was shared by the majority of Reformed Protestants, Rollock's points articulated by the Synod of Dort (1619):

> Therefore all men are conceived in sin, and by nature children of wrath, incapable of saving good, prone to evil, dead in sin, and in bondage thereto, and without the regenerating grace of the Holy Spirit, they are neither able nor willing to return to God, to reform the depravity of their nature, nor to dispose themselves to reformation.[86]

The effect of original sin on the emotions was twofold: it impaired the judgements of the rational part of the soul and corrupted the motions of the appetite. First, the consequence of Adam's sin made the understanding and

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[82] Rollock, *Effectual Calling*, 133-135.
[83] *Scots Confession, 1560 (Confessio Scoticana) and Negative Confession, 1581 (Confession Negativa)*, ed. G. D. Henderson (Aberdeen: Church of Scotland Committee on Publications, 1937), III.
[84] Rollock, *Effectual Calling*, 147-148.
[85] *Scots Confession*, III.
[86] *The Articles of the Synod of Dort*, trans. Thomas Scott (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1841), III.3.

will make wrong judgements.[87] Bishop of Caithness John Abernethy, (*c*.1595-1639?) asserted that original sin has made the natural inclination of human nature to seek 'wrong, and unlawful objects'.[88] Abernethy's position presupposed the theory of emotion outlined in chapter one.[89] As indicated, the 'object' of an emotion is its formal object, the form received into the imagination with its intention. The understanding judges whether the apprehension of the object is accurate, while the will evaluates whether it is good for the subject or not. Abernethy's claim is that, due to its natural corruption, the understanding and will misjudge a formal object's intention. They frequently misidentify that which is actually good for that which is evil; that which is really evil for that which is good. Thus, the rational cognition's judgements of a formal object are not accurate to the actual state of things. This consequently moves the appetite in an inappropriate way in relation to the real value of the formal object in relation to the subject.

Second, the motion of the appetite is itself impaired. Abernethy argued that passions are prone to 'exceed and redound'.[90] This meant for him that the appetite would often move disproportionately in relation to the actual goodness of the formal object. That is, the appetite would be moved either too much or too little towards or away from its formal object, in relation to the perceived intention of the formal object. Hence the appetite, it was assumed, often misinterpreted even the 'true report of the braine'.[91] Thus not only did the disjunction between reality and appearance cause the emotions to go awry, but also the failure of the appetite to respond appropriately to the judgements of rational cognition and volition. Together, the corruption of the faculties entailed that human emotion was perverted from its ideal.

As a result of the perceived effect of original sin on the psychological faculties, Scottish Protestants believed that humans are predisposed to

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[87] Gellera, 'Scholastic Philosophy', 97; Maurer, 'Human Nature', 177; Christian Maurer, ''A Lapsu Corruptus': Calvinist Doctrines and Seventeenth-Century Scottish Theses Ethicæ' in *History of Universities*, XXIX, no.2 (2017), 192.
[88] Abernethy, *Physicke*, 258-261.
[89] Chapter One, 28-40.
[90] Abernethy, *Physicke*, 256.
[91] Abernethy, *Physicke*, 259.

misidentify the supreme good. Finite and temporal creatures are identified as ends in themselves; the soul is moved to love that which is not-God absolutely. This includes not only a desire for finite and temporal creatures, but also the superstitious worship of God, which is nothing other than a love for a dream and figment of the imagination.[92] This is idolatry, which was believed to have a detrimental effect on the emotions by Scottish Protestants. A consequence of not loving the supreme good absolutely was that it put the passions in a state of 'contraeitie and contradiction'.[93] Weemes described the passions in this state as like 'contrary winds or tides', the subject 'drawn by two wild horses contrariways'.[94] Abernethy gave a list of contrary 'tides' or 'horses' that simultaneously pull in contradictory directions: 'lust and shame, pride and parsimony, fury and feare, loue and hate, joy and hope'.[95] Weemes used the illustration of a covetous adulterer, who at one and the same time wants to hold what he has (covetousness), but also wants to spend what he has (adulterous).[96] This distempered condition was described by William Drummond as 'A shrill tempestuous Winde, Which doth disturbe the Minde'.[97] The inner logic of these claims was that the corrupted individual, whose appetite is never satisfied by the finite objects that they love absolutely, have their sensitive appetite moved in contradictory ways by mutually exclusive formal objects in the search for permanent rest. As such, the subject's appetite is pulled to and away from the objects of its love, a direct result of the inadequacy of seeking rest in finite objects (as analysed earlier in this chapter).[98] Consequently the passions, it was assumed, are in a perpetual state of contradiction due to the corrupted appetite's unqualified desire for the wrong objects.

A second effect of absolute love for that which is not-God on the emotions is that the passions, so it was believed by Scottish Protestants, are

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[92] See Calvin, *Institutes*, 1.11; *Scots Confession*, V, XIV.
[93] Weemes, *Portraiture*, 148.
[94] Weemes, *Portraiture*, 148.
[95] Abernethy, *Physicke*, 264.
[96] Weemes, *Portraiture*, 148.
[97] Drummond, *Flowers*, 19.
[98] Chapter Two, 52-54.

made inconstant. Abernethy observed that one passion ‘maketh a way for the extremity of another’.[99] For example, an excess of joy is often followed by excessive sadness when the object of joy is gone. Similarly, excessive desire causes excessive sorrow when the desired object is lost. This is because, argued Abernethy, the emotions are ‘gunpowdered’ so that when their formal object is perceived they explode and pull the appetite in a new direction. Not only is this inconstancy due to the disproportionate nature of the appetite’s motions, but also the ever-changing state of creation (analysed earlier in the chapter).[100] Thus, Scottish Protestants blamed original sin for the changeability of their emotions. Put another way, the corruption of human nature has prevented subjects from resting in God. Consequently, their appetites are left in a state of perpetual motion.

Due to its contradictory and inconstant nature, the fallen human condition was characterised by Scottish Protestants as ‘miserable’ or ‘misery’ – the opposite of happiness. For William Drummond, fallen human nature is ‘a finit piece of reasonable miserie’, while poet William Mure of Rowallan (1594-1657) considered ‘the miserie of man by Sinne’ great in magnitude.[101] James Melville implored his readers to ‘remooue and flit from this miserie, to that felicitie everlasting’, and so highlighted to his reader that the state of misery is the opposite of the state of happiness.[102] William Struther thought that misery was the privation of happiness, implied by his claim that ‘Happinesse is the sovereign cure of our miserie’.[103] Bishop of Galloway William Cowper (1568-1619) argued that the sinner lives in ‘miserable servitude’, especially when they ‘enjoy the objects of their sinnes, yet have they not their desired joy and contentment’, leaving all wicked people in a

[99] Abernethy, *Physicke*, 259-260.
[100] Chapter Two, 53-54.
[101] Drummond, *Flowers*, 77; William Mure of Rowallan, *The True Crucifixe for True Catholickes* (Edinburgh, 1629), 79; *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020.
[102] James Melville, *Ane Fruitful and Comfortable Exhortation Anent Death* (Edinburgh, 1597), 69.
[103] Struther, *Happiness*, 2.

perpetually ‘unhappy experience’.[104] In other words, ministers taught their congregations that the natural state of human nature, due to the Fall, was misery: the absence of happiness.

Scottish Protestants believed the fallen emotions prevented happiness because they obstructed communion with God. As Adamson expressed in his *Theses*, humans are naturally incapable of virtue due to their corrupt faculties, and as such cannot have the faith in or love of God necessary for fellowship with their supreme good.[105] Thus, Scottish Protestants lamented their natural state and by implication their perverted emotions. Minister Zachary Boyd (1585-1653) decried that ‘in us all there is not a trimmed chamber for Christ till God prepare it’.[106] Rutherford despaired that ‘these who has gotten an ill drink from the Devil, full of lusts, pride, covetousness, full of love of the world; such are they that has no stomack for Christ’.[107] The ‘God of heaven cannot have any fellowship with the soul that is always unclean, and altogether defiled’, complained Bruce.[108] He went onto clarify that ‘God cannot make His residence in a soul that is always a stinking dunghill’. The message was clear: without significant preparation and reformation of the faculties – including those that are involved in the passions – the human soul is incapable of having communion with God. However, it was out-with the power of human nature to bring about the change required for happiness given its inability to do good. Thus, without external intervention, humanity was doomed by Adam’s original sin to everlasting misery.

Scottish Protestants, therefore, assumed that their they were unable to have the faith and love necessary for the acquisition of happiness. This belief

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[104] William Cowper, *The Workes of Mr William Cowper Late Bishop of Galloway* (London, 1623), 494-495; *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020.
[105] Maurer, ‘A Lapsu Corruptus’, 192; John Adamson, *Theses Philosophicae* (Edinburgh, 1604); Maurer, ‘Human Nature’, 177; Gellera, ‘Scholastic Philosophy’, 97-98.
[106] Zachary Boyd, *Selected Sermons of Zachary Boyd*, ed. David W. Atkinson (Aberdeen: The Scottish Text Society, 1989), 39; *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020.
[107] Samuel Rutherford, *Christs Napkin: or, A Sermon Preached in Kirkcubright at the Communion, May 12. 1633.* (1660), 16.
[108] Bruce*, Lord’s Supper*, 153.

had a profound effect on their evaluation of the significance of their emotions. They were predisposed to conclude that their emotions were in error, given the assumed perversion of their faculties. Moreover, as they identified human nature as corrupt, their natural inclination was to categorise an experience which seemed to obstruct an ideal emotion as sinful. Thus, any passion which could be considered a distraction from an absolute love of God was deemed the product of original sin. Furthermore, belief in the total depravity of human nature meant that Scottish Protestants, when naming and mobilising their emotions, entered into these processes with the assumption that their subject is naturally corrupt, and as such distant from the ideal emotional standard. In this way, the presupposition that human nature is fallen informed the categorisation of emotion that Scottish Protestants attempted in their practice of radical emotional reflexivity.

This second chapter has analysed the goal by which Scottish Protestants evaluated the meaning of their emotions. It has argued that they assumed that happiness, understood as communion with and enjoyment of God, was the purpose of life, and the standard by which their emotions should be judged. As they believed faith and love of God were the means by which they could have fellowship with God, Scottish Protestants assumed that these were the ideals against which their emotions should be tested. However, they also presupposed that human nature was such that it was impossible to have faith and love. Thus while Scottish Protestants believed life was for happiness, they also held that it was due to original sin pure misery.

These features of the Scottish Protestant linguistic-conceptual framework impacted the practice of radical emotional reflexivity in two ways. First, the evaluation of experience in relation to an identified goal was used by Scottish Protestants to stimulate an emotional response. Where an emotion stood in relation to the acquisition of communion with God via faith and love determined its meaning. How this goal impacted the mobilisation of

emotion in public worship and private devotion will be discussed in chapter five.[109] Second, the contrast between the natural state of humanity and the ideal emotions provided the rationale for the identification of the emotions in the form of a spiritual journey. If the acquisition of happiness is impossible for humans to achieve by themselves, and yet 'religion was instituted by God to serve as a pathway to guide us to our chief felicity', to reiterate the quotation from Robert Bruce which opened this chapter, then there must be a change in the subject's emotions through time from the state of misery to happiness.[110] This meant that the emotional aim of Scottish Protestants, and the assessment of their condition they brought to their identification of emotion, entailed that they named their emotions in narrative form: a spiritual journey from misery to happiness. It is to this feature of their practice of radical emotional reflexivity that the next chapter turns.

[109] Chapter Five, 189-203.
[110] Bruce, *Lord's Supper*, 194.

Chapter Three: The Language of Emotion

Scottish Protestants were taught to identify their emotions in the form of a spiritual journey. Some of the more zealous evaluated their experiences and concluded that their emotions could only be understood by way of a narrative. That story consisted in a perceived transformation in the emotions from a point of total depravity to the possession of faith and love. As a result, it was a plot in which a subject metaphorically 'travelled' from misery to happiness, idolatry to communion with God, wrong emotion to right emotion. It was a narrative built into the language about emotion used in public worship and the self-writings some of the more fervent Scots produced.[1] Thus, the widely shared assumption that the soul was on a spiritual journey towards communion with God (on which the subject's faculties and emotions would be regenerated) was the linguistic-conceptual and emotional spine of communal ritual and private piety.

Therefore, the focus of this chapter is to analyse the language of emotion used in public worship and in the texts produced by some of the most pious Scottish Protestants. It begins with a discussion of the vocabulary of emotion built into corporate religious practice in early modern Scotland. The investigation shows that most Scots were regularly taught a language of emotion through participation in public rituals. Through participation they learned terms and how to use these words appropriately about their emotions. This lexicon defined the importance of an emotion by situating a subject's experience within a spiritual journey. Importantly, ministers encouraged their congregations to engage in radical emotional reflexivity and use the linguistic-conceptual framework they had learned in public worship when they did so. This meant that the extant personal writings produced by some of the more zealous Scots are saturated in the language of emotion used in public worship to categorise a subject's experiences in the form of a spiritual journey.

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[1] Mullan, *Scottish Puritanism*, 111-139.

Consequently, the second part of this chapter examines the language of emotion found in those texts produced by Scottish Protestants who engaged in radical emotional reflexivity. The vehicle for this examination is the spiritual conversion narrative of an author entitled 'Mistress Rutherford' (*fl*.1630/1670?), a young Presbyterian woman with landed connections who grew up near Edinburgh in the first few decades of the seventeenth century before travelling to raise a family of her own in Ireland.[2] Her text is a particularly apt representation of the personal and spiritual writings produced by fervent Scots given that it has been an important document in the historiography of Scottish Protestant emotionality.[3] The discussion in this chapter explores her use of emotional language and how this changes as the plot progresses. These shifts in Rutherford's vocabulary are schematised into six stages which chart the narrative structure of her spiritual journey: love for devotion, the apprehension of sin, legal terror, repentance, a feeling of mercy, and communion with God. While there was variation in how strictly texts conformed to this schema, it captures the general sequence of emotional change presented in Scottish Protestant personal writings. In other words, the six stages classify how authors used emotional language to convey to a reader the story of their subject's spiritual journey.

Thus, this chapter analyses how the language used in public worship and private devotion presented a subject's emotions in the narrative form of a spiritual journey.

1. Emotional Vocabulary in Corporate Worship

At the opening of his autobiography Robert Blair, an influential Presbyterian minister, recalled the beginning of his spiritual 'pilgrimage'.[4] He was aged seven and, as was typical of children his age, had been left at home during the corporate religious practice his community engaged in on a

[2] Mistress Rutherford, 'Mistress Rutherford's Conversion Narrative' in *Miscellany of the Scottish History Society*, XIII, ed. David Mullan (Edinburgh: Lothian Print, 2004), 151.
[3] David George Mullan, 'Mistress Rutherford: A Scottish Puritan Autobiography' in *Bunyan Studies*, 7 (1997): 13-37; Mullan, *Scottish Puritanism*, 93-96; Brock, 'Internalizing', 35-36.
[4] Blair, *Life*, 3-5.

Sunday. Alone with his thoughts, the boy started to reflect upon his purpose in life. He wondered 'Wherfore servest thou, unprofitable creature?' He gazed upon his environment and determined that the sun was made to give light to the world, while the cows he saw were created to provide Blair with nourishing milk. However, he could not work out what he himself had been made for. Pacing up and down in an agitated manner, he remembered that his family and wider social network were in a building called a church. Blair reasoned that whatever people did in there, it must be connected to the reason for human existence. A few Sundays later, Blair was in the church, and a visiting puritan minister from England was preaching. The first words the man spoke in his exhortation were Psalm 73:28: 'But as to me, it is good to me to draw near to God'. This was the text the preacher expounded upon, and so he repeated the phrase many times within the sermon. Each utterance of the verse arrested Blair. The sentence provoked an emotional response in the boy, his heart 'much affected' by it. He believed, with great confidence and joy, that God had answered his question about the purpose of his life. Blair knew that he had been made to have communion with God.

This story is indicative of how public worship instructed Scots in a vocabulary and grammar of emotion which some, like Blair, used in their private practice of radical emotional reflexivity. The biblical citation pronounced by the puritan preacher provided a language which the young boy identified as his purpose in life. The corporate religious practice taught Blair that communion with God is the goal of human and, thus, his existence, a topic explored in chapter two.[5] He remembered this event vividly when he wrote his autobiography at the age of sixty-three, and the language he learned that day was implicit in his characterisation of his life as a 'pilgrimage'. Many Scottish Protestant ministers, and their puritan counterparts in England and North America, used pilgrimage as a metaphor for their soul's sanctification, the thoughts and feelings of a person figuratively travelling from their natural corruption to faith in and love for

[5] Chapter Two, 57-60.

God.[6] It represented in an imaginative way the transition from alienation from to communion with God. Most famously, Elizabeth Melville allegorised the experience of salvation as a journey made by 'pilgrimes puir' in her published poem *Ane Godlie Dreame*.[7] The representation of the Christian life as a pilgrimage made sense in the shared linguistic framework used by Scottish Protestants because it presupposed ideas outlined in the previous chapter: that human nature is totally depraved, and a person must undergo great change if they are to fulfil their fundamental desire for communion with God.[8] Consequently, when Blair told his reader that his autobiography was an examination of his 'pilgrimage', he used language and ideas he had learned as a boy in public worship in his practice of radical emotional reflexivity: that his goal in life was to draw near to God.[9]

Through public repentance, public fasting, the Lord's Supper, sermons, and psalm singing, Scots like Blair were provided with both a vocabulary of emotion and a model for how to use it. Crucially, the use of language in these rituals had a narrative structure: the spiritual journey of an individual or community. Thus, in these corporate religious practices Scottish Protestants were taught to use a linguistic-conceptual framework which could both categorise a feeling and determine its significance in relation to the purpose of life: communion with God.

Penitential rituals, such as public repentance and the reception of excommunicants, focused on the penitent's 'conversion'.[10] The process began when someone was found to have committed a public sin, an act of 'wickednes and obstinate rebellion' caused by Satan's 'wenoum & deceavable entismentes'.[11] Such offences required the guilty party to repent in the time of public worship. Kirk sessions were advised by the official guidance that only those offenders who could demonstrate that they had a

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[6] Boyd, *Sermons*, 53; Melville, *Exhortation*, 31, 37; Campbell, *Treatise*, A2*v*; Hambrick-Stowe, *Piety*, 54-90; Mullan, *Scottish Puritanism*, 111-139; Cohen, *God's Caress*, 210-212.
[7] Melville, *Poems*, 86.
[8] Chapter Two, 67-72.
[9] Blair, *Life*, 3.
[10] Knox, *The Ordoure of Excommunicatioun and of Publict Repentance* (Edinburgh, 1569), D2*r*.
[11] Knox, *Repentance*, C8*v*-D1*r*.

'feare and terrour of God's judgementes', 'haitrent of sinne and doloure for the same', and a 'sense and feilling' of 'Gods merceys', should be admitted to participate in these rituals.[12] In the ceremony, the minister would inform the congregation that the penitent had come to 'witnes and declair his unfained repentance'. He was directed to tell them that the penitent had fallen into sin due to the total depravity of human nature and the activity of Satan, but that there was hope insofar as God has ordained that, through sincere repentance, a sinner will be forgiven. The minister would lead the congregation in prayer, asking God to 'effectuallie move' the sinner to feel 'dolour of the heart' for their sin, and 'some sense and fealing of thy mercy'.[13] Additionally, the penitent was expected to confess before the congregation that they were 'sory for his sinne' and that they 'unfeanedly desyreth God to be mercyfull'. Through this verbal exclamation, the offender would identify the meaning of their behaviour in the ceremony, which was expected to include: the wearing of 'base & abject apparaill',[14]; a willingness to kneel before the congregation,[15]; to sit on the 'stool' or 'pillar of repentance',[16]; and the emission of tears and groans.[17] This would culminate in a 'trial of repentance', a dialogue in which the minister would interrogate the sinner before the entire assembly.[18] If the minister was satisfied that the penitent's repentance was sincere, he would then ask the congregation if they would absolve the penitent, as in his view the community had witnessed 'the

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[12] Knox, *Repentance*, B1*r*-B3*r*.
[13] Knox, *Repentance*, B3*r*-B4*r*.
[14] Knox, *Repentance*, A5*r*; Margo Todd, *The Culture of Protestantism in Early Modern Scotland* (London: Yale University Press, 2002), 143-149; Jane Dawson, 'Discipline and the Making of Protestant Scotland' in *Worship and Liturgy in Context: Studies and Case Studies in Theology and Practice*, eds. Duncan Forrester and Doug Gay (London: SCM Press, 2009), 'Discipline', 127; Nikki Marie Macdonald, 'Reconciling Performance: the Drama of Discipline in Early Modern Scotland, 1560-1610' (PhD, The University of Edinburgh, 2013), 64.
[15] Robert Bruce, *Sermons by the Rev. Robert Bruce with Collections for his Life by Robert Wodrow*, ed. W. Cunningham (Edinburgh, 1843), 366; Macdonald, 'Reconciling', 112-113; Todd, *Culture*, 150, 160-161.
[16] Bruce, *Sermons*, 366; Dawson, 'Discipline', 128; Macdonald, 'Reconciling', 33.
[17] Knox, *Repentance*, B2*v*; Blair, *Life*, 68-69; Macdonald, 'Reconciling', 93; Todd, *Culture*, 160-161; Chapter Five, 170-175.
[18] Todd, *Culture*, 156; Dawson, 'Discipline', 128; Macdonald, 'Reconciling', 206-207; Chapter Five, 163-164.

conversion and repentance of this our brother'.[19] If the congregation offered a 'sign of their consent', the penitent would be absolved. The minister would declare that the penitent's sins 'are forgevin not only in earth, but also in the heaven', while the elders and deacons would embrace, kiss, and lead the reconciled individual to sit with the community.[20]

Public fasting, whether in response to crisis or in preparation for the Lord's Supper, enabled the whole community to participate as penitents in public worship. Apart from the sick, new mothers, and the pregnant, all were expected to abstain from food and merriment throughout the fast, which usually lasted for at least a week.[21] Such hunger was supposed to make people feel their need to 'earnestly to craue of God' for mercy and assistance. In the time of public worship, the people were not allowed to wear 'gorgious apparell'. Ministers, like William Struther, explained that a humiliating costume, which had biblical precedent in times of public fasting, expressed a 'heart sopped with sorrow and bitternesse for sin'.[22] At the start of the service, the minister would ask God, on behalf of the congregation, to:

> move our dull heartes, and by the power of thy holy Spirite, that thow will write & seale into them that holy feare and revere[n]ce, which thow cravest of thy chosen children, and that faithfull obedience to they holie will, together with the fealing and sense that our sinnes are fully purged.[23]

In this way, the minister named the God-caused emotions that the abstinence and costume of the congregation were supposed to non-verbally express. Through this ceremony the community were reconciled to God, and so the participants should finish the fast with a feeling of mercy. As William Struther explained, as the fast 'beginneth in sorrow for our felt miseries, so it *end in ioy,*'.[24]

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[19] Knox, *Repentance*, B6*r*.
[20] *FBD*, VII; Knox, *Repentance*, B6*v*.
[21] John Knox, *The Ordour and Doctrine of the Generall Faste* (Edinburgh, 1566), E7*r*-E8*v*.
[22] William Struther, *Scotlands Warning, or a Treatise of Fasting* (Edinburgh, 1628), 61-62; 1 Kings 21:27; Nehemiah 9:1; Jonah 3:5-9.
[23] Knox, *Fast*, F2*v*.
[24] Struther, *Warning*, 76.

The language of emotion in these penitential rituals – an implicit narrative structure of repentance and conversion – was explained by ministers in their sermons. A fine example is an exhortation delivered by Robert Bruce at the public repentance of Francis Stewart (*c*.1562-1612), the Earl of Bothwell.[25] Bruce attempted to define the vocabulary associated with repentance for the benefit of Stewart and the congregation. He began with 'worldly sorrow'.[26] This he called a 'blind terror, vexation, and anxiety of conscience'. He labelled it blind because the person who experiences worldly sorrow lacks hope that they can escape it, as they do not recognise that their emotional torment comes from God for the sin they have committed. Thus, it manifests in suicidal 'desperation', the subject tempted to 'put hands in themselves' – to purposefully self-harm – in order to relieve their sorrows. However, such dread 'changeth not the heart' as it is a reaction to the 'pain' of feeling 'the wrath of God', an emotional 'fire burning me up as stubble', as a judgement on a subject's sin.[27] As soon as their 'dolour and torment' disappear, the subject returns to their sins.[28] Consequently, Bruce taught his congregation that worldly sorrow is not repentance, but a deep anguish caused by the presence of a guilty conscience and the wrath of God.

Bruce then moved onto true repentance: 'godly sorrow'.[29] He called this emotion an 'earnest sorrow, a true sorrow, not feigned or counterfeit'. Such sadness was not caused by the presence of emotional pain or torment. Rather, it arises because the subject had 'offended so gracious a God'. It is a sorrow which is moved by the evilness of sin, not by the presence of God's wrath for such sin. This godly dolour, Bruce argued, has a lasting impact upon the subject. It causes them to hate 'that quhilk God hateth'.[30] Godly sorrow moves a person to hate their sin and try to flee from their offences

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[25] *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020. Other examples of sermons preached on repentance include: Boyd, *Sermons*, 175-187; Archibald Simson, *A Sacred Septenarie* (London, 1638); William Cowper, *A Mirrour of Mercie or The Prodigals Conuersion* (London, 1614).
[26] Bruce, *Sermons*, 356-357. See also Rollock, *Effectual Calling*, 204-207.
[27] Bruce, *Sermons*, 361.
[28] Bruce, *Sermons*, 357.
[29] Bruce, *Sermons*, 357-359. See also Rollock, *Effectual Calling*, 206, 208.
[30] Bruce, *Sermons*, 359-360. See also Rollock, *Effectual Calling*, 207.

against God. This hatred, Bruce explained, was the Holy Spirit's work, weakening the 'lusts and affections that are in me' while also taking away 'the strength and power of sin within me'. This was what Bruce called 'mortification' or 'contrition', what in the liturgy for baptism the minister would define as 'a resisting of the rebellious lusts of the flesh'.[31]

The second effect of godly sorrow, Bruce taught his congregation, was that it makes the subject 'turn our hearts' and 'apply the mercy of God to ourselves'.[32] This 'turning' presupposed a 'feeling of mercy'. This was a 'feeling of his peace, a feeling of his sweetness', whereby the anguish of a guilty conscience is 'pacified'. The feeling of mercy set the heart at ease because it was a kind of confidence or assurance that God's mercy applies in 'particular to myself', what was examined in chapter two as the idea of faith pedalled by Scottish Protestant ministers.[33] Only such a feeling, Bruce explained to his congregation, could turn the soul towards God, as the soul terrified by the feeling of God's wrath would never dare to approach the divine for mercy. The 'terrors of the conscience quieted' by a 'taste of his mercy' convinces the soul it can turn to God, which in turn brings forth 'joy' and a 'love towards him'. This love 'endueth our hearts with new affections… and bringeth forth in us living motions, actions, and cogitations' which 'carry us to life everlasting'. The birth of this new love for God, identified in chapter two as that which brings God and soul into communion, was what Bruce called 'vivification' and 'conversion', or what the baptismal liturgy named a 'newnes of life'.[34]

Bruce's preaching on repentance made explicit the emotional terms and narrative of conversion built into the language of penitential rituals. It

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[31] *The Forme of Prayers and Ministration of the Sacraments Used in the English church at Geneua* (Edinburgh, 1564), 65. Though Rollock agreed that godly sorrow causes the subject to hate sin, he did not believe this was, strictly speaking, mortification, which he identified as a resistance to sin which emerges later in the process of regeneration. See Rollock, *Effectual Calling*, 207-208.
[32] Bruce, *Sermons*, 360-362. See also Rollock, *Effectual Calling*, 207-208.
[33] Chapter Two, 60-63.
[34] *Forme*, 65. Again, though Rollock agreed godly sorrow was the origin of conversion, he believed 'vivification' was a later stage in the process of regeneration. See Rollock, *Effectual Calling*, 204, 207-208.

begins with an act of sin. This arouses in the individual whose faculties are corrupted worldly sorrow, a fear of God's judgements. By itself, this is not genuine repentance. Godly sorrow, a sorrow for sin, is also needed. This emotion breeds a hatred of sin and a desire for God's mercy. The process is brought to a climax when an individual experiences a feeling of mercy. Love for God, or conversion, is born from the peace and tranquillity this passion births in the soul. Repentance and conversion, then, were considered a sequence of emotional changes that reconcile the alienated sinner with God. That participants were expected to display of sorrow for sin and a feeling of mercy indicates that the pilgrimage of the soul was a fundamental dimension of these corporate religious practices.[35] In other words, the spiritual journey from misery to happiness was embedded in the linguistic-conceptual framework of penitential rituals: they told the story of conversion.[36]

The Lord's Supper augmented the narrative structure of the spiritual journey presented in penitence rituals. The community prepared for the Sacrament by participation in a public fast.[37] Hence they were expected to have undergone the sequence of emotions associated with conversion prior to the corporate religious practice. This meant that the Lord's Supper was the climax of the spiritual journey: it was a ritualised form of communion with God. This idea was reflected in the language used in and about the ceremony. The *Scots Confession* (1560) established that in the Lord's Supper the Christ is 'joined with us' by the 'operatioun of the haly Ghaist, who by trew faith carryis us above al things that are visible, carnal, and earthly, and makes us feede upon the body and blude of Christ Jesus'.[38] Through this 'spiritual eating', Christ 'remaines in them', the faithful, and 'they in him'. This 'communion' was not mediated through the consumption of bread and wine transformed into the body and blood of Christ, but a spiritual eating

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[35] The meaning of 'display' in this context is analysed in Chapter Five, 166-179.
[36] Yeoman, 'Heart-work', 177; Marilyn J. Westerkamp, *Triumph of the Laity: Scots-Irish Piety and the Great Awakening, 1625-1760* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 34.
[37] Leigh Eric Schmidt, *Holy Fairs: Scottish Communions and American Revivals in the Early Modern Period* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989),19; Westerkamp, *Triumph of the Laity*, 31.
[38] *Scots Confession*, 85.

which was conjoined with the physical intake of the elements.[39] Ministers were expected to explain this to their congregations prior to participation in the ritual. Thus, the directions for the ceremony encourage the minister to declare that in the Sacrament a person can feed on the flesh and blood of Christ when the Spirit lifts 'up our minds by faith above all things worldlies and sensible, and thereby to entre into heaven, that we may find and receive Christ, where he dwelleth'.[40] Robert Bruce, whose sermons on the Lord's Supper were widely read, argued that when in the ritual Christ was 'in your soul', the subject can 'feel a blessed life', as this conjunction is the 'fountain of all your joy and felicity'.[41] The minister had identified the communion with Christ that takes place in the Sacrament as the 'perfection and blessedness' of human nature which was analysed in chapter two.[42] The language used in and about the Lord's Supper, thus, positioned it as an experience of happiness.[43] Put another way, holy communion was a ritual that had at its essence the narrative climax of the spiritual journey: *communion* with God. Thus, the linguistic-conceptual framework built into the Sacrament complemented the story of conversion embedded in the language of penitential ceremonies.

A language of emotion was built into corporate religious practices. Through public repentance, corporate fasting, the Lord's Supper, and listening to sermons, congregations were taught this vocabulary of emotion and how to use these words and phrases. They were educated into this linguistic and conceptual framework by what they saw, heard, and experienced in liturgical action. Frequent participation in these rituals, in some instances more than once a week, repeated these multi-sensory

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[39] Bruce, *Lord's Supper*, 43-44, 77-79; *Scots Confession* XXI; Stephen Mark Holmes, *Sacred Signs in Reformation Scotland: Interpreting Worship, 1488-1590* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 199-203; Mark W. Elliott, 'Spiritual Theology in Bruce, Howie, Johnston, Boyd, and Leighton' in *The History of Scottish Theology, Volume I: Celtic Origins to Reformed Orthodoxy*, eds. David Fergusson and Mark W. Elliott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 211.
[40] *Forme*, 87-88.
[41] Bruce, *Lord's Supper*, 90-91.
[42] Chapter Two, 50-57.
[43] Yeoman, 'Heart-work', 180-184.

lessons. It meant that Scots were regularly exposed in public worship to a stable and dominant language of emotion. This language was secure insofar as the vocabulary of emotion in religious ritual was subject to little, if any, change between 1590-1640. As Scots (except for the excommunicated) were required and forced to attend public worship, most people had to learn the language of emotion built into corporate religious practice. Ecclesial authority had managed to foster a shared awareness across Scotland, from the miller to the nobleman, about how to use this vocabulary to express and identify emotion in public worship. There was, thus, a largely unchanging reservoir of phrases and ideas that Scots could draw upon to name and categorise their emotions in the form of a spiritual journey.

Importantly, those who participated in corporate religious practices were expected to practice radical emotional reflexivity using the language of emotion they had learned. In public repentance, the minister was meant to teach that the hatred of sin, godly sorrow, and feeling of mercy the penitent was supposed to display – through their costume, choreography, posture, demeanour, and dialogue – was a resource from which the congregation could learn a vocabulary and grammar of emotion. He would tell his listeners that if 'we considder his [the penitent's] fall and sinne in him only, without having consideration of our selfes and of our owen corruption, we sall proffeit nothing'.[44] Rather, taking 'exemple of this our penitent brother', the congregation was charged to 'be unfeanedly displeased' with their sin, ask God for 'grace and mercy for your offences committed', and to 'satisfie the Church of God' if they ever commit a public offence.[45] Similarly, at the end of public fasting the minister petitioned the Holy Spirit to:

> worke into our stubburne heartes, an unfeaned dolour for our former offences, with some sense and fealing of thy grace and mercy, together with an earnest desyre of Justice and righteousness, in the which we are bound continually walk.[46]

[44] Knox, *Repentance*, B2*r*.
[45] Knox, *Repentance*, B5*v*.
[46] Knox, *Fast*, F4*r*.

As the minister had asked God to give the congregation these emotions, there was an implicit expectation that they would attempt to cultivate these passions in their ordinary lives. By extension, they would need to use the language and concepts used in public repentance and fasting to recognise when God had worked these emotions in their hearts.

Congregations were also expected to adapt the language of emotion used in sermons to their own experiences. Robert Bruce was clear that his analysis of repentance was for the benefit of the whole congregation. He explained that he had defined these terms not only so that Stewart could display his contrition with aplomb, but also that 'every one of you that are in inferior ranks, that every one of you may confess your own sins'.[47] He conveyed that the confession of sin, public or private, was the eruption of a vivified soul into the 'praise of God' for the mercy the Lord has showered on the sinner. A profession that one had experienced godly sorrow, mortification, a feeling of mercy, and vivification, glorifies God, as the 'Spirit of Christ' is the 'worker of true dolour and conversion'. Yet, because confession magnifies the mercy of God, it is opposed by Satan. The devil attempts to persuade the sinner that the confession of their sin is 'inconvenient' and the most 'shameful turn that ever' a person did. Determined to make sure that his congregation knew that through confession 'God may be glorified' and others may be 'moved through their [the penitent's] example to do the like', Bruce taught his congregation the meaning of the words they used about emotion in public repentance. Thus, through his sermon Bruce attempted to educate his listeners as to the meaning of the vocabulary of emotion they heard and used in public repentance, and thus enable them to use this language to confess their sins in private. He wanted his congregation to use the linguistic-conceptual framework embedded in corporate repentance in their personal piety.

The most powerful and effective activity by which Scots engaged with the language of emotion in public worship was the practice of psalm singing.

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[47] Bruce, *Sermons*, 362-363.

Listening to sermons and watching public repentance required concentration, while in public fasting and the Lord's Supper the vocabulary of emotion was spoken by the minister about the congregation's actions. By contrast, psalm singing was the main opportunity for the whole congregation to use the language of emotion built into corporate religious practice, with their own tongues. In a non-literate culture where people's memories were exceptionally good, the singing of psalms, in the vernacular and by heart, was a widespread practice in Scotland by the seventeenth century.[48] A significant factor which propelled the memorisation of the psalms was their musicality. Like many of his puritan counterparts in England and North America, the Presbyterian minister James Melville was fully aware of the power music had to unleash emotion.[49] In a preface to a devotional guide written for his congregation, he explained that:

> the measures of poesie & harmonie of music… delytes the mind, and sa helps the memoire very meikle, to embrace and keip fast the matter, and stirres up and sets the force of the soules affectiones towards God.[50]

Music's power to evoke emotion could be abused, Melville concerned that his community were singing profane songs which served to 'sop the saule in sinne and uncleannes, and steir up the corrupt and filthy affectiones'.[51] However, when the Word of God is sung to edifying tunes, it raises the soul to 'atteine to that happines that is in the presence of his face'. Through this powerful joy, it is possible to leave 'Christian doctrine imprinted in your memorie', of which the Psalms are the 'maist pretious treasure of instruction and comfort' for the 'saule and inward man'. Psalm singing, when joined with rapturous emotion, was the singing of faith: it taught the congregation how to use biblical language by empowering people to experience the meaning of

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[48] McCallum, *Reforming*, 88-89; Timothy Duguid, *Metrical Psalmody in Print and Practice: English 'singing Psalms' and Scottish 'psalm Buiks', c.1547-1640* (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2014).
[49] Melville, *Propine*, A2*r*-A4*v*; Glenda Goodman, '"The Tears I Shed at the Songs of Thy Church": Seventeenth-Century Musical Piety in the English Atlantic World' in *Journal of the American Musicological Society*, 65, no.3 (2012), 695, 702-703.
[50] Melville, *Propine*, A2*v*.
[51] Melville, *Propine*, A2*r*; Goodman, 'Musical Piety', 695, 707.

what they sang.[52] Put another way, the sounds produced by psalm singing were the mode in which their subject matter was 'effectively present in the subject'.[53]

When Scots sang the psalms communally, they voiced and experienced the Psalmists's radical emotional reflexivity for themselves. This idea was best expressed by Mistress Rutherford, who at one time sang the Psalmists's words 'wishing in my heart to be as was there expressed'.[54] That she desired to feel what she sang indicates that the assumed purpose of corporate psalm singing, at least in her view, was to know and experience what the language of emotion, embedded into the bible and public ritual, was meant to express about the singer's emotionality. When this was achieved, a primary lesson the singing of psalms taught was that the significance of a feeling was determined by how that emotion changes one's relationship with God. In the Scottish Psalter, Psalm 27 began 'The Loard my licht an' hailth will be, For quhat than suld I be dismayt'.[55] Similarly, Psalm 42's opening line was 'Like at the hairt dis braith an' bray, the wallsprings till obtain, sae dis my Saull desyre away wi' Thee, Loard, tae remaine'.[56] In these and other examples, the Psalmists identified the importance of their emotions insofar as they related to their fellowship with God. They claimed that their souls should not be sad because they have God; they recognise that they have an infinite and eternal desire that can only be satisfied by rest in God. In other words, they expressed in lyrical language that the goal of life was communion with God.

Psalm singing could also expand and enrich the lexicon of emotion Scots could use about the process of conversion. Penitential psalms could teach the language and experience of repentance. Psalm 51, frequently sung, opened as follows:

> Lord consider my distresse,

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[52] Watkins, *Puritan Experience*, 211.
[53] Rowan Williams, *The Edge of Words: God and the Habits of Language* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 100.
[54] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 174.
[55] 'Psalmes of David' in *Forme*, 67.
[56] 'Psalmes' in *Forme*, 116.

> And now w[ith] speede some pitie take:
> My sinnes deface, my fautes redresse,
> Good Lord, for thy great mercies sake.
> Washe me o Lord & make me cleane,
> Fro[m] t[h]is unjust & sinful act,
> And purifie yet once againe my haynous crime
> and bloodie fact.[57]

In this verse David, and thus the singer, identified their disobedience as an 'unjust and sinful act'. This called forth a two-pronged emotional response. The first is sorrow for the sin done, the sinner in 'distresse'. The second was a desire for mercy, the penitent singer forced to petition God so that their sins would be purified for 'mercies sake'. Thus, in this one verse the two emotional pillars of genuine repentance in public worship (godly sorrow and a hope of mercy) were expressed in poetic and musical form.[58]

Psalm singing also allowed Scots to use a richer language about the enjoyment of God. A good example is found in the first four verses of Psalm 103, which was the recommended congregational response to the absolution of a penitent in public repentance. The text read:

> My soule give laude unto the Lord, my sprit do the same:
> And all the secretes of myne heart praise ye his holy name:
> Give thankes to God for all his giftes, shewe not thy selfe unkinde:
> And suffer not his benefites to slippe out of thy minde.
> That gave thee pardone for thy fautes, and thee restorde againe:
> For all they weake and fraile disease, and healde thee of thy paine.
> That did redeme thy lyfe from death, from which thou couldst not flee:
> His mercy and compassion both, he did extend to thee.[59]

In these verses, the singer acknowledged that God had shown them mercy through the forgiveness of their sins. These mercies, experienced as the feeling of God's mercy, should be remembered, and consequently move the subject to 'laud' and 'praise' God. The singing of this psalm in the context of public repentance, then, provided a richer language to express the feeling of mercy. In other words, psalm-singing provided a biblical vocabulary for the

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[57] 'Psalmes' in *Forme*, 141-142.
[58] Bruce made this connection in a sermon at the public repentance of Francis Stewart. See Bruce, *Sermons*, 363.
[59] 'Psalmes' in *Forme*, 300-301.

articulation of experiences felt on the spiritual journey towards communion with God.

Some Scottish Protestants, like their puritan counterparts in England and North America, responded positively to the encouragements of ministers to use the language they had learned in public worship to categorise, and thus mobilise, their emotions in the form of a private spiritual journey. The same terms and phrases used in public worship to represent feelings appeared in the autobiographies, diaries, memoirs, confessions, dialogues, and poetry that some of the most zealous adherents to the faith produced. This was because corporate religious practice provided a shared frame of reference for author and reader, sometimes the same individual, which meant that feelings could be categorised using a vocabulary which both author and reader could understand due to their own participation in public worship. In other words, it made their emotions, and those of others, intelligible. By implication, the highly emotional literature those with an enthusiasm for their faith produced provides a partial insight into the linguistic and conceptual framework of emotion which the majority of Scots engaged with in corporate rituals. Such sources present how many of the most committed received, interpreted, and applied this language to their experiences. In so doing, they may indicate the ways in which the majority of Scots, to varying degrees, understood and engaged with the language of emotion built into corporate religious practices. Therefore, the causal connection between the language of emotion learned in public worship and the vocabulary of emotion used in private practice of radical emotional reflexivity means that the two should only be understood in tandem, analysis of one informing the interpretation of the other. Consequently, the chapter now turns to the language some of the more ardent Scottish Protestants used to name and identify their emotions in the form of a spiritual journey.

2. The Six Stages of the Personal Spiritual Journey

The pilgrimage of the soul was not a uniform sequence of experiences. The narratives produced by fervent Scottish Protestants varied

in structure. It is reasonable to suppose that this was also the case more broadly among those who experienced the spiritual journey. This feature of Scottish Protestant emotionality was explored by William Struther, minister in Edinburgh. He argued that the experience of the soul's pilgrimage was unique to each individual.[60] He suggested that it could differ in duration: for some people short, like the conversion of the criminal on the cross next to Christ; while others required a longer preparation of their emotions for communion with God.[61] In terms of content, some are but 'lightly touched with griefe for sinne and feare of Wrath'. Perhaps Struther had in mind someone like Jean Kincaid née Livingston (*d*.1600) when he made this statement.[62] Others - like a parishioner in Lanark named Bessie Clarkson (*d*.1625) – 'are *oppressed* with the terrours of God, and in the way of Heaven are in a sort drawne through Hell'.[63] Thus, some 'scarccely taste anie Joy all their lifetime', while others 'passe over their days in some Joy, and in respect of the former have a constant prosperitie'. Beyond God's secret will, Struther identified three factors that cause this emotional variation. First, the dispositions of the subject influence their experience of emotional change.

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[60] William Struther, *Christian Observations and Resolutions*, II (Edinburgh, 1629) 204-210.
[61] An example of a spiritual journey which progressed in a short space of time (a couple of days) was that of Jean Kincaid's. See, James Balfour, *A Memorial of the Conversion of Jean Livingston, Lady Waristoun*, *with an Account of her Carriage at her Execution, July 1600*, in Margaret Cunningham, *Lady Magaret Cunninghame, Lady Waristoun*, ed. C. K. Sharpe (Edinburgh, 1827). However, most spiritual pilgrimages took place over many years. Examples include, but are not limited to: William Cowper, *The Life and Death of the Reverend Father, and Faithfull Servant of God, Mr William Cowper, Bishop of Galloway* (London, 1619); James Mitchell of Dykes, *Memoirs of the Life of James Mitchell of Dykes, in the Parish of Ardrossan. Containing, his own spiritual exercises, and some of the spiritual exercises of his two sons, that died before him, and many singular instances of divine providence, towards himself and family. Written by himself* (Glasgow, 1759); David Calderwood, *The History of the Kirk of Scotland*, 8 vols. (Edinburgh, 1842-9), IV, 635-637; Archibald, Porteous *The Spiritual Exercise of Soul and Blessed Departure of Dame Mary Rutherford Lady Hundaly, and Mary M'Konnel, Cousin to the said Lady; which fell out in the Year 1640; both died in London* (Edinburgh, 1699); John Forbes of Corse, *Diary*, National Archives of Scotland, CH 12/18/6.
[62] In general, Kincaid's journey was characterised by a feeling of mercy and communion with God. Only for a short time did she exhibit any behaviour which could be interpreted as worldly sorrow, and after her conversion she never experienced anything close to dread or despair. See Balfour, *Conversion*, II-VI.
[63] Bessie Clarkson's experience was, for three years, characterised by terror, anguish, and near suicidal torment. She even claimed her emotional trauma was akin to being in hell. See William Livingston, *The Conflict in the Conscience of a deare Christian, named Bessie Clarksone* (Edinburgh, 1631).

Though God, through the spiritual journey, destroys the natural corruption of the faculties, God does not damage 'his workmanship in us', God tempers the transformation of the emotions in accord with the natural inclinations of the subject. Thus, a person predisposed to be continually grieved (a melancholic) like the Edinburgh lawyer and Presbyterian Archibald Johnston of Wariston (*bap*. 1611, *d*.1663), will most likely experience prolonged worldly sorrow and godly sorrow; while an optimist (a sanguinean) may pass mostly unscathed by these passions, such as minister John Livingston (1603-1672).[64] Second, the way a person behaves, their 'conversation', influences their emotional progression. If a person sins, they will be 'aflicted in conscience', as was Robert Bruce when he resisted his calling to the ministry.[65] However, if they are obedient, Struther argued that they will have 'a joyfull heart'. Third, the instrument God uses to change the sinner has an impact. If the spiritual journey takes place in private, it may be a pleasanter experience than in public, where God wishes to use the transformation of the sinner as an example to others. Struther concluded his discussion when he reminded his reader that:

> it is a great presumption to tye Gods working to one *manner*… *where wee see true Godlinesse and righteousness, there God had wrought in mercie, what ever bee the manner of his working*.[66]

The spiritual journey was not a rigid emotional sequence, but a pluriform experiential process.

However, the narratives zealous Scots produced shared a common linguistic-conceptual framework which made them recognisable as spiritual journeys. Despite their idiosyncratic differences, each text had a common core: the subject's transition from misery to happiness, the state of nature to communion with God. Typically, the structure of these plots borrowed from a

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[64] Archibald Johnston of Wariston, *Diary 1632-1639*, ed. G. M. Paul (Edinburgh: Scottish History Society, 1911); John Livingston, *A Brief Historical Relation of the Life of Mr John Livingstone, Minister of the Gospel* (Glasgow, 1754), 61; *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020. For discussion on the effect humoural temperament was thought to have on a person's emotional disposition, see Chapter One, 42-45.
[65] Calderwood, *History*, IV, 635-636.
[66] Struther, *Observations*, II, 209-210.

pattern of emotional shifts embedded in the language of public worship. The basic sequence of emotions can be schematised as: love for devotion, the apprehension of sin, legal terror, repentance, a feeling of mercy, and communion with God.[67] Authors played with how the phases of the spiritual journey built into public worship (analysed above) applied to their subject's experience.[68] Occasionally, narratives did not mention a stage in the spiritual journey, changed the order in which they were experienced, or made them overlap. Nevertheless, all the extant material used the language and concepts of emotion associated with at least two of the phases of the schema. This meant that the plots of these sources constituted an emotional sequence which was characterised by a vocabulary of emotion used in public worship about the spiritual journey of the soul. Put another way, what united these texts was the conviction that their story of emotional change was best told using the language and concepts of the six stages that constitute the soul's pilgrimage.

The conversion narrative of Mistress Rutherford has been chosen as a case-study because its narrative contains the six stages of the spiritual journey. As a result, it provides an invaluable resource for analysing the vocabulary and ideas associated with each phase of the soul's pilgrimage. By extension, discussion of Rutherford's story makes explicit the linguistic-conceptual framework used in those texts that charted a person's spiritual

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[67] This classification of the spiritual journey has a degree of similarity with the essential framework of the 'affective cycle of conversion' Cohen has identified was laid out in the preaching of puritan ministers: knowledge of the law and gospel, a sight of sin, sorrow for sin, holy desperation, vocation or calling, empowerment and perseverance. It is also similar to the 'dynamic of conversion' he has discerned in lay accounts: conviction of sin, contrition, conversion, empowerment, assurance. Both this thesis's scheme and those produced by Cohen attempt to examine how Reformed Protestants *used* language in their practice of radical emotional reflexivity in their respective contexts. To this end, they both utilise personal writings and the theology of ministers to identify what authors meant by their words. However, Protestant Scotland and puritan New England had different, albeit similar, linguistic conceptual frameworks built into their worship and piety. This may explain why Cohen's schemes, given their respective source material, use different terminology to demarcate the stages of the conversion cycle than is used here. Moreover, it may explain why Cohen conceives of the sequence of emotions experienced by New English puritans in cyclical terms, while this thesis considers it more appropriate to ascribe a more linear structure to the spiritual journey of Scottish Protestants to reflect the linguistic shifts present within the extant source material they produced. See Cohen, *God's Caress*, 21, 75-110, 202-212.

[68] Chapter Three, 75-89.

journey. Put another way, the narrative written by Rutherford reveals most of the common language built into the Scottish Protestant practice of radical emotional reflexivity.

a. Love for Devotion

Rutherford presented the first phase of her narrative as her initial experiences of religious piety. She decided that her spiritual journey began when she prayed for the first time. At the age of ten her grandmother, whom she was living with, 'took great pains in bringing [Rutherford] up in the fear of God', to participate in private devotions twice a day. Rutherford was initially bewildered by the experience for she 'knew not what it was to pray more than a beast'.[69] This was because, it is implied, she had not formerly engaged in the frequent practice of religious exercises. This was a common experience for many children in early modern Scotland. The ecclesiastical authorities expected the guardians of children, usually the master of the household, to instruct children in the articles of faith, the Ten Commandments, how to pray, and in what righteousness consists.[70] However, that ministers lamented the paucity of the spiritual education children received in the home is an indication that this was not done to a sufficiently high standard. Clergy like David Dickson decried the little attention many paid to the religious instruction of their children.[71] It is plausible that in Rutherford's case she had not, prior to living with her grandmother, been educated in the rudiments of religion, and as such it was only at the age of ten that she began to pray.

In the years following the start of Rutherford's spiritual journey – the 'founding event' of her story – her love for devotion intensified.[72] At the age of

[69] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 152.
[70] *The First Book of Discipline*, ed. J. K. Cameron (Edinburgh, 1972), IX.
[71] David Dickson, *Select Practical Writings* (Edinburgh, 1845), 82.
[72] Kathleen Lynch has argued that puritan conversion narratives presupposed that the author had apprehended what Paul Ricoeur has called a 'founding event', that which begins a new era or calendar by which the self is mapped. Only once they had assurance that they had experienced some axiomatic moment would Protestants write spiritual autobiographies. Thus, in Lynch's view, the creation of a conversion narrative assumed the subject had been converted. See Lynch, *Protestant Autobiography*, 14-15; Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer, vol.3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 104-26.

eleven she had her first experience of communion with God. One Sabbath night, while the rest of her family played in the fields, Rutherford was in her room, on her knees, praying to God. She had barely spoken three words before she was, in her words, 'ravished and taken up with joy that I cannot express, so that at that time I may say I tasted the powers of the world to come'.[73] Her claim that the intense joy encountered in her prayer was the subjective dimension of the next world's powers implied that she identified her religious ecstasy as her first experience of communion with God.[74] Though the experience was only temporary, it left a mark on Rutherford's soul. She no longer swore, and she began to love the godly community, especially zealous ministers.[75] Between eleven and fifteen, Rutherford gradually became acclimatised to the practice of prayer, taking 'great delight' and 'sweetness' in the service of God. She found that in her devotions it 'pleased the Lord to blow upon me with his Spirit' so that she experienced 'great contentment'. She also began to enjoy listening to sermons and, after reading Isaiah 58, resolved to spend the Sabbath in prayer, bible study, and meditation.[76] Thus, Rutherford identified that between the ages of ten to fifteen, she had travelled from little more than a beast who did not understand how to pray, to someone who enjoyed communion with God in prayer, delighted in the Word preached and read, loved the community of God's people, and practiced behaviour - such as abstinence from swearing and playing on the Sabbath - which was obedient to God's will.[77]

Rutherford's characterisation of her initial steps in her spiritual journey drew on a socially learned conception of how the pilgrimage of the soul begins. This idea was clearly articulated by the Aberdeen Episcopalian Robert Baron (*c*.1596-1639) in a sermon delivered on the death of one of his students named William Michel (*d*.1634).[78] In an effort to comfort the boy's

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[73] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 153.
[74] Chapter Four, 150-156.
[75] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 153.
[76] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 157.
[77] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion', 153-158.
[78] Robert Baron, *Epitaphs upon the Untymelie Death of that Hopefull, Learned, and Religious youth, Mr William Michel* (Aberdeen, 1634), F1*r*-F2*v*; *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020.

grieving parents, Baron outlined Michel's spiritual journey so that they could be assured he was in heaven. He argued that when Michel was a boy God had 'possessed his heart, making him to finde heavenlie delight, in all spirituall exercyses'. He was known to have frequently participated in religious exercises, which was considered by his godly friends as an edifying example for the community. Baron claimed the boy 'found nothing, then, but sweetnesse, and delight, and heavenlie ravishmentes in serving of God'. This was, Baron explained, the ordinary way in which the spiritual journey should begin. He outlined that God first makes those he 'hath converted' to 'finde heavenlie delight and joye', so that the soul 'may be the more enamoured with it [religious devotion], and that hee may the more easily with-drawe his heart from those carnall pleasures, with which before his conversion he was enamoured'. This effect of love for devotion can be seen in Rutherford's spiritual progression: she played less on Sundays and resisted the urge to swear. Thus the first phase of the spiritual journey, as presented by Baron, was a growth in love and enjoyment of religious exercises. In other words, this stage of the spiritual journey was a period when change began, not only in the inclinations of the appetite but also, by extension, in the judgements of the faculties.

Love for devotion acquainted a subject with instruments which would enable them to apprehend their sins. Through religious exercises, particularly the reading and hearing of the Word, the idolatry endemic to the human heart could be identified by the sinner: the second stage of the spiritual journey. It provided the tools which could shine a light on the soul's wickedness. Hence, love of devotion provided a context from which the necessary emotional changes for the cultivation of faith and love in the soul could be achieved.

b. <u>The Apprehension of Sin</u>

Rutherford's love for devotion was interrupted by her experiences of temptation and sin. She encountered three primary challenges to her love of piety: Sabbath breaking, suicidal inclinations, and atheistic doubts. As mentioned above, after reading Isaiah 58 Rutherford was convinced that she

should spend the Sabbath exclusively in prayer, bible study, and meditation.[79] Her arrival at this conclusion was consistent with the perspective on the Sabbath she would have been taught by the ecclesiastical authorities in her community. Reformed divines argued that one should observe religious ordinances in private and public on a Sunday as a form of proper obedience to the Fourth Commandment.[80] This belief is what Rutherford had internalised after her engagement with Isaiah 58. However, she regularly failed to live up to this ideal. Rutherford identified, through her practice of radical emotional reflexivity, that she frequently acquiesced to her sister's encouragements to play in the fields on the Sabbath.[81] Another time, Rutherford decided to 'bide' (not attend) church because she thought that she 'got more good' from private devotion than through listening to sermons.[82] Later, she abandoned altogether religious exercises on the Sabbath. Instead, she prioritised household tasks, such as going to get milk, travelling to buy a ribbon, or picking berries.[83] Rutherford identified that each time she broke the Sabbath, she experienced weariness and guilt, her 'conscience' checking the decisions she made to go against what she knew was the will of God.[84]

Rutherford also identified suicidal thoughts and feelings as disturbances in her love for devotion. She judged that she was 'tempted' to put what she called 'violent hands' 'into' herself, and that this experience was frequent.[85] The feelings these desires aroused in Rutherford were categorised as a form of fear, evoked by the possibility that she would injure or kill herself, and by so doing be damned to hell. Rutherford determined that she had used a variety of strategies to fight these urges. She sent up petitions to God for deliverance, but she attained no relief. She felt completely 'deserted' by God.[86] Reason was her next port of call. Rutherford

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[79] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 157.
[80] Mullan, *Narratives*, 171-172.
[81] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 157-158.
[82] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 158.
[83] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 160-161.
[84] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 160.
[85] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 155.
[86] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 156.

tried to persuade herself that suicide would lead to her damnation, and thus she should not do it. This line of attack drew on the common belief that suicide was an act which indicated the reprobation of the person who had died.[87] In desperation, she even turned to a fortune teller, who told Rutherford she would live a long life, which did provide her with a modicum of peace. However, the temptation reemerged, so much so that Rutherford had to hide her knives out of 'fear' she would end her life.[88] Relief eventually came: the temptations vanished, and Rutherford judged that she was not afflicted by these temptations ever again.[89]

Doubt, specifically about the existence of God, was a third phenomenon Rutherford identified as a disruption of her love for devotion. She associated the origin of doubt with her neglect of prayer, bible study, and religious exercises, as she mentioned these directly before her discussion of her atheism. Listening to a sermon while in this state of perceived spiritual laxity, a doubt 'was casten in her mind that ther was not a God'.[90] The idea 'molested' her, so that she was in a state of perpetual anxiety. She judged that it was the 'enimie', Satan, who had planted this evil thought in her mind. Every time she petitioned God for a persuasion that God exists, she found, in her evaluation, the devil taunting her, inquiring in a mocking tone: 'Quhat is thou doing? Thou is praying to God; there is no God'.[91] Initially, this doubt afflicted Rutherford for, in her view, about eight days. However, it resurfaced with vengeance. She implied its reemergence was connected to her Sabbath breaking, as this was what directly preceded her scepticism. These fresh doubts terrified Rutherford. She was concerned that if she believed there was no God when she died, she would be sent to hell.[92] Rutherford connected her anguish with her loss of appetite. Though in prayer she occasionally found relief, her situation continued to escalate.[93] Afraid she would doubt the

[87] Mullan, *Narratives*, 261-264.
[88] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 156.
[89] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 156-157.
[90] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 154.
[91] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 155.
[92] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 160.
[93] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 161-162.

existence of God while at prayer and engaged in study of the bible, she no longer practiced religious exercises. This, she judged, precipitated new doubts: Rutherford was tempted to believe the scriptures were not the Word of God and that the soul did not exist after death. Aware that what she was inclined to doubt what she ought to profess wholeheartedly, as taught by the ecclesiastical authorities, her stress increased to the point that she nearly fainted. However, she concluded that at that moment, when all hope was lost, 'it pleased the Lord to remove them from me immediately and cleared me of it'.[94]

The temptations Rutherford encountered were not unique to her. In their own practice of radical emotional reflexivity other Scots judged that they had also faced suicidal temptations and doubts. A contemporary example of Rutherford's was that of Lady Hundaly, Mary Rutherford (*d*.1640). Archibald Porteous (*fl.*1640), the man who wrote an account of a dialogue the two had, conveyed to his readers that she identified that she was tempted by the devil to self-harm.[95] Moreover, Mistress Rutherford's scepticism was a common experience. James Mitchell of Dykes (*fl*.1619-1646), like Rutherford, doubted the existence of God, which he associated with a decline in his religious devotion.[96] More commonly, Protestants in Scotland and elsewhere were moved to question the veracity of biblical promises.[97] On the 25th August 1624, John Forbes of Corse (1593-1648) judged that he was 'overwhelmed' and 'greatly troubled' by a 'dangerous tentation concerning the divine true of the scriptures'.[98] William Cowper was afflicted with a lack of certainty in the Word.[99] Rutherford's doubts about the immortality of the soul were also common experiences for Reformed Protestants in Britain.[100] An example is that of Dykes, who questioned whether there was 'another life', which like

[94] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 162; Chapter Five, 200-202.
[95] Porteous, *Exercise*, 16-17.
[96] Dykes, *Memoirs*, 14-15.
[97] Alec Ryrie, *Unbelievers: An Emotional History of Doubt* (London: William Collins, 2019), 120-122.
[98] Forbes, *Diary*, 20; *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020.
[99] Cowper, *Life*, B3*r*.
[100] Ryrie, *Unbelievers*, 119-120.

Rutherford he connected with his lack of participation in religious exercises.[101]

Mischief on the Sabbath, suicidal thoughts, and atheistic doubts were all experiences Rutherford identified as sinful emotions. She believed that they were wrong, given her socially learned concepts of what was right. That is, they were judged by Rutherford, in her practice of radical emotional reflexivity, as emotions which obstructed her spiritual journey. They stunted, and even reversed, her love of devotion, and consequently her transition from idolatry to communion with God. She implied that this was her assessment by the way she named her emotions and responses to these experiences. She communicated that she felt guilty for breaking the Sabbath; she was afraid she would be damned for her suicidal and atheistic inclinations; she asked God to remove her temptations and tried as hard as she could to escape them. Occasionally, Rutherford recorded that in these trials she remembered her former love for devotion fondly, and was ashamed that her actions, thoughts, and feelings had led her so far astray.[102] Thus, these experiences were not presented by Rutherford in a positive manner. She did not deviate from her initial judgement that these were evil, except only to further reinforce the fact that they had a Satanic origin. Rather, she identified her Sabbath breaking, suicidal desires, and atheistic beliefs as examples of sin, something that should be avoided and fought in the spiritual journey from misery to happiness. In this way, she not only identified what kinds of thing she had experienced (Sabbath breaking, suicidal desires, atheistic doubts) but also their significance in her soul's pilgrimage.

To understand why Rutherford would identify these aspects of her history as a form of sin, it would be useful to analyse the conception of sin embedded in the Scottish Protestant linguistic-conceptual framework. Robert Rollock provided the clearest examination of this category.[103] There are, he argued, four types of sin. The first two are 'internal', a kind of emotion, while

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[101] Dykes, *Memoirs*, 14.
[102] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 161.
[103] Rollock, *Effectual Calling*, 147-149.

the latter two are ‘external’, embodied actions. Both the internal and external sins can be divided into those of ‘omission’ and those of ‘comission’. The internal sin of omission, Rollock claimed, was the lack ‘of a good motion’ of the soul, which proceeds from a lack of ‘original justice’ – original sin. This is joined with the internal sin of commission, which is a ‘perverse and evil motion’ of the soul. Rollock identified these internal sins as ‘affections or motions’: they were passions. Thus, the idea of internal sins of omission and commission was built upon the theory of emotion that Scottish Protestants presupposed (outlined in chapter one) and their assumption that the psychological faculties are corrupted (analysed in chapter two).[104] Rutherford implicitly identified her suicidal inclinations as internal sins of commission, given that they constituted an evil desire which would lead to eternal misery. Likewise, she categorised her doubts about the existence of God as internal sins of omission, as they were a lack of faith in and love for God, the instruments of happiness. The internal sins cause, Rollock argued, external sin: actions of the body. External sins of omission are sins committed when what ought to be done is not done, which proceed from the internal sin of omission. The external sins of commission, which are motivated by the internal sins of commission, are twofold: those violations of God’s law which are done in negligence, and those done with the knowledge that they are wrong. Rutherford tacitly judged her Sabbath breaking and neglect of her devotions as both an external sin of omission, a failure to render to God what is God’s due, and a sin of commission, as she knew that she had violated the Fourth Commandment.

Rutherford judged that her suicidal and atheistic experiences (internal sins of omission and commission) were caused by Satan. She claimed that Satan planted in her mind the thought that ‘ther was not a God’.[105] Rutherford interpreted her resistance to this temptation as a combat with Satan in her soul, the devil usually victorious in the fight.[106] Moreover, Rutherford

[104] Chapter One, 18-47; Chapter Two, 67-72.
[105] Mistress Rutherford, ‘Conversion Narrative’, 154-155, 160-162.
[106] Mistress Rutherford, ‘Conversion Narrative’, 155. See Chapter Three, 97.

identified her suicidal thoughts and feelings as the work of Satan. Though at the time she interpreted her suicidal inclinations as a product of a 'naturall desert in the blood', when she created her narrative she had concluded that her emotions were in fact caused by 'Satan'.[107] It was widely assumed in Reformed Protestant circles that it was Satan who lured people to self-harm and die by suicide, which rationalises why Rutherford changed her judgement (analysed more fully in chapter five).[108]

The idea that Satan could cause internal sins of omission and commission was a feature of the linguistic-conceptual framework of the spiritual journey that explains why Rutherford could identify her sinful emotions as his work. Presbyterian minister Robert Bruce warned his congregation that 'the devil hath spued into our hearts' the 'deceit and false pleasure of sin'. He encouraged his listeners to always 'examine your affections', for 'the devil is in them'.[109] Bishop William Cowper reflected that his doubts, fears, and sins were 'not so much actions done by mee', but are 'spirituall oppressions of mine enemie', motions 'making invasion upon my soule'.[110] 'God worketh no more mightily in the elect, than Sathan doth in the reprobate', declared William Struther, while David Dickson cautioned his congregation to 'suffer not Satan so to blind your mind'.[111] Similar views of Satan's agency were also espoused by contemporaneous English protestants.[112] Brock has called this identification of negative emotions as the product of Satan's activity within the soul by Scottish Protestants 'internalization of the demonic'.[113] Her analysis of this idea will be examined

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[107] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 157. See below for more discussion on this point.
[108] Mullan, *Narratives*, 261-264.
[109] Bruce, *Sermons*, 354.
[110] William Cowper, *A Most Comfortable and Christian Dialogue, Betweene the Lord, and the Soule* (London, 1611), 65-66.
[111] Struther, *Happiness*, 134; Dickson, *Writings*, 31.
[112] Nathan Johnstone, *The Devil and Demonism in Early Modern England* (Cambridge, 2006); Nathan Johnstone, 'The Protestant Devil: The Experience of Temptation in Early Modern England' in *Journal of British Studies*, 43, no.2 (2004), 173–205; Frank Luttmer, 'Prosecutors, Tempters and Vassals of the Devil: The Unregenerate in Puritan Practical Divinity' in *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 51, no.1 (2000), 37–68; Darren Oldridge, *The Devil in Early Modern England* (Sutton, 2000); Darren Oldridge, *The Devil in Tudor and Stuart England* (Stroud, 2010).
[113] Brock, *Satan and the Scots*, 97-123.

more fully in chapter four.[114] For the present purpose, what matters is that Protestants in Scotland identified Satan as an actor 'actually *within* men and women', the cause of their internal, and by extension external, sins.[115] The devil played the role of the formal object that moves the appetites. This claim was plausible from the Scottish Protestant perspective because of the emotional logic they presupposed (analysed in chapter one) which demanded that an external agent, which enters the subject's consciousness, moves the sensitive appetite.[116] This process, whereby the supernatural effects and resides inside the soul, will be explored further in the next chapter.[117]

Rutherford's sins overlapped and subsumed her love of devotion. This was because the first phase of her spiritual journey was a growth in enjoyment of religious exercises rather than of God. This is why the person in this stage could easily be overwhelmed by their experience of sin. While it marked a change of the subject's appetites, insofar as they were moved to love good things, it had not ascertained an absolute desire for God. Rather, it was moved to love piety. While prayer, bible study, meditation, listening to sermons, and right behaviour could all be instruments which facilitated communion with God, they were not themselves fellowship with God. They were finite, temporal creatures created by God. An absolute love for devotion was still both a state of misery and idolatry. It was a form of emotion produced by the corruption of the faculties, as it was not an unqualified love or enjoyment of God. Thus, love of devotion, as a finite and temporal reality, could not satisfy the illimited desire of the soul (as analysed in chapter two).[118] Unable to provide permanent rest, the appetite wandered back to its love of that which it should not have desired unconditionally, which produces internal sins of omission and commission. This can be seen in Rutherford's temptations: she desired to return to her Sabbath breaking; she was inclined

[114] Chapter Four, 138-139.
[115] Brock, *Satan and the Scots*, 106.
[116] Chapter One, 29.
[117] Chapter Four, 140-149.
[118] Chapter Two, 52-54.

to reject the joy she had and die; she was even tempted to deny that there was in fact a God, and consequently to abandon her piety. Mere love of *devotion*, hence, allowed sin to flourish because, at its core, it was a form of sin, and as such was unable to satisfy the absolute love of the soul.

Simultaneously, Rutherford's engagement in religious exercises made her aware that her emotions and actions were sinful.[119] Prayer, bible reading, and listening to sermons taught her to differentiate godliness and idolatry. As a consequence, she learned to perceive that she was a sinner. For example, it was through reading Isaiah 58 that Rutherford learned that Sabbath breaking was a sin, which meant that when she did violate the Fourth Commandment she recognised that what she had done was wrong.[120] Crucially, Rutherford had committed sin before this stage in the spiritual journey due to the effects of original sin on her faculties. What mattered here was that she had become *aware* of her wrongdoing through her love for devotion. Thus, though she had sinned before and would do so again, a participation in religious exercises taught Rutherford to apprehend her sins, a decisive stage in the spiritual journey.

c. Legal Terror

The third phase of Rutherford's spiritual journey can be identified with when she underwent 'the exercise of conscience and had legal terror'.[121] While in the previous phase Rutherford had become aware of the fact that in some instances she had sinned, in this stage she understood the extent of the sin in her life and the consequences she faced for her wrongdoing. Through reflection upon her childhood, Rutherford judged that she had sinned through her unruly passions, her neglect of the Sabbath, her 'worldly' thoughts, the lack of feeling she experienced in prayer, and that she had received the Lord's Supper unworthily. For these sins, Rutherford concluded

[119] Yeoman has argued this was the typical beginning of the conversion process. See Yeoman, 'Heart-work', 22. In relation to a puritan context, see Cohen, *God's Caress*, 202.
[120] Chapter Three, 95-96.
[121] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 162-171; Yeoman, 'Heart-work', 9; Mullan, *Scottish Puritanism*, 90-93; Cohen, *God's Caress*, 202-207; Watkins, *Puritan Experience*, 37-39.

that ‘wrath and damnation’ were her lot, as she had offended God. Identification of her sins as an insult to God which deserved an eternity in hell stimulated, in Rutherford’s judgement at the time of writing, a ‘torment as is inexpressible’ in her former self.[122] Even when, in time, the ‘fear of hell left’ Rutherford, she judged that she was in a state of despair for ‘the offence I had done to God’.[123] It meant that she did not pray, as she was too afraid and ashamed to seek help from God. Rutherford’s legal terror, thus, was presented by her as an experience of intense dread and despair evoked by a recognition she had sinned and consequently was a reprobate.

Rutherford’s presentation of her experience as a fear and sorrow motivated by an awareness of one’s own depravity was a categorisation of her emotions which drew upon the ideas of ‘law-work’ and ‘legal terror’, which was conveyed to her by ‘legal preaching’.[124] This idea was set forth with clarity by Robert Rollock in the form of a ‘legal syllogism’. First, the subject is made, through the activity of the Holy Spirit, to believe that everyone is damned who does not fulfil the God’s law in its entirety. Second, the Spirit persuades the subject that they have not perfectly obeyed God’s Law. Consequently, they believe that they are damned.[125] Analysis of each step in the argument will elucidate the experience and language of law-work as presented in narratives of the spiritual journey.

The first premise, that all who disobey God are damned, drew upon the Scottish Protestant conception of the covenant of works, also called a legal or natural covenant. Rollock argued that the covenant of works was a promise made by God to Adam in the Garden of Eden prior to the Fall. God stipulated that if Adam and his posterity performed good works, then they would receive eternal life – communion with God. However, if they failed in this, sinners would receive their just reward: eternal punishment. Thus, the covenant of works was bilateral. It constituted a contract between God and humanity, in which God offers eternal life to the one who satisfies the

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[122] Mistress Rutherford, ‘Conversion Narrative’, 163.
[123] Mistress Rutherford, ‘Conversion Narrative, 167, 169.
[124] Yeoman, ‘Heart-work’, 9-11, 21; Mullan *Scottish Puritanism*, 90-93.
[125] Rollock, *Effectual Calling*, 205.

obligation to perform good works.[126] As this covenant was offered to all humanity, it was not an optional bargain: all people were born into this relationship with God. Hence, it could be called the 'natural' covenant.[127]

Fulfilment of the covenant's condition, Rollock argued, required 'perfect obedience to his law'. By one's natural capacities one was expected to be obedient to the will of God, which was later put into concrete form in the Ten Commandments – 'the law'. Reformed Protestants believed that the stipulations of the law applied not only to external behaviour, but also the inner life. John Dod's (1550-1645) popular exegesis of the Ten Commandments, read and used by Scottish Protestants like Archibald Johnston of Wariston, made this point.[128] When he analysed the commandment against adultery, Dod interpreted the injunction to prohibit not only certain kinds of sexual act, but also wrongful desires and lusts.[129] Similarly, Dod extended the command against theft as a prohibition against the desire to steal.[130] Dod's approach was not novel: it followed Jesus's reinterpretation of what constitutes adultery and murder in the Sermon on the Mount.[131] The law understood in this way entailed that absolute moral perfection in thought, emotion, and action was necessary to fulfil the covenant of works.[132] This demand cultivated a culture of exactness in Reformed Protestantism, an incessant demand for perfection: what has been called the 'nomist dimension' (by Jerald Brauer), the 'precisianist strand' (by Theodore Bozeman) and the 'voluntarist' aspect (by Peter Lake) of puritan

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[126] Rollock, *Effectual Calling*, 6-11; Mullan, *Scottish Puritanism*, 186-187; Guy M. Richard, 'The Covenant Idea in Mid-Seventeenth-Century Scotland' in *The History of Scottish Theology, Volume I: Celtic Origins to Reformed Orthodoxy*, eds. David Fergusson and Mark W. Elliott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 242-247; Scott Spurlock, 'Boundaries of Scottish Reformed Orthodoxy, 1560-1700', *The History of Scottish Theology*, 363.
[127] Perry Miller, *The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1954), 45.
[128] Wariston, *Diary*, 94, 114, 120, 139; *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020.
[129] John Dod, *A Plaine and Familiar Exposition of the Ten Commandements* (London, 1604), 51.
[130] Dod, *Ten Commandements*, 57.
[131] Matthew 5:21-22; 5:27-28.
[132] Miller, *New England*, 45, 57.

piety in English and North American contexts.[133] This emphasis in Scottish Protestantism will be explored more fully in chapter five.[134] For the present purposes, what is important is that for many Reformed Protestants the fulfilment of the law, in the covenant of works, required (but was not limited too) emotional perfection.

The second premise of the legal syllogism, that the subject has not perfectly obeyed God's law, required the subject to identify past thoughts, emotions, and actions as sins. It was facilitated by engagement in radical emotional reflexivity, through which the subject compared their performance with God's law and concluded that they had disobeyed. Theological treatises, like Dod's exegesis on the Ten Commandments, were used by Scottish Protestants to facilitate this process, as they provided a clear exposition of what constituted sin.[135] This evaluative process, which will be analysed more fully in chapter five as a mobilising practice, was expected to produce the result that the subject recognised they had failed their part in the covenant of works.[136] In chapter two, it was argued that Protestants in Scotland believed that original sin had left human nature totally depraved, so that it consistently committed internal and external sins of omission and commission.[137] As sin was considered a violation of God's law, it meant that humanity was predisposed, by the Fall, to constantly think, feel, and act in ways which disobeyed God's will. Thus the inner logic of the theological scheme that Scottish Protestants were socially taught entailed that no one could fulfil the condition of the covenant of works.[138] Hence comparison of one's performance with the law should, as Rollock argued, lead to an identification of sin, and as such of imperfect obedience to the will of God.[139] Taken to its

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[133] Jerald C. Brauer, 'Types of Puritan Piety' in *Church History: Studies in Christianity and Culture*, 56, no.1 (1987), 45-47; Theodore Dwight Bozeman, *The Precisianist Strain: Disciplinary Religion & Antinomian Backlash in Puritanism to 1638* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 11; Lake, *Moderate Puritans*, 153.
[134] Chapter Five, 160-204.
[135] Wariston, *Diary*, 139.
[136] Chapter Five, 189-203.
[137] Chapter Two, 67-72.
[138] Yeoman, 'Heart-work', 11-12; Mullan, *Scottish Puritanism*, 91.
[139] Yeoman, 'Heart-work, 12-13, 22-26; Mullan, *Scottish Puritanism*, 91-93.

logical extreme, the process should produce the result that the subject has never obeyed God, as all their thoughts, feelings, and actions are evil due to their orientation towards idolatrous ends.

The syllogism was complete when the subject believed and felt that, because of their disobedience, they were damned. They experienced this conclusion in the emotion of worldly sorrow (discussed earlier in this chapter).[140] What matters here is that legal terror was a kind of emotional knowledge. The nature of such knowing was defined by Robert Blair. It is not a 'brain, frothy, foamy knowledge'. Instead, it is 'true and spiritual knowledge' which is 'affectionate and practical'.[141] Yeoman has coined this 'heart-work' or 'heart-knowledge', a kind of understanding which involves emotional change.[142] It has also been characterised by Lake as the translation of objective doctrine into subjective experience.[143] In the vocabulary used by Scottish Protestants, analysed in chapter one, heart-knowledge differed from brain-knowledge insofar as the latter involved and evaluation of the intention of the known object in relation to the subject, which moved the appetite in the appropriate way.[144] In the case of worldly sorrow, the subject does not merely understand that they are damned in a disinterested manner. In the language Scottish Protestants would have used, the understanding and will judged that damnation was not good for the subject and, if the appetite were moved rightly, they would experience passions appropriate to these judgements: fear and despair. Heart-knowledge, thus, was a passion which indicated the subject had correctly judged the significance of what a doctrine described in relation to their own wellbeing, manifested in a person's consequent psychosomatic experience. Hence, legal terror was considered a passion that was moved by a correct judgement by the rational cognition and volition, and thus was a kind of heart-knowledge.

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[140] Chapter Three, 80.
[141] Blair, *Life*, 21-24.
[142] Yeoman, 'Heart-work', 133-135. It should be noted that Yeoman primarily uses this term in relation to the positive emotions Scottish Protestants experienced.
[143] Lake, *Moderate Puritans*, 127; Mullan, *Scottish Puritanism*, 87-88; Watkins, *Puritan Experience*, 39.
[144] Chapter One, 28-29, 30-35, 38-39.

Therefore, when Rutherford conveyed that she had experienced legal terror in the third act of her soul's journey, she told her reader that she had experiences of dread and despair caused by her engagement with the legal syllogism. She had tested her prior thoughts, emotions, and actions against the perfect obedience that the covenant of works required and recognised that she had come up short. She had concluded that she was damned, and this aroused, in her judgement at the time of writing, terrible fear and anguish. This was a form of heart-knowledge, an emotion which was motivated by a proper judgement of what the reality of sin meant for her eternal future. As she judged these features of law-work matched her experience, Rutherford identified these experiences as an example of legal terror.

Scottish Protestants considered law-work an important stage in the spiritual journey towards happiness because they believed it prepared the subject to have faith. They assumed that, because of the soul's propensity to love absolutely what is not God (explored in chapter two), their faculties required reformation to facilitate communion with God.[145] Consequently, ministers like Samuel Rutherford reaffirmed this point when he argued that what is needed is for Christ to 'give you a Vomite-Drink, that you may grow Wholseome and Hungry again for Christ'.[146] Similarly, David Dickson compared the preparation of the sinner to 'the drying of timber to make it sooner take fire, when it is casten into it'.[147] Law-work was the vomit-drink and the drying of timber in these metaphors. It persuaded the subject that what they loved most was not worth their unconditional desire, as its consequence was eternal damnation. Like the vomit-drink mentioned by Rutherford, law-work could lead to the expulsion of idolatry, which would provide an opportunity for the appetite to find its rest in some other object. Legal terror, thus, was a stage where the subject's absolute love for idols was weakened through the exposure to where such worship leads – hell –

[145] Chapter Two, 67-72.
[146] Samuel Rutherford, *Christs Napkin*, 16.
[147] Dickson, *Writings*, 219-220.

which prepared the soul for a new love to be placed within it. Hence, a fundamental goal of Scottish Protestants ministers was to stimulate worldly sorrow in their congregations through their preaching.[148] As an important way of mobilising emotion, this will be analysed further in chapter five.[149]

d. Repentance

Rutherford's worldly sorrow was alleviated by her experience of a hope of mercy and godly sorrow.[150] Both emotions were expected of participants in penitential rituals, as they were considered the emotional dimension of sincere repentance (as explored earlier in the chapter).[151] Rutherford's hope emerged when she got 'liberty to read' Hezekiah's sickness.[152] Through this text, 'the Lord was pleased to work some hope of mercy in me'. 'Hope', as analysed in chapter one, was considered an inclination towards a good object which was not present and difficult to obtain.[153] In Rutherford's case, the formal object of her hope was God's mercy. Whereas before she was in a state of despair, defined as a resignation that the good formal object is impossible to obtain, now she believed that she could get mercy. Her hope meant that while before she had believed God's mercy was something she could never get, and thus would be futile to desire, now she could have it, as there was a chance she could receive it.

Emboldened with a hope of mercy, Rutherford was then moved to godly sorrow. She 'was led to mourn for sin in generall', sometimes 'in great bitternes for offending a mercifull and loving God'.[154] She judged that occasionally she had a 'fear of reprobation', but never a 'fear of hell'. Instead, Rutherford had an 'exceeding longing for Christ on any condition, and it had

[148] Yeoman, 'Heart-work', 21; Mullan, *Scottish Puritanism*, 92. Puritan ministers had a similar aim when preaching the law. See Watkins, *Puritan Experience*, 5-9, 37-39; Cohen, *God's Caress*, 86-94.
[149] Chapter Five, 189-203.
[150] Yeoman, 'Heart-work', 173.
[151] Chapter Three, 80-81.
[152] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 168; 2 Kings 20; 2 Chronicles 32; Isaiah 38.
[153] Chapter One, 38-39.
[154] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 169.

been to have endured all the torture of the damned'.[155] Her language corresponded to the socially learned emotion type of godly sorrow, which Robert Bruce (as discussed above) defined as a sorrow 'for God's own cause' and by Robert Rollock as 'sorrow for sinne itselfe'.[156] Put another way, Rutherford was aggrieved not by the consequence of her sin – damnation – but by an apprehension that she had wronged the God 'who was so loving, so merciful, and had such pity and compassion upon' sinners.[157] Thus she had repented of and hated her sin. Having experienced mortification, she was ready to undergo vivification.[158]

e. A Feeling of Mercy

Predisposed to believe God's mercy was in reach and that God is the supreme good of human nature, Rutherford was ready to receive the gift of faith. This happened, she identified, at the Lord's Supper in the West Kirk, Edinburgh. Rutherford judged that when she attended the table, she 'gat bleeding Christ apprehended, and his merit applyed for pardon'.[159] Rutherford's interpretation of her acquisition of faith relied upon what Robert Rollock called the 'evangelicall syllogisme' (mentioned briefly in chapter two).[160] First, the subject holds that whoever has faith is justified. Rollock, like many Scottish Protestants, believed that after the Fall, God made a new covenant with Adam which provided the only feasible route for fallen humanity to acquire communion with God. This covenant of grace, the gospel, was a promise that if the subject had faith in Christ, they would be forgiven of their sins, have Christ's righteousness imputed to them, and have their emotions changed so that they could have happiness. Thus this covenant was considered both unilateral and bilateral. Communion with God is still conditional on human performance. However, unlike the covenant of

[155] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 169-170.
[156] Bruce, *Sermons*, 357; Rollock, *Effectual Calling*, 204.
[157] Bruce, *Sermons*, 358.
[158] In a puritan context, repentance and self-denial were considered necessary for the heart to be ready to receive faith. See Cohen, *God's Caress*, 80-86, 206.
[159] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 171.
[160] Chapter Two, 61-62.

works, which can only be fulfilled by a human's natural powers, in the covenant of grace the Holy Spirit creates effectual faith in the recipient of grace. Consequently, the covenant of grace is both a free offer of grace and conditional upon the performance of faith.[161]

The second step in the evangelical syllogism is that the subject believes they have faith. As analysed in chapter two, Scottish Protestants believed that faith was a double judgement of the understanding and will that God's mercy in the person and work of Jesus Christ is true and good for the subject.[162] It is, then, a persuasion that the gospel is both trustworthy and applies specifically to the subject. It is Christ and his benefits as applied to the self. Thus, when Rutherford judged that she had 'gat' Christ and mercy 'applyed' for the forgiveness of her sins, she conveyed to the reader that this was an experience of faith.

Finally, the subject who has identified they have faith can conclude they are justified. This is exactly what Rutherford did when she argued that through this apprehension of Christ she had become a recipient of 'justification'. This she experienced as 'inexpressible joy', and she felt 'eased and joyfull' for the rest of the day. Such an emotional response was called by Robert Bruce 'a feeling of mercy', essential for admittance to the ritual of public repentance (as discussed earlier in this chapter).[163] Put another way, the feeling of mercy was heart-knowledge, a rest of the appetite in Christ and his benefits, as presented in the gospel. It was more than an intellectual belief that God's mercy saves. A feeling of mercy was the movement of the appetite to love and joy by the judgement that the gospel applied to the subject in particular. Thus Rutherford's presentation of this experience was indicative of a change, at this stage in the narrative, in which concept she used to interpret her emotions: from the nomist dimension to what Brauer

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[161] Rollock, *Effectual Calling*, 11-26; Mullan, *Scottish Puritanism*, 187; Richard, 'Covenant', 240-242; Spurlock, 'Boundaries', 363; John von Rohr, *The Covenant of Grace in Puritan Thought* (Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press, 1986), 2-9.
[162] Chapter Two, 60-63.
[163] Bruce, *Sermons*, 361. Chapter Three, 81.

called the ‘evangelical’ strain of Reformed Protestant piety.[164] In other words, she had experienced conversion.[165]

Having acquired faith and a feeling of mercy, Rutherford’s emotions in her judgement continued to progress towards absolute love for God. She felt reassured in her faith when she learned that, though her apprehension of God’s presence fluctuated in the feeling of mercy, ‘he would carry me through’.[166] Moreover, Rutherford’s faith was augmented when she understood that she had to take Christ with God as the ‘object of my faith and obedience’.[167] Previously, she had only faith in God the Father and ‘not mine eye on Christ’. She was, ‘lovingly… reproved’, and her experience was a ‘sweet blyth day’, which she interpreted as heart-knowledge of this truth. This was confirmed by the fact that, in her view, they were not a set of ‘flitting thoughts’, but remained a ‘continiouing light of truth’. Rutherford was also taught that her love for the godly and her fear of God’s wrath were signs of election, the truth of which she felt as a ‘greater sweetnes and promises of performance’, which had a prolonged effect.[168] All in all, Rutherford’s emotions underwent significant change. Her joy, and by implication love, was stimulated by an ever more refined comprehension of the gospel as she applied it to herself. She had an increasingly clear idea and experience of what the covenant of grace demanded of her and what it entailed in every situation. Thus Rutherford presented her judgements of the understanding and will, in relation to the gospel, as undergoing a process of change where they became more accurate. As such her heart-knowledge grew so that her appetite was moved, in the right ways in more situations than before, to the love and enjoyment of Christ and his benefits. Desire for the gospel gradually replaced the love of not-God in her life.[169]

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[164] Brauer, ‘Types’, 47-49; Lake, *Moderate Puritans*, 165-168.
[165] Yeoman, ‘Heart-work’, 17, 21, 28-29; Mullan, *Scottish Protestantism*, 87-88; Watkins, 39-40; Cohen, *God’s Caress*, 208-210.
[166] Mistress Rutherford, ‘Conversion Narrative’, 173.
[167] Mistress Rutherford, ‘Conversion Narrative’, 173.
[168] Mistress Rutherford, ‘Conversion Narrative’, 175, 180.
[169] This is similar to Yeoman’s and Cohen’s ideas that after conversion Scottish Protestants/puritans felt empowered to pursue godliness. See Yeoman, ‘Heart-work’, 29-32; Cohen, *God’s Caress*, 98-100.

Rutherford's increase in love for and enjoyment of Christ did not mean that she never sinned. She identified that she frequently had to deal with internal sins in this fifth phase of her spiritual journey. However, they differed in kind from those she had encountered in the earlier phases her love for devotion, apprehension of sin, and legal terror. Rutherford's internal sins consisted in her doubts about the reality of her spiritual journey. She was tempted to question whether the emotional changes she had undergone were real, or simply a figment of her imagination. She was sceptical about 'if I had faith or repentance or love or fear of God… the reality of my grace, thinking my faith a temporary faith and repentance temporary and obedience a temporary obedience'.[170] This was because, through her practice of self-examination, Rutherford came to believe that she did not have a godly sorrow and feeling of mercy 'as I would measure to myself' – as she expected from somebody who was on a spiritual pilgrimage.[171] Thus, she believed she was a hypocrite, which stimulated 'great bitterness' in Rutherford's mind.[172] Her anguish was so strong that at that time that Rutherford claimed, 'if I had 1000d worlds I would have given them for God'.[173] She attributed these doubts and scepticism to Satan's malicious activity. This reinforced her presentation of these doubts as sins, for they questioned the reality of what God had done. Note that her identification of these experiences as sinful presupposed that she was wrong to doubt the genuineness of her faith. But by the time she wrote down her experiences, she must have believed that her faith was real, and so interpreted her doubts as wrong about her spiritual estate. Thus her evaluation of these experiences as sins reinforced Rutherford's message to the reader: she was on a spiritual journey, even if Satan had tried to derail her persuasion that she was on a pilgrimage towards happiness.

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[170] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 176.
[171] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 174.
[172] The nature and cause of the doubts will be analysed and evaluated fully in chapter five, as they were the unintended results of the practice of radical emotional reflexivity as engaged in by Scottish Protestants. See Chapter Five, 179-189.
[173] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 174. A similar phrase was used by Ninian Campbell, cited in chapter two, to explain the how God was the supreme good of the soul in comparison to all else. See Chapter Two, 54.

The biggest difference, however, was that due to her faith and increasing heart-knowledge, Rutherford handled her sins better than before. In the phases of love for devotion and an apprehension of sin, faced with atheism and suicide, Rutherford did not pray often.[174] While at the stage of legal terror, she was too terrified to pray. By contrast, Rutherford regularly prayed to God when she suffered temptations after she had felt God's mercy.[175] Many of her doubts were overcome, in her judgement, through the acquisition of heart-knowledge is answer to these prayers. Sometimes this was through God's speech directly into her soul or through the study of the bible, while at other points it came through words from her friends.[176] Whatever the case, these phrases – what Yeoman has called 'text-getting' – reinforced Rutherford's assurance that she was a member of the elect.[177] For example, it was the words of Rutherford's mentor Betty Aird which persuaded her that she had a genuine godly sorrow.[178] Similarly, John Gillon (*fl*.1619) taught Rutherford that feeling fear was a divine gift, and this gave her the confidence that she was saved.[179] Her doubts, thus, were overcome by growth in her feeling of God's mercy.[180] Rutherford's presentation of her experience in this part of the narrative as one where she was better able to overcome her doubts with divine assistance was intended to emphasise that she had received faith. This contrasted with the previous stages, where she was unable to triumph over sin because she lacked an assurance that she was loved by God.

Thus the fifth part of Rutherford's narrative was the acquisition of feeling God's mercy, and its growth. It was judged as a period of emotional

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[174] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 162.
[175] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 172, 174, 176, 178, 181.
[176] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 175, 176, 180.
[177] Yeoman, 'Heart-work', 31; Chapter Four, 134-135.
[178] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 172. Betty Aird, daughter of minister William Aird (*d*.1606/7), ran a school for girls in Edinburgh which Mistress Rutherford attended. See Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 147.
[179] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 180. Beyond his involvement with Rutherford, nothing is known about Gillon.
[180] This is similar to Cohen's idea that after conversion the elect were better able to cooperate with grace to combat the flesh because they had within them a 'spiritual principle'. See Cohen, *God's Caress*, 210.

development, an increase in right emotion in many situations. Although it was imperfect, Rutherford pointedly emphasised that she was, unlike in prior stages, able to overcome many of the challenges she faced. Ultimately, it was an empowerment of the subject to love, and thus enjoy, Christ and his benefits. However, this stage did not culminate in communion with God. Rutherford had not reached continual happiness. Rather, her appetite could not rest in the supreme good because the residue of corruption remained in her faculties; thus she was prone to the sins of internal omission and commission, manifested in her doubts. Idolatry was still a feature of her life, and the journey needed to enter its sixth stage to reach its climax.

f. Communion with God

The last part of the narrative Rutherford presented as a stage where she came to love absolutely and had a lasting communion with God. It was precipitated by a marriage proposal. Unsure of whether to accept, 'with great earnestnes and a loosed heart' she begged God for guidance in prayer.[181] Asked to give her verdict on the proposal, she entered the room where others gathered to hear her answer. In a 'suddain the Lord filled the heart with such a sense of himself that cannot be expressed with assurance of his leading me'.[182] She interpreted this experience as a sign that she should accept, and she did so. Further confirmation arose when, for the next few days, her 'heart was filled with peace, I may say which passeth understanding'. She could not 'make language of it', only able to call it 'the power of God' within her. Rutherford judged that from that time on, 'all the passages of my particular' were lived 'without breaking of my communion with God'.[183] In other words, she was persuaded that she had a constant possession of God.[184] And, as established in chapter two, this meant she had happiness: the peace of the appetite at rest in the object of its desire.[185]

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[181] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 181.
[182] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 182.
[183] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 182.
[184] This sense of assurance mirrors Cohen's description of the climax of the affective cycle of conversion. See Cohen, *God's Caress*, 211.
[185] Chapter Two, 57-60, 63-67.

However, as Rutherford's faculties were still corrupted, her communion with God could grow, as her love and enjoyment of God could become all-encompassing.[186] She and her husband travelled to Ireland, and on this physical journey Rutherford 'fand the Lord', feeling 'his presence' when they landed.[187] Though she had doubts, they were 'fully loosed' at Robert Cunningham's (*fl*.1608-1636) administration of the Lord's Supper, where she 'gote Christ taken to be my life and head'.[188] This brought 'such fulnes with it my narrow heart could hold no more'. At Robert Blair's communion, Rutherford judged that her experience of Christ went even further. She 'got Christ taken for sanctification with much comfort'. At another of Blair's Lord's Suppers, it was 'cast into' Rutherford's mind to 'take Christ to be all', for strength and as an escape from all troubles. She received the elements as a promise that 'Christ shall be all unto me, and I gat him taken so'. The Wednesday after, in Rutherford's evaluation, the Lord gave 'a measure of presence in prayer and sense of himself that I was not able to endure my narrow heart'. Rutherford presented this period as filled with ecstatic experiences of communion with God, intense joy interpreted as a perception of God's presence (an idea which will be explored further in chapter four).[189] Moreover, it was a further augmentation of Rutherford's faith, an increase in her heart-knowledge. She learned to apply Christ not only for her justification, but also for her sanctification. He became her 'all', her 'head'. In other words, her understanding and will judged that Christ and his benefits were the absolute good of her soul, and this moved her appetite to brilliant feelings of communion with God. It was an advanced form of heart-work, which radically increased Rutherford's comprehension of the gospel, and as such powerfully improved her enjoyment of God.

Yet, Rutherford conveyed to the reader that there were a few significant challenges that she had to triumph over before her love for God

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[186] Cohen, *God's Caress*, 211-212.
[187] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 182.
[188] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 183; W. D. Baillie, *The Six Mile Water Revival of 1625* (The Presbyterian Historical Society of Ireland, 1976), 8-23.
[189] Chapter Four, 150-156.

could be unconditional. This was acquired through acceptance of her husband's and son's deaths. Throughout her husband's fatal illness, Rutherford was 'tortured with fear of his death'.[190] She was afraid that he would be damned, and so sought the 'sense of God's love and presence to him [her husband]'. Likewise, she prayed for her son's eternal destiny fervently, asking God to pardon him for the original sin he had inherited through her. However, what distressed Rutherford most, at the time she created her narrative, was that she was tempted to dishonour God with an 'exceeding grief' at the loss of her husband and son. She judged that when her spouse died, the Lord was pleased 'to give me a sweet blink of the joy he was entered in', so that she praised Him. However, after she gave in to the temptation to mourn, she was left in 'confusion and much greif all that night'. Her grief was overcome at a communion in Holywood: Rutherford heard 'Take God to be thy God', and she identified that her 'heart was well content to do so'.[191] It was suggested to her, she claimed, within her religious experience at the table that God must be her 'fear, love, delight, and portion' above 'thy child, nor no created thing'. This was, she judged, 'made clear to the heart'. For a while she had 'sweet rejoicing in God for himself'.[192] She enjoyed God as the unqualified good to such an extent that she said in prayer to the divine that if her son were damned to hell for all eternity, she would 'gladly rejoice in God executing justice'. When her son's breathing became faint, 'it was spoken lovingly to' her in her heart that 'I have pardoned according to thy word', which she believed with joy. Yet she was moved to grieve for the loss of her son. She began to doubt whether he was truly a member of the elect. Rutherford judged, however, that the Lord 'made my heart to answer, If my Lord hath decreed, what is that to me?' This released her from the grief she had for her son's death and eternal fate. This is the point at which Rutherford's narrative ends.[193]

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[190] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 184.
[191] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 187.
[192] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 188.
[193] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 188.

It is impossible to know whether Rutherford intentionally closed her spiritual narrative at this point. However, it did make sense in the context of her spiritual pilgrimage, as there was no further development she could reach within mortal life. Rutherford had, in her view, embraced God with an absolute love, her desire for God firmly established as unconditional in comparison to any creature. This meant that she loved God more than even those she loved dearly, like her husband and son. Her initial grief was motivated by her loss of those she loved, her appetite resting in a present evil. However, she judged this experience to be a form of sin, as it was a manifestation of ingratitude and rebellion against God's decision to end a person's life. It was, thus, emotional disobedience against God's law, motivated by idolatry, an overzealous love for what is not-God. When she took God as her supreme good, loved and enjoyed God more than her child, and accepted God's determination of her child's future, Rutherford's emotions had ascended to a place where she had an unqualified love for God. She had reached unblemished happiness.

The language Rutherford used to convey that she had reached an absolute love for God echoed that used between God and Abraham. In the covenant of grace, reaffirmed between God and Abraham, God made a promise to Abraham and all his posterity. He declared that 'I will establish my covenant between me and thee, and thy seed after thee in their generations, for an everlasting covenant, to be God unto thee, and to thy seed after thee'.[194] This was the essence of communion with God: God would be the supreme good of the subject, and the subject would take God as their supreme good – as their God. Thus, when Rutherford heard in her consciousness that she should take God as her God, she understood that she was being implored to reaffirm the covenant of grace in its fullest sense. This she did, and the result was a contentment which (as analysed in chapter two) was considered the enjoyment of God.[195] Moreover, Abraham was commanded by God to sacrifice his son Isaac. Abraham complied, and was

[194] Genesis 17:7.
[195] Chapter Two, 57-60.

prepared to offer his son, whom he loved, as a burnt offering for God's sake. As he was about to kill his son, God stopped him. The Lord took Abraham's willingness to sacrifice as evidence that 'thou fearest God, seeing for my sake thou has not spared thine only son'.[196] The binding of Isaac, thus, was the fulfilment of the covenant on Abraham's part: he took God to be his God, even if that meant he had to love God above his precious son. Rutherford's situation was similar. She was told to embrace God as her delight above her child. She did this when she was moved to think that God's judgement of his life was worthy of praise. Consequently, Rutherford demonstrated that she enjoyed God just for God's sake. She took God to be her God: she had given the greatest evidence of her election. She had achieved her goal, which was to love God as her supreme good.

Strikingly, the beginning of Robert Blair's spiritual pilgrimage and the end of Mistress Rutherford's demonstrate that the narrative structure of the spiritual journey was the same in public worship and private piety. Blair's sequence of religious emotions was triggered by a preacher telling the congregation to draw near to God.[197] Rutherford's communion with God was precipitated by a minister teaching his congregation to take God as their God.[198] By the end of her narrative Rutherford had an emotional understanding of what it meant to draw near to God: to take God as your God and to love God above all else. Put another way, the spiritual journey was a sequence of emotions which led to a heart-knowledge of what ministers had preached and corporate rituals had ceremonialised: that happiness consists in communion with God. The story of emotional change in public worship and in private spirituality, thus, was one and the same.[199] The narrative in public worship (apprehension of sin, worldly sorrow, godly sorrow, a feeling of mercy, communion with God) was near identical to the plot authors used, modified, and augmented to characterise their subject's spiritual journey (love

[196] Genesis 22:12.
[197] Chapter Three, 75-77.
[198] Chapter Three, 115-117.
[199] Cohen has made a similar point about how the conversion stories of lay puritans resembled the ideal laid out by preachers. See Cohen, *God's Caress*, 212.

for devotion, apprehension of sin, legal terror, repentance, a feeling of mercy, communion with God). The sequences of emotion built into communal religious practice and private piety only differed in duration, a point made by William Struther.

> Since Repentance then is nothing but Sanctification contracted: And sanctification all our life is nothing, but Repentance inlarged and continued, it will follow that if sanctification doe not kyth constant after our Fasting, there hath beene no true Repentance in it.[200]

Corporate ritual was a microcosm of the spiritual journey experienced in personal devotion, while private piety was meant to be the experience of emotional change in public worship extended over the course of an entire lifetime. Thus, ministers and congregations interpreted corporate communal ritual as a form of 'corporate conversion', while personal devotion was, at least for the most pious, the experience of public worship replicated in an individual's life.[201] Consequently, the spiritual journey towards communion with God, and as such the practice of radical emotional reflexivity, was built into the language and concepts of public worship and private piety. Why the pilgrimage of the soul was important in both contexts will be discussed further in chapter five.[202]

This chapter has analysed the language of emotion used by Scottish Protestants. It has argued that the pilgrimage of the soul was the emotional spine of both public ritual and private devotion. Through participation in penitential rituals, the Lord's Supper, sermons, and psalm-singing, Scots were taught and used a language of emotional change associated with the pilgrimage of the soul from misery to happiness. The expectation of ministers was that their congregations would use this vocabulary in their private practice of radical emotional reflexivity. Some of the more zealous Scots took

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[200] Struther, *Warning*, 78.
[201] Westerkamp, *Triumph of the Laity*, 34; Yeoman, 'Heart-work', 175-188, 207; Chapter Three, 89.
[202] Chapter Five, 189-203.

up this task and produced narratives of their own or of another's spiritual journey. Though every text was idiosyncratic, they all used the linguistic-conceptual framework built into public worship which made them recognisable as telling the story of a soul's pilgrimage. Thus, their plots were variations of a sequence of emotions, conveyed through linguistic shifts that this thesis schematized into six stages: love for devotion, apprehension of sin, legal terror, repentance, a feeling of mercy, and communion with God. The conversion narrative of Mistress Rutherford was used to explore the language and concepts associated with each phase. In so doing, the chapter has presented the basic narrative structure authors modified and rearranged in their personal writings. Why they would want to identify their emotions in the form of a spiritual journey will be examined in chapter five.[203]

God was considered by Scottish Protestants the principal agent in the spiritual journey of the emotions. It was divine agency which caused the emotions to change. God altered the emotions to facilitate the subject's communion with God. God was, thus, the reality Protestants in Scotland understood as the main factor in the trajectory of their emotions from misery to happiness. Divine agency was crucial at each stage of the spiritual journey. As such, to understand the narrative form in which Scottish Protestants identified their emotions, an analysis of God's role within this plot needs to be undertaken. This is the task of the next chapter.

[203] Chapter Five, 189-203.

Chapter Four: God and the Emotions

Protestants in Scotland identified, through the practice of radical emotional reflexivity, that God was both the cause and end of desired emotion in the spiritual journey towards happiness. They judged that God was the external agent who moved the appetite towards love of God, and as a result the cause of their transition from misery to happiness. This meant that they considered God the formal object of passions which facilitated communion with God. Thus, God's activity, like that of any external agent, was assumed to enact change upon a passive subject. Moreover, like any formal object, God was assumed to operate *inside* the subject's consciousness. The theory of emotion that Scottish Protestants presupposed (analysed in chapter one) entailed that God engaged with the subject in this way if God was an emotion's cause.[1]

Moreover, Scottish Protestants judged that their experiences of ecstatic joy were the subjective experience of communion with God. When their love for God was consummated, their feelings were, in some sense, a perception of God's presence in the soul. As the phenomenological dimension of happiness, a rest of the appetite in God, this 'feeling' of God was the experience of the supreme good of the soul and as such was a desired end in itself (analysed in chapter two).[2] In other words, to perceive God's presence in the soul through the emotions was the essence of happiness: the end point of the spiritual journey (explored in chapter three).[3]

To flesh out the implications of the Scottish Protestant identification of God as the cause and end of desired emotions, this chapter analyses more closely the language used in public worship and private devotion. It argues that the emotional shifts which constituted the spiritual journey – what are called here 'supernatural emotions' – were the effect of God's agency. Moreover, the language of communal ritual and personal writings

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[1] Chapter One, 29.
[2] Chapter Two, 55-57.
[3] Chapter Three, 82-83, 115-120.

characterised the climax of the soul's pilgrimage as a subjective experience of communion with God. As such, the identification of God's association with the emotions was fundamental to the practice of radical emotional reflexivity for Protestant communities in early modern Scotland. Thus this chapter moves beyond the discussion of the spiritual journey in chapter three to examine the ideas that God was the cause of the soul's pilgrimage and could be experienced through the emotions, ideas which were built into the linguistic-conceptual framework of Scottish Protestant worship and piety.

This analysis is done in three sections. Part one examines the claim made by Protestants in early modern Scotland that God was the cause of desired emotions, those experiences critical to advancement on the spiritual journey. The second section analyses the implication of Scottish Protestant claims that God was the formal object of some passions: that God acted within a subject's consciousness to create supernatural emotions. Finally, there is an exploration of the idea that ecstatic joy was the subjective dimension of communion with God, and as such that 'right emotion' was a perception of God's presence.

1. <u>God as the External Agent of a Passion</u>

The Holy Spirit in particular, and God more generally, was frequently identified as the agent who caused the 'supernatural emotions' identified as part of the spiritual journey. Many named God as the cause of their spiritual 'motions'.[4] The Episcopalian John Forbes of Corse judged that it was God who 'pleased… by his H.[Holy] Spirit w[i]t[h] groans unutterable' to lift up his heart.[5] God, Forbes observed, decided to 'give me his abundant Grace, mercie, & peace'.[6] It was God who 'maid' the Edinburgh lawyer Archibald Johnston of Wariston, in his view, 'sensible of his present particular presence'; and the Presbyterian Mistress Rutherford believed she was 'filled' by the Lord with 'a sense of himself that cannot be expressed with assurance

[4] Chapter One, 37-40.
[5] Forbes, *Diary*, 127-130.
[6] Forbes, *Diary*, 130-131.

of his leading me'.[7] Ministers petitioned God in the ritual of public repentance to 'so effectuallie moue his [the penitent's] hart & oures also' that they may 'atteane some sense and fealing of they mercy', and in the Lord's Supper to 'imprint and fasten [His benefits] sure in our hearts, that we may growe and increase daily in true faith… and good workes'.[8] They did so because they assumed that God was the cause of desired emotion.

Exceptional episodes of emotional release were also attributed to the agency of the Holy Spirit. At a renewal of the covenant of grace in 1596 in Fife, those gathered were reminded of their unthankfulness and failure to reform Scotland. James Melville judged that suddenly the 'Lord steirit up sic a motioun of hart, that all war forcit to fall down before the Lord, with sobbes and teares in aboundance, everie man mightelie commovit with the affectionnes of their conscience in the presence of their conscience', so that they were in private meditation upon their sins, 'craving ernestlie grace for amendiment'.[9] Similarly, at the swearing of the National Covenant in 1638 at Currie Kirk, near Edinburgh, Wariston reported that in the 'tuinkling of ane eye their fell sutch ane extraordinarie influence of Gods Sprit upon the whol congregation, melting their frozen hearts, waltering their dry cheeks… it was a wonder to seie so visible, sensible, momentaneal a chainge upon al, man and woman, lasse and ladde'.[10] Why these unique experiences of emotional discharge were considered God-caused will be examined in chapter five.[11]

Contemporaneous episodes from the spiritual diaries of John Forbes of Corse and Archibald Johnston of Wariston exemplify how Scottish Protestants identified God as the cause of emotional preparation for and the reception of happiness: they will be outlined and then analysed. On 7 April 1634, Forbes's was extremely downcast. He was 'afflicted with a great & grievous tenta[tio]un'. He sought the Lord with 'humble supplicatiouns, &

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[7] Wariston, *Diary*, 219-220; Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 182.
[8] Knox, *Repentance*, B3*v*-B4*r*; *Forme*, 86.
[9] James Melville, *The Autobiography and Diary of Mr. James Melville*, ed. Robert Pitcairn (Edinburgh, 1842), 353-360.
[10] Wariston, *Diary*, 329.
[11] Chapter Five, 168-169, 175-177.

groans & tears'. He 'received mercie, strength, & unspeakable comfort'.[12] A month later, on 26 May 1634, Wariston felt the Lord's 'wonderful presence with me, yea evin as present as if visibly and audibly he had bein speaken with me and I with him'. As a response, the 'Lord maid me put up petitions to him'. Wariston's 'libertie greu ever the greater', accompanied by the 'wonderful pouer of the sprit, floods of tears, and multitude of strong cryes and groans'. His heart 'spak to God', his tears 'the only outward expression of my meaning to God or to myself', and he was left 'drunken with rivers of pleasure in the assurance of his tenderest mercies'. The Lord had 'opened the eies of thy mynd to seie Gods faice schyning presently on thy saule with sutch amiable beams flouing from his reconiled countenance as almost transported the[e] out of thyselth'. The 'sensible possession of God' and 'sight of my happiness' made his eyes 'stand amazed in my head', stomach 'to turn upsyd doune' with fear, which he blamed on this mischievous activity of Satan. Wariston praised God for this possession of happiness, which he judged an 'unspeakable favour'.[13]

Forbes and Wariston believed that God was the cause of both the means and experience of their experiences of happiness. Forbes presented his supplications for relief from his depressed feelings as the product of God's agency. Similarly, Wariston attributed to the Holy Spirit his 'petitions'. These prayers were the instruments to which God responded and satisfied Forbes and Wariston's requests. Thus, both men believed their experience after their petitions were also caused by God. Forbes identified that he 'received' comfort, the subjective experience of mercy and grace. Wariston interpreted his experience as one where the Lord 'opened' his mind to apprehend God's mercy. They both claimed their joy was the product of God's action. Thus, like puritans in New England, zealous Protestants in Scotland argued that those emotional changes directed towards happiness, communion with God, were the solely the work of God.[14] Put another way,

[12] Forbes, *Diary*, 132.
[13] Wariston, *Diary*, 218-219.
[14] Cohen, *God's Caress*, 86-87, 207-208.

the Holy Spirit was named by fervent Scots as the external agent who causes those emotional shifts which lead to happiness: a love for devotion, an apprehension of sin, legal terror, repentance, a feeling of mercy, and communion with God.[15] They never intimated that one's fellowship with the divine was ever the product of their own merit, or of a joint effort with God. This finding militates against Yeoman's notion that though God was responsible for most of the process, humans were still required to 'initiate the purging process of repentance'.[16] Preparation for happiness was not considered the result of human activity. Rather, Forbes and Wariston illustrate that the instruments for the reception of happiness were interpreted as the work of the Holy Spirit, insofar as they evaluated the petitions and supplications they spoke to God as the effect of God's agency.

The transformation of the emotions in the form of the spiritual journey, therefore, was presented as an entirely passive experience from the subject's point of view. This belief of theirs was supported by two presuppositions embedded in the language Scots used in public worship and their private writings: their theory of emotion and adherence to the doctrine of total depravity. In chapter one, the nature of emotions was explored.[17] It was argued that Scots considered a passion a change of the appetite experienced passively by the subject, caused by an action of an external agent. In the course of the spiritual journey, Scottish Protestants identified the external agent who acts upon the passive subject to create supernatural emotions as the Holy Spirit.

The identification the pilgrimage of the soul as a passive experience was also supported by the view that humanity is totally depraved (explored in chapter two).[18] Protestants in Scotland believed that, due to Adam's original sin, human nature has been entirely corrupted. This meant that humans have no power to contribute to their preparation for happiness, and thus they all fail

[15] Chapter Three, 89-120.
[16] Yeoman, 'Heart-work', 182, 2, 11-12.
[17] Chapter One, 18-47.
[18] Chapter Two, 67-72.

to obey the covenant of works (as examined in chapter three).[19] Given that they assumed a subject cannot have faith or love of God of their own volition, Scottish Protestants were forced to conclude that only an external agent can produce desired emotion in a sinner. In other words, because humanity is intrinsically evil due to the Fall, it cannot contribute to its own sanctification; rather, God is the only agent of the spiritual journey, and the subject undergoes the process passively. The *Scots Confession* expressed this point clearly. Its authors and subscribers affirmed that:

> for of nature we are so dead, so blind, and so perverse, that nether can we feill when we are pricked, see the licht when it shines, nor assent to the will of God when it is reveiled, unles the Spirit of the Lord *Jesus* quicken that quhilk is dead, remove the darknesse from our myndes, and bowe our stubburne hearts to the obedience of his blessed will.[20]

The theory of emotion and theological anthropology that Scottish Protestants assumed, therefore, provided the logic which made intelligible the judgement that the Holy Spirit was the cause of those emotions, presented in the form of a spiritual journey, directed towards communion with God.

The perceived femaleness of passivity was a fundamental aspect of the language some of the more zealous Scottish Protestants used in their personal writings.[21] As analysed in chapter one, Aristotle's theory of reproduction identified women as the cooler, weaker, and more passive member of the sexes.[22] In the early modern period, Aristotle's classification of femininity with passivity was extended to the nature of the material order by developments in alchemical theory, so that the passive dimension of all things was considered female.[23] This intellectual advancement reinforced the connection between femininity and passivity.[24] Moreover, the legal

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[19] Chapter Three, 103-109; Yeoman, 'Heart-work', 11-12.
[20] *Scots Confession*, XII.
[21] Mullan has observed that in Greek and Latin 'soul', 'psyche' and 'anima' respectively, belongs to the feminine case. Mullan, *Scottish Puritanism*, 160.
[22] Chapter One, 44-45.
[23] Kathleen Crowther, 'Sexual Difference' in *The Oxford Handbook of the Protestant Reformations*, ed. Ulinka Rublack (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 675-676.
[24] Peter Lowe referenced Paracelsus as a source for his treatise on medicine, while a few texts which involved alchemical theory were published in 1618 within Scotland. See Lowe, *Course*, A8*r*; William Barclay, *The Nature & Effects of the New-Found Well at Kinghorne*

relationship between husbands and wives in early modern Scotland strengthened the association between femaleness and passivity. Drawing from scripture, early modern thinkers argued that every society requires a government and that the superior should rule the weaker. Marriage, a fundamental unit of economic, legal, and social standing, was therefore interpreted as a relationship where the male leads or rules over the female, given the female's weaker, passive nature.[25] Although in Scotland women tended to have more economic and legal freedom than in England – given that the notion that marriage is a 'communion of goods' was integral to Scots law – coverture still permeated the relationship between the sexes. Women still needed implicit or tacit consent for economic transactions, and men were held legally responsible for the behaviour of their wives.[26] Though exceptions were common, these legal and economic structures of female subordination were a constant reminder in everyday interactions of female physiological inferiority, rooted fundamentally in their coldness, and as such they concretised the association between passivity and femininity in the early modern Protestant linguistic-conceptual framework.

As passivity was characterised by Scottish Protestants as a feminine form of experience, they were inclined to identify their experience of God's action upon their appetites as having a female quality: they were akin to the passive female in their relationship with the divine. This attitude, in part, explains why Scottish Protestants believed it was appropriate to characterise their communion with God in the 'marriage metaphor'.[27] This was a point of

(Edinburgh, 1618); Patrick Anderson, *The Colde Spring of Kinghorne Craig his Admirable and New Tryed Properties* (Edinburgh, 1618).

[25] Sommerville, *Sex*, 84-85; Mullan, *Scottish Puritanism*, 144-145.

[26] Deborah Simonton, 'Community of goods, coverture and capability in Britain: Scotland versus England' in *Gender, Law and Economic Wellbeing in Europe in Europe from the Fifteenth to the Nineteenth Century: North versus South?*, eds. Anna Bellavitis and Beatrice Zucca Micheletto (London: Routledge, 2018), 36-38, 42-43; Rebecca Masson, 'Married Women, property and paraphernalia in early modern Scotland', in *Gender, Law and Economic Wellbeing in Europe in Europe from the Fifteenth to the Nineteenth Century: North versus South?*, eds. Anna Bellavitis and Beatrice Zucca Micheletto (London: Routledge, 2018), 206.

[27] Mullan, *Scottish Puritanism*, 160-162.

reference often cited in sermons, treatises, and devotional guides.[28] With reference to divinely inspired scripture – in particular the Song of Songs and Ephesians – zealous Scots allegorically interpreted the love between the husband and wife as an allegory for the fellowship that exists between Christ and the regenerate soul.[29] For example, Helen Livingston *née* Hay (*c.*1552-1627), Countess of Linlithgow, when repenting for her former adherence to Roman Catholicism expressed that she had 'setled peace and comfort' in her 'spirituall marriage with my head and husband the Lord Jesus Christ, who hath marryed mee to himselfe'.[30] Lady Hundaly, Mary Rutherford (*d*.1640), encountered Christ in a similar way, praising God for 'the unspeakable love of the Bridegroom to his dear spouse… the spouse may rejoice in the honour of her bridegroom... she may rejoice in his love, which found us when we were lost… the spouse may rejoice in the beauty of the bridegroom'.[31] In a hymn authored by Robert Blair, he presented Christ as declaring to the soul:

> Now follow me and thou shalt see
> The nuptials of my bride,
> The spouse which I purchas'd to me,
> With blood shed from my side.[32]

However, the appropriateness of the marriage metaphor was justified not only by the mutual love judged to have been experienced between Christ

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[28] Though the extant material which takes the Song of Songs as a primary text of analysis is far less than in England, Richard has provided a compelling case why this should not be taken to suggest the text was not important in early modern Scotland. Moreover, in support of Richard it can be argued that while it may not have been the focus of many texts, it was often referred to in support of theological positions and in self and dialogical writings. See Guy M. Richard, 'Clavis Cantici: A "Key" to the Reformation in early modern Scotland?' in *Reformed Orthodoxy in Scotland: Essays on Scottish Theology, 1560-1775* (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2015), 158.

[29] Chapter Two, 62-63; Mullan, *Narratives*, 312; Richard, 'Clavis', 159. This kind of reading was common throughout the Christian tradition, and in western Christianity was famously inspired by the writings of Bernard of Clairvaux. See Dennis E. Tamburello, *Union with Christ: John Calvin and the Mysticism of St. Bernard* (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 1994), 64-83.

[30] Eleanor Livingston, Countess of Linlithgow, *The Confession and Conversion of the Right Honorable, most Illustrious, and Elect Lady, my Lady C. of L.* (Edinburgh, 1629), 23-24; *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020.

[31] Porteous, *Exercise*, 23.

[32] Blair, *Life*, 106.

and the believer.[33] Scottish Protestants, like their counterparts in England and North America, adapted the language of the text to express God's agency and their passivity in relation to their emotions. Samuel Rutherford has been described as the key influence on Scottish employment of the language in the Song of Songs, and his use of these metaphors illustrate the point best.[34] Comforting Jane Gordon *née* Campbell (*d*.1675), Lady Kenmure, he encouraged her to not fear if she had no strong feelings of God's presence, for 'Christ soweth His living seed, and He will not lose His seed. If He have the guiding of my flock and state, it shall not miscarry. Our spilled works, losses, deadness, coldness, wretchedness, are the ground upon which the Good Husbandman laboureth'.[35] Playing with two metaphors at once, that 'living seed' is both like human semen (indicated in the reference to miscarriage), and that the seeds farmers sow to grow crops, Rutherford sought to convey that the grace of Christ, inseminated in the womb of the soul, cannot fail but to produce new life. In this instance, Rutherford's language relied upon the Aristotelian theory of reproduction (outlined in chapter one) to present Christ as the one who acts upon, or inseminates, the passive subject, to propel her spiritual journey, the growth of the living seed.[36]

The association of femininity and passivity in the Scottish Protestant worldview also underpinned the pervasive notion that women were more receptive to God's action than men. Due to their cooler, weaker constitutions, women were thought to be less rational than men, and as such less able to control their emotions.[37] This meant that they were supposed to be more easily influenced by the supernatural. Edward Raban (*d*.1658) extolled the many 'perfectious Excellencies and virtuous Qualities' that women had,

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[33] Mullan, *Narratives*, 312; Elizabeth Reis, 'The Devil, the Body, and the Feminine Soul in Puritan New England' in *The Journal of American History*, 82, no.1 (1995). I am grateful to Mikki Brock for passing on this reference.
[34] Mullan, *Narratives*, 316; Susan Hardman Moore, 'Sexing the Soul: Gender and the Rhetoric of Puritan Piety' in *Studies in Church History*, 34 (1998), 177.
[35] Samuel Rutherford, *Letters of Samuel Rutherford*, ed. A. A. Bonar (Edinburgh, 1891), No.106, No.219; *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020.
[36] Chapter One, 44-45.
[37] Sommerville, *Sex*, 12; Yeoman, 'Heart-work', 196.

'excelling the grosse, and churlish conditions of men'. He argued that women are the 'formost part-taker of every Heavenlie gift and grace… composed both the more excellent substance, and qualities'. In woman, he argued, 'doe shyne the beams of Beautie, Comelinesse, Constancie, Vertue, Prudencie, Pietie, Charities, and practice of good manners', far 'exceeding grosse man'.[38] These 'wifely traits' were those which the Christian should seek in relation to God, and as such reinforced the femininity of the spiritual journey.[39] Moreover, women were considered more appropriate vessels of divine inspiration due to their inherent passivity.[40] Jean Kincaid's words to those gathered to hear her were interpreted as the direct speech of the Holy Spirit – they were not her own words.[41] Wariston encountered a woman similarly possessed of the Holy Spirit, Margaret Mitchelson (*fl*.1638), who being 'transported in heavinly raptures' spoke to thousands of people 'strainge things for the happy succes of Gods cause and Chryst croune in this kingdome quhilk was already inacted in heavin'.[42] The perceived passiveness of Kincaid and Mitchelson, due to their sex, lent credence in the minds of their audience to their claims that their messages were from God.[43]

Thus, the identification of passivity with femininity by Scottish Protestants, in relation to the Holy Spirit's action upon their appetites, presupposed a rigid concept of gender. Support for this position is provided by Susan Hardman Moore's argument that it was 'precisely from the male understanding of what it meant to be a woman' that 'feminized imagery for men' in puritanism gained its power.[44] It was the rigid definition of the gender assumed by Reformed Protestants, Hardman Moore has claimed, which allowed men and women to use femaleness as an allegory for their status in

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[38] Edward Raban, *The Glorie of Man Consisting in the Excellencie and Perfection of Woman* (Aberdeen, 1638), 5-6; *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020.
[39] Reis, 'Devil', 21.
[40] Hardman Moore, 'Sexing', 184; Ann Hughes, 'Puritanism and Gender' in *The Cambridge Companion to Puritanism*, eds. John Coffey and Paul C. H. Lim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 198-199.
[41] Balfour, *Conversion*, XVIII.
[42] Wariston, *Diary*, 396.
[43] Merry E. Wiesner, *Gender, Church, and State in Early Modern Germany* (London: Routledge, 1998), 23-28.
[44] Hardman Moore, 'Sexing', 184.

religious experience. The identification of passivity with the female in the writings of early modern Scottish Protestants challenges ideas in modern historiography that seventeenth century Reformed Protestants employed any kind of 'alternative masculinity', 'role ambiguity', or 'gender fluidity' in their use of the marriage metaphor.[45] It was precisely the rigid identification of femaleness with passivity which made it appropriate to categorise the subject's experience of the Holy Spirit's action as feminine. It only worked if the feminine was attributed to the passive, and vice versa. Hence, Scottish Protestant characterisation of their God-caused emotions with feminised language assumed the rigid concept of gender embedded in the Scottish Protestant worldview. Put another way, it was the experience of change by the subject acted upon by God which was perceived as feminine.

Protestants in early modern Scotland believed God acted upon the passive, feminine, subject to create emotion both directly and indirectly. John Weemes provided a clear explanation of how God acts directly upon the passive subject. Through the agency of the Holy Spirit, Christ directly fixes the fallen faculties of the elect, and thus creates in them desired emotions. He does so, Weemes argued, in four main ways. First, Christ 'subdueth the passions that they arise not inordinately'.[46] That is, the appetite is moved in 'moderation', in an appropriate degree in relation to its formal object. This fixes the tendency of the appetite to move disproportionately due to original sin, analysed in chapter two. Second, Christ 'reconciles the passions, which strive so one against another'.[47] They no longer contradict one another. In this way, Christ corrects the 'contraeity' of the passions, caused by the subject's absolute love for creatures (also examined in chapter two).[48] Third, Christ 'setts the passions upon their right objects, whereas before they were

[45] Hardman Moore acknowledges that the use of feminised language by Puritan men to express their spiritual emotionality is the focus of her research, as does Capp in relation to his study of crying. See Hardman Moore, 'Sexing', 186; Capp, 'Jesus Wept', 100; Margaret Masson, 'Typology of the Female as a Model for the Regenerate: Puritan Preaching, 1690-1730' in *Signs,* 2, no.2 (1976), 313-315; Reis, 'Devil', 21.
[46] Weemes, *Portraiture*, 159.
[47] Weemes, *Portraiture*, 160.
[48] Chapter Two, 68-69.

set upon the wrong objects'.[49] Christ changes the judgements of the rational cognition and appetition so that the sensitive appetite is moved in the right way in response to formal objects. Through this, Christ corrects the error-strewn judgements of the mind and will, the consequence of original sin (which was discussed in chapter two).[50] Thus, humans recognise what is their supreme good, God. Fourth, the passions are moved by Christ so 'that they cannot bee mooved'.[51] Christ fixes the inconstancy of the emotions, as the appetite is moved to rest in an eternal and infinite formal object: God. Thus, Weemes argued that Christ directly restores the faculties, which retunes the judgements of the formal object and the motion of the appetite so that the inconstancy and contradictory nature of the passions is removed. Christ, Weemes claimed, reorients the emotions away from idolatry towards love for God through these changes, and thus moves the subject from misery to happiness.

Scottish Protestants identified God directly acting upon their passive selves when they prayed, petitioned, and confessed. This appears clearly in Archibald Johnston of Wariston's diary, in his claim that through his prayers, tears, and groans, the 'Sprit of God, with inenarrable expressions, spak in my saule to God'.[52] This claim was influenced by a passage from Romans 8:

> Likewise the Spirit also helpeth our infirmities: for we know not what to pray as we ought: but the Spirit itself maketh request for us with sighs, which cannot be expressed. But he that searcheth the hearts, knoweth what is the meaning of the Spirit: for he maketh request for the Saints, according to *the will of* God.[53]

Wariston judged, in light of this verse, that his prayers, tears, and groans were the speech of the Holy Spirit to God on Wariston's behalf, using Wariston's voice as a mouthpiece. His emotions were the medium God's Spirit used to communicate, and the product of God's direct action upon the appetite. Other zealous Scottish Protestants shared a similar view of their

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[49] Weemes, *Portraiture*, 160.
[50] Chapter Two, 67-72.
[51] Weemes, *Portraiture*, 161.
[52] Wariston, *Diary*, 221.
[53] Romans 8:26-27.

prayers. Forbes frequently claimed that it was the Lord who had caused him to pray.[54] No intermediary was cited: it was just God's action which made Forbes petition and confess. Similarly, Hundaly, Kincaid, and others identified God as the cause of their prayers, while Clarkson acknowledged that her inability to pray was due to God's not moving her appetite to confession and petition.[55] God's direct action was crucial for the practice of prayer; or at least, of those prayers which were answered.[56]

In addition to the correction of the faculties, Scottish Protestants believed that sometimes God used indirect means to create emotion in a passive subject. The most frequent context this happened was through what Yeoman has called 'text-getting' (discussed briefly in chapter three).[57] She has argued that this was an experience where an individual found 'a convincing Biblical text came to mind with an extraordinary feeling attached to it, which was considered to be a direct communication from God'.[58] Often experienced within the context of prayer or bible reading, text-getting was an internal apprehension of the Word. Mistress Rutherford reported that bible verses 'lovingly spoken' into her heart by God, brought her comfort in times of doubt and anxiety.[59] In prayer, Robert Blair heard audibly 'The just shall live by his faith', which moved him to use faith as a means of sanctification.[60] Sometimes, however, God spoke words particular to the subject's situation, using extra-biblical language. Blair heard within his soul 'as if one standing by me had audibly said, "Thou fool… thou must either preach the Gospel in Ireland, or nowhere at all"'.[61] This experience made Blair go to Ireland, rather than France, to preach the gospel. Wariston occasionally felt God's

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[54] Forbes, *Diary*, 127-130.
[55] Porteous, *Exercises*, 21-22; Balfour, *Conversion*, XVIII; Livingston, *Conflict*, 15, 18, 23-24.
[56] Mistress Rutherford claimed that in those prayers which were ineffectual, God was 'absent', and she had been 'deserted' by the divine. She implied that because these petitions were human in origin, they were ineffectual. Similarly, Hundaly questioned whether her prayers had 'access' to God or, if not, had a human origin. See Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 156; Porteous, *Exercise*, 10.
[57] Chapter Three, 114.
[58] Yeoman, 'Heart-work', 31; Mullan, *Scottish Puritanism*, 52-53.
[59] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 184.
[60] Blair, *Life*, 32.
[61] Blair, *Life*, 52.

'wonderful presence with me, yea evin as present as if visibly and audibly he had bein speaken with me and I with him'.[62] John Livingston, with 'a terror of wrath of God' in his sleep, 'thought it was said to me within my heart, "See what a fool thou art to desire the thing thou couldst not endure"'.[63] Ever after, he was content with his experience of God's action in his soul. The lawyer Thomas Hope of Craighall (1573-1646), when he petitioned the Lord to pity the Kirk, heard a voice saying 'I will pitie it'.[64] The experience convinced him God had spoken to him. Text-getting, then, was a form of direct revelation to the passive subject which God used to stimulate emotion and action. In other words, God supplied the formal object which evoked heart-knowledge and so through this instrument indirectly moved the sensitive appetite in the desired manner.[65]

While text-getting was the implantation of a formal object in the mind to mobilise desired emotion, ministers taught that God could also use external instruments to evoke passions indirectly. Bishop of Caithness John Abernethy proposed that one such method was meditation on the crucifixion. He argued that the most 'excellent remedy against all passions, is true *mortification*'.[66] In this context, mortification was a practice which reconfigured the passions through the 'inward practice' of 'a sound meditation'.[67] Meditation on Christ's death, argued Abernethy, enables the subject to apprehend 'thy infinite guiltinesse, thy endlesse misery, and that inestimable redeeming *counterpiece*'. This, he reasoned, moves the sensitive appetite to 'hatred of thy selfe & sorrow for thy sinnes.'[68] It was, thus, a practice to mobilise the emotions which constituted sincere repentance (discussed in chapters three and five).[69] The poet William Drummond of

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[62] Wariston, *Diary*, 218-219.
[63] Livingston, *Brief*, 61.
[64] Thomas Hope of Craighall, *A Diary of the Public Correspondence of Sir Thomas Hope of Craighall, Bart., 1633-1645* (Edinburgh, 1843), 96; *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020.
[65] Chapter Three, 107, 114.
[66] Abernethy, *Physicke*, 268.
[67] Abernethy, *Physicke*, 268; Yeoman, 'Heart-work', 178-180.
[68] Abernethy, *Physicke*, 269-270; John Abernethy, *The Dignity and Duty of a Christian* (London, 1620), 110.
[69] Chapter Three, 80-81, 109-110; Chapter Five, 170-175, 189-293.

Hawthornden used poetry as a medium of mortification to evoke godly sorrow in his audience:

> A King who fix'd the Poles, made Spheares to moue,
> All Wisedome, Purenesse, Excellencie, Might,
> All Goodnesse, Greatnesse, Iustice, Beautie, Loue;
> With feare and wonder hither turne your Sight,
> See, see (alas) Him now, not in that State
> Though could fore-cast Him into Reasons light.
> Now Eyes with teares, now Hearts with griefe make great,
> Bemoane this cruell Death and drearie case,
> If ever Plaints iust Woe could aggrauate?
> From Sinne and Hell to saue us humaine Race,
> See this great King naill'd to an abject Tree,
> An object of reproach and sad disgrace.
> O unheard Pittie! Loue in strange degree!
> Hee his owne Life doth giue, his Blood doth shed,
> Por Wormelings base such Worthinesse to see.
> Poore Wights, behold His Visage pale as Lead,
> His Head bow'd to His Brest, Lockes sadlie rent,
> Like a cropt Rose that languishing doth fade.
> Weake Nature weepe, astonish'd World lament,
> Lament, you Windes, you Heauen that all containes,
> And thou (my Soule) let nouht thy Griefes relent.[70]

Contrasting Christ's glory and beauty with his suffering on the cross, Drummond sought to move his reader to sorrow. Similarly, for David Dickson contemplation of the cross 'Woes mee for all my sinne, woes me for rootes of sinne so strong'.[71] Yet meditation on the crucifixion, argued Abernethy, should also lead the subject to reflect upon the love of God, which it revealed, a 'great poynt of thankfulnesse'.[72] Observance of the 'greatest beneficence of the greatest Benefactor' will, Abernethy argued, 'force us to love him'.[73] Dickson's adulation encapsulated how mortification could stimulate love for God.

> To see my love for love of mee, on bloddie shoulders beare:
> That crosse, that curse that growing wrath and trembling thus for feare.
> To see almightie God so weake lifes fountaine thus to die,

[70] Drummond, *Flowers*, 9-10.
[71] Dickson, *True Christian Love*, Stanza 101.
[72] Abernethy, *Dignity* (London, 1620), 111.
[73] Abernethy, *Duty*, 111-112; Abernethy, *Physicke*, 270.

> With shame and paine ou'rchargde till heaven wondred: and all for me…
>
> …Fond lovers tell mee now if you have any love like this:
> Come take a share with mee, my love wholly spirituall is.
> Come change your loves, & love with me, or else you perish shall:
> Goe charge your loves to doe the same, or perish shall you all.[74]

Sermons were also identified by Scottish Protestants as a means the Holy Spirit used to establish a formal object in the mind and thereby mobilise emotion. Bessie Clarkson attributed her worldly sorrow and legal terror to the preaching of William Livingston.[75] Likewise, it was when Dickson preached on Jeremiah that the Ayrshire farmer James Mitchell of Dykes was powerfully moved to a sense of his sin and a feeling of God's mercy.[76] Instruction from others could also be interpreted as a means used by the Holy Spirit to cause emotion in a subject. When John Gillon reminded Mistress Rutherford of Jeremiah 31:33 and 32:40, the phrase 'I will put my fear in their heart' comforted her. She identified this experience as God making her 'apply' this verse to herself, and this 'rejoiced the heart much'.[77] The role of preaching as a tool for mobilising emotion will be analysed more fully in chapter five.[78] What is important for the present argument is that zealous Scottish Protestants identified listening to sermons and exhortations as tools by which God could indirectly move the appetite by fixing in the mind a formal object.

Crucially, sermons, bible reading, and meditation were considered only able to stimulate desired emotion if used by the Holy Spirit as an instrument to act on the passive subject.[79] Out of divine hands, they had no effectual power and were unable to facilitate progress along the spiritual journey. In other words, instruments like meditation and the preaching of the Word were, in the view of Scottish Protestants, only effective if conjoined with the direct action of God on the faculties to produce the right emotional

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[74] Dickson, *True Christian Love*, Stanza 100, 103.
[75] Livingston, *Conflict*, 1.
[76] Dykes, *Memoirs*, 29-31.
[77] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 171. Chapter Three, 115.
[78] Chapter Five, 189-203.
[79] Mullan, *Scottish Puritanism*, 53.

response. Thus, while all were exposed to the *indirect* means of the Holy Spirit's action in Sunday worship through the preaching of the Word, this did not guarantee that it would stimulate desired emotion. The *direct* activity of the Holy Spirit on the faculties was considered necessary for the creation of heart-knowledge, or 'supernatural emotion', and thus for the spiritual journey of the emotions.

That zealous Scottish Protestants judged God was the external agent of certain emotions was paralleled by their belief that Satan was a cause of internal sins of commission and omission. As analysed in chapter three, authors regularly identified their temptations and doubts as the effects of the devil's malicious activity within their souls.[80] Brock has labelled the process through which Scots reached this conclusion the 'internalization of the demonic', which consisted in a four-stage cycle.[81] First, clergy taught their congregations that they were totally depraved and that they needed to engage in self-examination. Second, those who took up the practice of introspection examined their thoughts, words, and deeds. They identified the devil as the cause of their sins. Third, the godly would come to identify themselves as evil, which would result in feelings of terror and despair. Finally, through prayer there would be an intervention of divine grace, which would relieve the subject of their negative emotions. Thus, through this emotional process the devil was, like God, considered a supernatural cause of emotions in the spiritual journey, particularly of emotions identified as sins.

Significantly, however, Brock has noted that men and women were held no less responsible for their sins because of Satan's machinations.[82] They considered themselves complicit in their transgressions. This was because, it could be argued, they assumed that Satan merely presented a formal object which moved the appetites, such as the prospect of suicide or doubts about Reformed doctrine. He did this in a similar manner to God. Like text-getting, one method Satan was thought to use was to 'speak' directly to

[80] Chapter Three, 100-102.
[81] Brock, *Satan and the Scots*, 97-123.
[82] Brock, *Satan and the Scots*, 79.

the soul, by which the formal object would be placed in the subject's mind. Thus, Mistress Rutherford heard Satan tease her that there was no God, while Robert Bruce believed he heard the devil accuse him of his many sins inside his consciousness.[83] The devil did not manipulate the faculties directly, but rather exploited their natural corruption: the judgements of the rational cognition and volition, and the motion of the appetite, were already error-strewn and prone to evil. Thus all Satan had to do, to cause an internal sin, was to communicate a formal object to the apprehension of the subject; as the faculties would oblige and produce a depraved emotion in response. Hence the Scottish Protestant assumption that human nature was totally corrupt (analysed in chapter two) provided the rationale for a belief that sin was a cooperative venture between the devil and the subject.[84] This marked a difference between how fervent Scottish Protestants assessed God's and Satan's action upon the passive subject. While emotions caused by God were attributed entirely to divine agency at every stage of the process which constituted a passion, Satan only presented the formal object which sparked sin.

Therefore, the Holy Spirit was identified as the external agent of the supernatural emotions which constituted the spiritual journey. Based on the theory of emotion that Scots presupposed, those who partook in public worship and produced personal writings judged that God was the sole agent who advanced the pilgrimage of their souls; the subject passive, and thus feminine, throughout the process. They claimed that God's action upon the subject could be direct. Christ could fix the faculties so that they responded correctly to a formal object, such as when God 'made' Scottish Protestants pray. Moreover, the Holy Spirit could present the formal object of a passion to the consciousness of the subject, via text-getting, to indirectly move the passions. The Holy Spirit could also use instruments, like meditation and sermons, to communicate a formal object into the mind to stir supernatural emotions. All in all, then, Scottish Protestants judged that God was the cause

[83] Rutherford, 'Mistress Rutherford', 155; Calderwood, *History*, IV, 636.
[84] Chapter Two, 67-72.

of the entire process which created desired emotion: the subject was entirely passive, and the formal object, its evaluation, and the motion of the appetite, were identified as the product of the God's agency. Thus, the spiritual journey was considered the sole work of God, and no other.[85] By implication, God was considered the unique cause of the sequence of emotion built into public worship and private piety (analysed in chapter three).[86]

2. God as the Formal Object of Emotion

As the external agent who moved the emotions, God was also identified as the formal object of those emotions which constituted the spiritual journey. This idea assumed that the external agent and formal object of a passion were identical (engaged with in chapter one).[87] Thus, if God was the cause of desired emotion, then God must be the formal object of emotion. This section analyses this implication of the linguistic-conceptual framework built into communal religious practice and the personal writings of pious Scots. It addresses the consequence of the assumption that God was the formal object of a passion: God was *inside* the subject's consciousness.

Authors classified the formal objects of their supernatural emotions as God's attributes. They did this by evaluating the 'intention' of the external agent which caused their passions. In chapter one, it was argued that Scottish Protestants, influenced by Aquinas, believed every formal object of a passion had an intention, which was the apprehension as to whether the object in question was good or evil in relation to the subject.[88] Zealous Scots judged that an apprehension of God's wrath was the cause of their worldly sorrow. Bessie Clarkson, her minister William Livingston recounted, claimed that her legal terror was stimulated by an apprehension of 'the wrath of an angrie God, of a crabbed God'.[89] Robert Bruce could 'feele the wrathe of God

[85] This was the same view puritans had of God's agency in their conversions. See Cohen, *God's Caress*, 86-87.
[86] Chapter Three, 74-121.
[87] Chapter One, 29-30.
[88] Chapter One, 28-29.
[89] Livingston, *Conflict*, 1.

pressing me doun'.[90] In the case of legal terror, the subject apprehended God's anger for their sin, and thus God's will that they should be damned. Thus the emotion of worldly sorrow was aroused by an apprehension of God as 'evil' to the subject, insofar as eternal damnation was a never-ending frustration of the deeply held desire for happiness. Considered evil for the soul, the appetite was moved to dread and despair.[91] Put another way, the perceived evil intention of God forced the subject to incline away from and avoid the presence of the divine. Consequently, Scots like Mistress Rutherford and Bessie Clarkson were too afraid to approach God for help, as they apprehended God was angry with their sin.[92] The formal object of legal terror, then, was God's wrath against the subject, and thus the apprehension of God as evil for the subject.

By contrast, the three emotions of godly sorrow, a desire or hope for mercy, and a feeling of mercy all apprehended the formal object, God, as good. This was because God's mercy was the attribute received into the imagination. When the subject understands that God's love is good for the subject the appetite is inclined towards communion with God. However, the three emotions in question differed in how the subject relates to God. *Godly sorrow* was considered an apprehension of sin committed against the God whose intention is good for the soul. Thus, the presence of sin caused the appetite to rest in sadness, the subject acknowledging that what was done was a wrong against God. God was apprehended as good, and consequently the presence of sin as evil for the subject. Consequently, an apprehension of sinning against God moved Clarkson to exclaim 'I care not my owne damnation, if God bee glorified'.[93] Archibald Johnston of Wariston judged that he had been moved to 'mourne for sinne' as it was 'relative unto God by offending, greiving, angring of so loving ane Faythe r', as opposed to it being caused by an experience of God's wrath.[94] Wariston was inspired, like

[90] Calderwood, *History*, IV, 636.
[91] Chapter One, 38-39.
[92] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 163; Livingston, *Conflict*, 30.
[93] Livingston, *Conflict*, 14.
[94] Wariston, *Diary*, 109.

Clarkson, to tell God that 'I sould preferre thy glory to my salvation', which brought him great comfort and assurance of salvation. Rutherford was also 'led to mourn for sin in generall', sometimes 'in great bitternes for offending a mercifull and loving God'.[95]

A desire or hope of mercy was also evoked by an apprehension of a loving God. It was moved by the love of God not yet obtained. Rutherford concluded that she, with her godly sorrow, had an 'exceeding longing for Christ on any condition, and it had been to have endured all the torture of the damned'.[96] Jean Kincaid was moved to prayer by her apprehension that she could have forgiveness from God: 'Lord, for mercy and grace at thy hand for thy dear Son, Jesus Christ his sake, to the glory of thy mercy and safety of my sill soul'.[97] The desire for mercy differed only in degree with the feeling of God's mercy, which had as its formal object the mercy of God *possessed*. John Forbes of Corse felt a 'feeling of his great mercie', motivated by a meditation on 'his great love toward mankynde', when he was 'beholding him q[uho]m I w[i]t[h] my sins had pearced'.[98] Similarly, Rutherford was overwhelmed with joy when she 'gat bleeding Christ apprehended, and his merit applyed for pardon'.[99] Kincaid, Balfour reported, judged herself to have gotten 'great mercy', which she claimed to have created in her 'a feeling of his mercy'.[100] Thus, the formal objects of these three emotions critical to the spiritual journey – godly sorrow, a desire for mercy, and a feeling of mercy – were identified by Scottish Protestants as God apprehended as a good in relation to the subject, albeit in different ways.

A specific way in which God's attributes acted as a formal object, so thought Scottish Protestants, was in the deliverances of the conscience. Robert Bruce outlined a comprehensive theory of the conscience, which was representative of contemporaneous accounts in early modern Scotland and

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[95] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 169.
[96] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 169-170.
[97] Balfour, *Conversion*, VII.
[98] Forbes, *Diary*, 132.
[99] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 171.
[100] Balfour, *Conversion*, XVII.

England.[101] In the main, the conscience was considered the faculty which evaluates the good and evil of a person's actions. Bruce explained that the conscience was a:

> certain feeling in the heart, resembling the judgement of the living God, following upon a deed done by us, flowing from a knowledge in the mind, and accompanied by a certain motion of the heart, fear or joy, trembling or rejoicing.[102]

Bruce argued that the conscience takes as its formal object a deed done by the subject. This action is judged in relation to the knowledge of the mind, which determines whether the thing done is good or evil. This evaluation would only be accurate if the conceptual framework which informs the mind's judgements is the Word of God. If the conscience were guided by judgements which followed the will of God expressed in scripture, then the emotion evoked forthwith 'resembles the judgement of God'. The feeling – fear if the deed done was interpreted as evil, joy if it was perceived as good – was understood to represent God's own attitude or declaration in relation to the deeds done by the subject. Put another way, the intention of the formal object was considered God's expressed judgement on the subject's actions. Thus the conscience was in Bruce's view an emotion evoked by a formal object which had an intention which was interpreted as God's attitude – wrath or mercy – towards a subject in light of their deeds.

Consequently, Ryrie is right to argue that Protestants in sixteenth and seventeenth century Britain, including Scots, considered emotion to be a form of 'revelation', which they could use to determine the will of God in relation to their lives.[103] In his view, Protestants could use their emotions as evidence for whether they had been elected or reprobated. Through this analysis of their emotions, Protestants examined how the teaching of scripture, God's revealed will, applied to them.[104] Emotion, thus, was God 'speaking' directly to the subject. This paralleled the activity of Satan, who

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[101] Bruce, *Lord's Supper*, 140-151; Mullan, *Scottish Puritanism*, 89.
[102] Bruce, *Lord's Supper*, 141.
[103] Ryrie, *Being Protestant*, 40-48.
[104] Yeoman, 'Heart-work', 143-153.

could also use the emotions as a means of communicating with the subject for his own nefarious purposes.[105] Ryrie has even claimed that Scottish Protestants were more brazen in their judgements that their emotions were the work of supernatural agency than their English counterparts.[106] Even if Ryrie's claim overstates the differences in how zealous Scottish and English Protestants interpreted their emotions, his analysis supports the argument of this thesis that in their personal writings fervent Scottish Protestants engaged with emotion as a felt expression of God's will, which makes sense in relation to the idea that the formal object of these emotions was identified as God's attitude towards the subject. Evoked by such a stimulant, these emotions were interpreted as if they resembled God's judgements through the medium of experience.

However, the argument presented in this thesis goes beyond Ryrie's claim that emotions were considered a form of revelation. This chapter argues that because God was identified as the formal object of an emotion God was deemed to be *in* the subject.[107] This claim can be defended in relation to the theory of emotion presupposed by Scottish Protestants (outlined in chapter one).[108] Its proponents contended that the formal object of a passion is the form of an object abstracted from its matter. The form

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[105] Brock, 'Internalizing', 33-34, 39-40; Oldridge, *Early Modern England*, 47; Johnstone, *The Devil*, 129.
[106] Ryrie, *Being Protestant*, 43-44.
[107] This view seems strange to a contemporary, western audience because experiential knowledge is considered representational. With Descartes and Locke emerged the ideas that to know something empirically is for the mind to create a representation of an object apprehended by the senses. Implicit in this view is what Taylor has called the 'buffered self', an impenetrable subject. As the Scottish philosopher Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, influenced by Kantian thought, put it, 'each Self is a unique existence, which is perfectly *impervious*, if I may so speak, to other selves… the self, accordingly, resists invasion… it refused to admit another self within itself'. This is because every experience has a unique subject which is both that which unifies the sequence of events it perceives and that which perceives through change that which remains the same. Such an interpretation of the self, in Taylor's view, is the modern conception of the knowing subject. It is incomprehensible in this worldview to claim that an agent can be in another subject: the pre-Cartesian 'porous self' is unintelligible. Thus, the argument presented in this section indicates that the understanding early modern Scottish Protestants had of God's relationship to emotion is completely alien to a modern audience, and as such is difficult to interpret in an intelligible manner. See Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 33; Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 185-193; Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, *Hegelianism and Personality* (Edinburgh: W. Blackwood, 1887), 216.
[108] Chapter One, 22-30.

received into the imagination is judged identical with that possessed by the known object, and hence is the same reality that exists independently of the subject's consciousness. Thus, the mercy or wrath of God received into the mind are, by implication, judged identical with God's attributes of mercy and wrath. This meant that it was God, not a mere representation of God, which constituted the formal object of a passion. God, through those divine attributes which were apprehended by the subject (wrath and mercy), was *in* the faculties.

The language Scottish Protestants used to identify their emotions assumed God's attributes were in the soul when apprehended as the formal object of an emotion. For example, John Forbes of Corse spoke of receiving 'Grace, mercie, & peace' or 'obtaining mercie & comfort'.[109] He did not say he had an emotion in reaction to a representation of God's mercy in his mind. Rather, Forbes judged that God's mercy was his possession: God's attributes were *in* his consciousness. The same is true for other zealous Scottish Protestants. They interpreted their emotions as moved by God's wrath or mercy without qualification.[110] Indeed, the idea of 'feeling' God's mercy implied that one could feel, or have an emotion evoked by, God's mercy, which was only possible if it could be a formal object of a passion. The plain reading of the source material indicates that Scottish Protestants assumed that the cause of their emotions, God, was in the soul as the formal object of a passion.

An objection that could be put forward against this hypothesis is the idea that significant Reformed Protestants who influenced Scottish piety did not believe God was in a subject when the Holy Spirit created supernatural emotions. Todd Billings has made this point in relation to Calvin's interpretation of the Lord's Supper.[111] He has argued that for Calvin spatial terms are the wrong way to conceive of Christ's presence in the Sacrament. It is not so much a process where the believer's soul is united with a spatially

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[109] Forbes, *Diary*, 130-131.
[110] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 182; Dykes, *Memoirs*, 29-31.
[111] Todd Billings, *Calvin, Participation, and the Gift: the Activity of Believers in Union with Christ* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 136-139.

distant Christ in heaven. Rather, the distance is one of transcendence. Christ's body is tasted insofar as believers receive the 'life-giving power of heaven on earth'. Thus, to say that Christ is the formal object of an emotion and thus is *in* the subject's consciousness could be construed as a category mistake. It is metaphorical language intended to express the access one has to Christ's power through the Lord's Supper. That Billing's argument could apply to the understanding of the Sacrament by Scottish Protestants may be evidenced by John Davidson's (*c*.1549-1604) comments on the Lord's Supper, in which he was explicit that the heart is 'convoyed and carried, to the lively consideration of his death and resurrection'.[112]

A similar argument, that God does not enter a person's consciousness when the formal object an emotion, has been put forward by John Fesko in relation to the theology of the influential English puritan theologian William Perkins (1558-1602).[113] In a short passage on union with Christ, Fesko argues that, for Perkins, Christ is not inside a subject when performing the work of sanctification. Rather, through the special operation of the Holy Spirit, Christ reforms the faculties. Fesko cites this quotation from Perkins to support his claims:

> The second is, vivification by the virtue of the resurrection of Christ (Phil 3.10). And this virtue is the power of the God-head of Christ, or the power of the Spirit, raising us to newness of life, as it raised Christ, from the death of sin. And by this power, Christ is said to live in them that believe.[114]

Given that Perkins seems to have claimed that Christ is not 'literally' in the believer, but that his power is in them, Fesko infers that Perkins did not believe Christ was in a literal sense present in the soul during sanctification. As Calvin and Perkins were significant representatives of the Reformed tradition, and both had an important influence on Scottish Protestantism, it

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[112] John Davidson, *Some Helpes for Young Schollers in Christianity as they are in Use & Taught* (Edinburgh, 1602), C8*r*; *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020.
[113] John Valero Fesko, *Beyond Calvin Union with Christ and Justification in Early Modern Reformed theology (1517-1700)* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012), 257-258; *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020.
[114] William Perkins, *A Commentarie or Exposition, Upon the Five First Chapters of the Epistle to the Galatians* (Cambridge, 1604), 128-129.

could be construed from Billings's and Fesko's interpretation of their positions that it is a misinterpretation of Scottish Protestant language about emotions to conclude that they thought God was in their faculties as a formal object. Indeed, the dissimilarity between God and the forms – one the living, infinite, eternal creator, the other an inanimate, finite, temporal creature – could support these arguments against the idea that God was considered to be within a subject's consciousness as the formal object of a supernatural emotion.

However, the communion theology of Robert Bruce emphatically demonstrates that the language of public worship (analysed in chapter three), and by extension personal writings, assumed that God was *in* the consciousness of a subject who was experiencing a supernatural emotion.[115] Bruce explained that Christ enters the soul during the Lord's Supper in a lively passage which is worth quoting in full:

> For example, at the sight of a picture of the King, the King will come into your mind, and it will signify to you that that is the King's picture. If, therefore, the sign of the Sacrament did no more than that, all pictures would be *Lord's Supper*; but the Sacrament exhibits and delivers the thing that it signifies to the soul and heart, as soon as the sign is delivered to the mouth. It is for this reason, especially, that it is called a sign. No picture of the King will deliver the King to you; there is no other image that will exhibit the reality of which it is the image; therefore no image can be a Sacrament. Thus it is chiefly because the Lord has appointed the *Lord's Supper* as hands to deliver and exhibit the things signified, that they are called signs.[116]

In this excerpt, Bruce argued that God's entrance into the soul was not like seeing a picture of the King, for all this does is create an image of the King in the mind. By contrast, the sacrament delivers the thing 'that it signifies to the soul and heart'.[117] It is the instrument appointed by God to 'deliver to us Christ Jesus for our everlasting salvation'. Bruce justified this claim in relation to his conception of perception. He claimed that, whether inward or outward, to perceive something makes a thing present to the subject, regardless of

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[115] Chapter Three, 75-89.
[116] Bruce, *Lord's Supper*, 44.
[117] Bruce, *Lord's Supper*, 44.

distance.[118] He cited the example of the sun, which though it is far away, by the sense of sight is present to him. In the Lord's Supper, the body of Christ is present to 'the inward senses, which is faith wrought in the soul'. It makes Christ present in the soul.[119] Thus, as Christ is apprehended in the soul, he is, for Bruce, in the subject's consciousness as the formal object of the feeling of God's mercy in the Lord's Supper.

Furthermore, the Reformed Protestant affirmation of the doctrine of divine simplicity implies that the readings of Calvin and Perkins by Billings and Fesko are questionable. The idea that God's attributes and essence are identical, only formally distinct, was widely believed by early modern Reformed Protestants, including in Scotland. If Calvin and Perkins believed that it is Christ's power that is resident in the soul in the Lord's Supper and sanctification respectively, given they considered Christ's power is identical with his essence, it follows that they ought to have concluded that Christ must be in the soul too. That this is a reasonable interpretation of Calvin and Perkins is confirmed by their own words. Calvin only denied local presence in relation to Christ being in the elements of bread and wine: he was satisfied to argue that in the Lord's Supper 'The Spirit alone causes us to possess Christ completely and *have him dwelling in us*.'[120] With regard to Perkins, he does not say that Christ's dwelling in us by his power denies that Christ is within the soul. This is an interpretation offered by Fesko. Rather, Perkins merely claimed that by the power of the Spirit 'Christ is said to live in them that believe' in the process of sanctification. This could be construed as a claim that in the reformation of the faculties it is God's mercy in Christ, not his wrath, that becomes the formal object of the emotions. At the very least, it is unclear that Calvin and Perkins denied that God was present in the subject's consciousness as the formal object of an emotion.

Finally, it could be argued, in response to counterpoints, that Scottish Protestants differed from the Reformed community in England and abroad in

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[118] Bruce, *Lord's Supper*, 133-134.
[119] Yeoman, 'Heart-work', 180.
[120] Calvin, *Institutes*, 4.17.12.

their assumption that God was in the soul as the formal object of a supernatural emotion. As has been argued, the language of emotion used in public worship and private piety assumed that supernatural emotions were caused by the apprehension of God's attributes, such as wrath and mercy, in the subject's consciousness. That Scottish Protestants were more confident in judging that their emotions were the product of divine action has been claimed by Ryrie.[121] Moreover, they presupposed that another supernatural agent, the devil, dwelt within the minds of those he emotionally manipulated: as Brock has argued, when Scottish Protestants internalised the demonic, they assumed that Satan was *within* them when he caused their sins, temptations, and doubts.[122] Consequently, appeals to Reformed Protestant views outside of Scotland should not necessarily undermine the argument that fervent Scottish Protestants assumed God was in their consciousness as the formal object of emotion, as such evidence may not represent the position held in Scotland by zealous Protestants. Their theory of emotion, along with their adherence to the doctrine of divine simplicity, their parallel views of the devil's agency, and the language they used to identify the formal objects of their emotions, provide a strong cumulative case for the plausibility of the view that Scottish Protestants believed God was in their souls, whether or not other Reformed communities took the same view.

Thus, Scottish Protestants judged that God was in their consciousness as the formal object which causes a passion. This was due, in part, to their presupposed theory of emotion and their support for the doctrine of divine simplicity. The natural interpretation of the language they used to articulate their experiences assumed that God, apprehended under a given aspect, was in the subject's soul, which stimulated emotion. Moreover, their view of God's presence in the subject mirrored their views about Satan's location when causing emotion. Hence, it is plausible to believe that zealous Scottish Protestants judged, in their practice of radical emotional reflexivity, that God was within them as the external agent of their supernatural emotions.

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[121] Ryrie, *Being Protestant*, 43-44.
[122] Brock, 'Internalizing', 33-34.

3. Ecstatic Joy and the Experience of Happiness

Zealous Scottish Protestants claimed that God could also be in the soul another way besides as the formal object of a passion. They identified that their experiences of intense enjoyment were, in the right context, the subjective dimension of communion with God. Their psychosomatic feelings, then, could be a mode of perception, a felt apprehension of a reality, in this case happiness; just as touch is the sensory perception of an object. In the language they used, this meant that the emotion of extreme pleasure was apprehended as the formal object of a passion, evaluated as good for the subject insofar as it was interpreted as the effect of God's communion with the subject. They drew this conclusion based on their theory of emotion (engaged with in chapter one).[123] Scottish Protestants presupposed that joy was the rest of the appetite in the object of its love. This meant that they assumed that ecstatic joy was the felt dimension of the appetite's rest in God.[124] As such rest was only possible in a present object, it was implied that for one to enjoy God then God must be present to and in the soul. These presuppositions and what they entailed about the ontological nature of joy explain why Scottish Protestants claimed that their experiences of ecstatic joy were in fact apprehensions or perceptions of God in themselves. Thus, they were considered a spiritual sensation of communion with God produced by the material manifestation of the appetite's rest in its supreme good.

William Struther argued that experiences of ecstatic joy evoked by communion with God were episodes of what he called 'Spirituall Excesse'.[125] In his view, these emotions were not the ordinary experience of believers. Rather, they were considered by Struther a special act of God where God 'commincateth himselfe to the soule', where the 'spirit is pulled out of it selfe, and the body feebled'. It is a being 'in heaven with God', filling the soul with 'love and joy' to a degree 'not oft to be found'. Thus Struther argued that spiritual excess was a special gift of God whereby the soul apprehends

[123] Chapter One, 38-39.
[124] Chapter Two, 57-60, 63-67.
[125] Struther, *Happiness*, 127-129.

God's presence as the saints do in heaven, where they see God 'face to face' without the instruments of the Word and Sacraments. It was a temporary experience of being 'full of God': a glimpse of happiness. In a similar vein, Robert Boyd of Trochrig (1578-1627), Principal of the university of Glasgow and later Edinburgh, counselled Robert Blair that the student's experience of divine ravishment was 'not the daily fare of the people of God', but a gift sent to 'strengthen my faith, to make my hope lively' and to 'prepare me to endure temptation and affliction'.[126] The purpose of 'spiritual excess' was identical to the experience of communion with Christ in the Lord's Supper: the Sacrament instituted 'for the growth and increase of our faith, for the increase of our holiness and sanctification'.[127] Episodic experiences of happiness in public worship and private piety, thus, were interpreted by ministers as gifts from God sent to propel the subject forward on their spiritual journey.

That zealous Scottish Protestants interpreted their ravishing pleasure as a perception of communion with God is evident from their personal writings. The vocabulary they used to characterise these experiences was similar to that used by Struther of what it was like to feel 'spiritual excess'. For example, many zealous Scottish Protestants, like Struther, characterised their episodes of happiness as an experience of being 'filled' or 'full' of God. Robert Blair evaluated that he had 'the love of God burning in my soul', a feeling of being 'full now of joy and pleasure in God'.[128] Mistress Rutherford judged that on one occasion all of a 'suddain the Lord filled the heart with such a sense of himself that cannot be expressed with assurance of his leading me'.[129] Archibald Johnston of Wariston claimed that in an episode the Lord had 'opened the eies of thy mynd to seie Gods faice schyning presently on thy saule with sutch amiable beams flouing from his reconiled countenance as almost transported the[e] out of thyselth'. This was a

[126] Blair, *Life*, 18; *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020.
[127] Bruce, *Lord's Supper*, 101; Yeoman, 'Heart-work', 181.
[128] Blair, *Life*, 18.
[129] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 182.

'sensible possession of God' and 'sight of my happiness'.[130] In these and other instances, the powerful emotions of joy and peace the author evaluated were interpreted as a perception of God's presence in the soul. Why such language denoted communion with God is analysed in the following discussion.

A common way authors characterised such an experience was to name it 'inexpressible'.[131] This language was borrowed from the writings of Paul. In Romans, he encouraged his readers that 'the Spirit helps us in our weakness, for we do not know how we should pray, but the Spirit himself intercedes for us with inexpressible groanings.'[132] In his own examination of his mystical vision, Paul saw, he claimed, 'inexpressible things'.[133] In the same way, Scottish Protestants emphasised the unspeakability of their experience of communion with God. It referenced the intensity of the peace and joy that they felt, so overwhelming that language was inadequate to express it. Moreover, it identified the subjective sphere, what was felt, with the ineffability of what was perceived through these emotions, just like Paul's mystical vision: the transcendent. The apophatic quality of these experiences was an indicator, for fervent Scottish Protestants, that these were apprehensions of communion with God. Thus the emotion which was a subjective experience of God was inexpressible because the one whom perceived it apprehended that communion with God is beyond all categorisation.

Fervent Scottish Protestants also interpreted perceptions of communion with God as an experience of being 'filled'. Mistress Rutherford was 'filled' with peace, while Archibald Johnston of Wariston was 'filled with holy thoughts and divine imaginations'.[134] James Mitchell of Dykes was 'filled' with the sense of God's love.[135] Such language is reminiscent of Acts 2,

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[130] Wariston, *Diary*, 218-219.
[131] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 171, 182; Wariston, *Diary*, 216-218; Dykes, *Memoirs*, 48.
[132] Romans 8:26.
[133] 2 Corinthians 12:4.
[134] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 182; Wariston, *Diary*, 219-220.
[135] Dykes, *Memoirs*, 39, 42.

where the Holy Spirit 'filled' the disciples, making them speak in tongues.[136] It is also inspired by Paul's imperative that followers of Christ should be 'filled with the Spirit'.[137] In the context of emotion, it probably reflected the all-encompassing nature of the emotions experienced. There was no discord or dissonance within the affections: all that was experienced was peace and joy through the rest of the appetite in God. At the same time, the physiological manifestation of rest in God was 'the heart inlarging the selfe sweetly, for to imbrace the object that is agreable to it', (as discussed in chapter one).[138] In this way, communion with God filled, or 'enlarged', the soul.

Committed Scottish Protestants identified their perception of God as enlargement, filling, and ravishment because its psychosomatic features were similar to those experienced in sexual orgasm.[139] This was not unique to Scottish Protestantism: a similarly sexualised interpretation of experiencing God is apparent in Roman Catholic art of the period, most notably in 'The Ecstasy of St Teresa' (1647-1652) by Gian Lorenzo Bernini (1598-1680). The psychosomatic features of communion with God which Scottish Protestants thought were similar to those of sexual orgasm are further analysed in the next chapter.[140] For the present purpose, what is important is that such language implied that, like sex, the pleasure the subject felt was aroused by intimacy with another. Given the implicitly feminine character of the subject acted upon by God in the Scottish Protestant linguistic-conceptual framework, the language used to identify perceptions of God via the medium of emotion conveyed that God was like a man who had pleasured his lover. Just as the joy of woman is increased by the enlargement of the male member to fill her, so too the growth of God's presence in the soul satisfies the passive subject. Moreover, the idea that communion with God is an experience of 'ravishment', often associated with the use of force and sexual violence, reinforced the idea that the subject's ecstatic joy was involuntary: it

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[136] Acts 2:4
[137] Ephesians 5:18.
[138] Makluire, *Buckler*, 60; Chapter One, 39-42.
[139] Yeoman, 'Heart-work', 190-192.
[140] Chapter Five, 174-175.

was stimulated solely by the action of God upon the passive, and thus feminine, individual.[141] The sexual imagery evoked by enlargement, filled, and ravished, indicated that, in the view of Scottish Protestants, their ecstatic joy was caused by the action of another inside them, and thus that such emotions were perceptions of God's presence in the soul.

Related to the idea of intimacy was the evaluation made by pious Scottish Protestants that ecstatic joy was a perception of physical proximity to God. One way this judgement was expressed was through the identification of an emotion as the soul 'seeing' God's face or countenance. In the depths of despair, William Cowper was made to see 'the bright and lightsome countenance of God proclaiming peace, and confirming peace', while James Mitchell of Dykes felt the 'Sun of righteousness by his spirit, to shine so clearly, and powerfully in the soul of so filthy and polluted a sinner'.[142] Archibald Johnston of Wariston recorded that the Lord had 'opened the eies of thy mynd to seie Gods faice schyning presently on thy saule with sutch amiable beams flouing from his reconciled countenance'.[143] While he was still a Jesuit priest, Thomas Abernethy (*c*.1600-*fl*.1639) usually read a chapter of the bible each day.[144] He had doubts about the validity of the Papacy when, on one occasion, he read Colossians 2:8: 'Beware least any man spoile you thorow philosophie, and vaine deceat, after the traditions of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ'.[145] Abernethy was suddenly seized with anxiety about the role of the Pope and, at the same time, was 'illuminate with an extraordinary light… whereby comparing the words of the Apostle with their doctrines and actions, I was convicted in my minde to define Poperie to be a superstitious masse of policie, under the pretext of religion'.[146] Such language was reminiscent of Numbers 6:25 'may the Lord make his face to shine upon you'. Given that the sight of God's face

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[141] See *DOST*, https://www.dsl.ac.uk. Date accessed 14/03/2020; *OED*, https://www.oed.com. Date accessed 14/03/2020.
[142] Cowper, *Life*, B3*r*; Dykes, *Memoirs*, 31.
[143] Wariston, *Diary*, 218-219.
[144] Alasdair Roberts, 'Thomas Abernethy, Jesuit and Covenanter', in *Scottish Church History Society* (1991), 141-160.
[145] Thomas Abernethy, *The Abjuration of Poperie* (Edinburgh, 1638), 26, 22.
[146] Abernethy, *Abjuration*, 22.

was considered a state of communion with God, it was a metaphor for the state of happiness. This is why Wariston described the experience of seeing God as a 'sensible possession of God' and 'sight of my happiness'.[147]

Simultaneously, many zealous Scottish Protestants identified that communion with God was experienced as a kind of 'elevation'. Cowper felt as if he was 'raised up to Heaven, to have joyfull fellowship with God in Christ Jesus', while Dykes, in perhaps his most ecstatic experience, had 'such a sense of joy filling the hole man, that in truth, I thought myself carried on eagle's wings, and possesst of this kindgom'.[148] Blair was, when full of the pleasure of God, 'in this banqueting house, the banner of his love over me', as his soul was 'elevated and enlarged', while Wariston, in his possession of God, felt as if he was 'almost transported the[e] out of thyselth'.[149] Dykes used similar language when he declared that the Lord gave him a 'great peace and calmness of mind' so that he was 'almost transported out of myself'.[150] Again, Paul's mystical vision, where he was present in the 'third heaven', Jesus's allusions to the Kingdom of God as being like a great banquet, and the promise in Isaiah that God will enable the elect to soar 'on wings like eagles', were probable influences on the identification of ecstatic joy as an elevation towards God's presence, along with the Song of Songs.[151] In any case, the language was used to indicate the perceived proximity of God to the soul.[152]

In sum, this section has shown how some Scottish Protestants identified that their experiences were, on occasion, intense perceptions of communion with God. Based on their theory of emotion, they presupposed that their ecstatic joy was the felt dimension of the rest of their appetite in the

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[147] Wariston, *Diary*, 218-219.
[148] Cowper, *Life*, B3*r*; Dykes, *Memoirs*, 39.
[149] Blair, *Life*, 17-18; Wariston, *Diary*, 218-219; Song of Songs 2:4.
[150] Dykes, *Memoirs*, 47.
[151] 2 Corinthians 12:2; Matthew 22:1-14; Isaiah 40:31.
[152] Such language is reminiscent of that used to describe the activity of God on the soul in the Lord's Supper, in which it was believed that by the 'operatioun of the haly Ghaist, who by trew faith carryis us above al things that are visible, carnal, and earthly, and makes us to feede upon the body and blude of Christ Jesus'. *Scots Confession*, XXI. See Chapter Three, 82-83.

supreme good. They used a rich vocabulary, inspired by scripture and well-known cultural terms, to convey that these emotions were experiences of God's presence in the soul. They learned this vocabulary from ministers like Struther, whose examination of 'spiritual excess' indicates, in conjunction with the evidence from other ministers and personal writings, that the perception of God's presence in the soul was built into the language of emotion integral to Scottish Protestant worship and piety. In particular, it characterised the experience of the sixth stage of the spiritual journey (explored in chapter three).[153] In other words, the identification of rapturous pleasure as a perception of communion with God was a socially learned interpretation utilised by fervent Scottish Protestants in their practice of radical emotional reflexivity. This provided another way– along with being considered the formal object of an emotion – that the presence of God was perceived in the soul.

This chapter has analysed Scottish Protestant judgements about the relationship between God and the supernatural emotions in the spiritual journey towards happiness. It has argued that they identified God as the cause of the emotions which propelled the soul towards communion with Christ. The implication of this view, that God resided in the subject as the formal object of a passion, was examined. Moreover, the chapter has explained how fervent Scots believed they could perceive communion with God through their experiences of ecstatic joy. This thesis was supported by considering the language they used to identify these emotions and possible counterarguments to this position. The assumptions in the Scottish Protestant mindset which made coherent the evaluations analysed in this chapter were outlined with reference to previous portions of the thesis.

In this and the previous chapter, the narrative framework and language of the spiritual journey has been analysed: both the structure they

[153] Chapter Three, 115-120.

assigned to their emotions, and the character who propelled the plot, God. In this way chapters three and four have explored the way in which Scottish Protestants identified the significance of their emotions, insofar as they related to their goal: communion with God. Put another way, these chapters have explored how Scottish Protestants, in public worship and personal writings, used language about their emotions. It has examined the basic story they tried to tell about their emotions, through shifts in their vocabulary, and what they meant by their words.

Two further questions remain. First, why did Scots, in public worship and private piety, decide certain words better denoted their emotions than others? Put another way, why did they make the judgements they did about their emotions? Answering these queries will show why the extant personal writings present Scottish Protestantism as highly emotional. Second, why did Scottish Protestants, in corporate religious practice and personal writings, consciously evaluate their emotions? Addressing this question shall explain why the spiritual journey was the emotional spine of public worship and private devotion. By extension, the reason why zealous Scots practiced radical emotional reflexivity and produced narratives of the spiritual journey will be explicated. It is to address these questions that the thesis now turns.

Chapter Five: The Mobilisation of Supernatural Emotions

This chapter examines the process and purpose of radical emotional reflexivity in Scottish Protestant worship and piety. It argues that the examination of emotion was built into corporate religious activity and private devotion because Scots were taught that this practice was the means appointed by God to mobilise in them supernatural emotions. Put another way, the categorisation of emotion was a part of corporate religious practice and private devotion because it was thought that the process could evoke those desired feelings which facilitate communion with God. The naming and identification of emotion had this effect because the process could show a person where they were on the spiritual journey towards happiness, which would stimulate an appropriate emotional response. Consequently, testing the 'sincerity' of one's emotions, and as such one's spiritual state, was an activity which was central to public worship and private spirituality in early modern Scotland. Through analysis of this practice, the thesis moves beyond what Scottish Protestants said about their emotions, explored in chapters three and four, to how and why they used this language to categorise their experiences. Moreover, it explains why radical emotional reflexivity was practiced in corporate ritual and through the production and reading of personal writings by zealous Scottish Protestants.

The course of the argument is developed in three sections. The first segment engages with the processes Scots used in public worship and private piety to test the sincerity of a subject's emotions. 'Sincerity' was a key concept in Scottish Protestantism, and how it grounded the practice of radical emotional reflexivity in corporate ritual and private spirituality is explored. This paves the way for an analysis of how Scots evaluated the authenticity of an individual's emotions. It is argued that this was carried out by inferring the nature of an emotion by its causes and effects. Based on such inferences, Scots could determine whether they, or another, had genuinely experienced supernatural emotions.

Inevitably, the assessment of one's emotions to determine their sincerity meant that in some cases Scots concluded a subject did not have supernatural affections. This is the focus of the second section. It navigates the ways in which Scots inferred that their emotions were not of divine origin, due to the causes and effects of these experiences. In so doing, the discussion addresses the problem of doubt which afflicted many of the most fervent Scottish Protestants. The anxiousness that arose from such conclusions was, it is claimed, produced by a tension intrinsic to the language and concepts of emotion that Scots were taught and used in their practice of radical emotional reflexivity.

The final section explores why Scots used public worship and personal writings to examine their emotions. It argues that Scots used radical emotional reflexivity – the test of sincerity – to mobilise desired, supernatural emotions. To show that this was the function of self-examination, the section examines how the identification and naming of emotion in corporate ritual and private devotion evoked those emotions which constituted the spiritual journey (outlined in chapter three).[1] Put another way, this chapter demonstrates that communal religious practice and the personal writings produced by zealous Scots functioned as ways and means by which they could stimulate supernatural emotions. Moreover, because radical emotional reflexivity was God-caused it was considered an activity in which a person not only evoked desired emotions, but experienced the spiritual journey. Thus this chapter explores why Scottish Protestants consciously examined their emotions and why this was a core feature of their public worship and private piety. By extension, it explains why fervent Scots wrote narratives about a subject's spiritual journey: they used these texts to mobilise God-caused emotions and to engage in the pilgrimage of their souls. Consequently, the final section explores the function of the language used about emotion in public worship and private piety in early modern Scottish Protestantism.

[1] Chapter Three, 89-120.

1. The Procedure of Radical Emotional Reflexivity

    a. Testing the Sincerity of a Subject's Emotions

On the 7 August 1590, King James VI delivered a speech at the General Assembly. His words were met by a fifteen-minute standing ovation from his audience. The following excerpt from James's oration indicates why it met with such approval.

> ...his Majesty praiseth God that he was born in such a time, as in the time of the light of the Gospell, to such a place to be King, in such a Kirk, the sincerest Kirk in the world. The Kirk of Geneva, said he, keepeth Pasche and Yuile. What have they for them? They have no institution. As for our neighbour Kirk in England, it is ane evill said messe in English, wanting nothing but the liftings. I charge you my good people, Ministers, Doctors, Elders, Nobles, Gentlemen, and Barrons to stand to your purity, and to exhort the people to do the same.[2]

James claimed that the church in Scotland was 'sincere'. It had a 'purity' the gathered assembly should defend and maintain. This imperative presupposed what Jane Dawson has called the 'regulative principle'.[3] The idea was articulated in the *Scots Confession*. The authors of the text, and by extension its subscribers, asked those who believed that their confession was 'repugnand to Gods halie word', to show them their error, so that religion in Scotland would have fidelity to 'his haly scriptures'.[4] In the so-called 'Negative Confession' of 1581 the regulative principle was reaffirmed, subscribers attesting that only that which is grounded 'upon his written word' is 'the trew Christian Faith and Religion'.[5] True religion was manifested at two levels: the institutional and the individual.[6] First, Scotland's religion was sincere insofar as it had purity in theology, practice, and structure. The *Scots Confession* argued that a church was sincere insofar as it facilitated the right

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[2] *Acts and Proceedings of the General Assemblies of the Kirk of Scotland, From the Year MDLX*, ed. Thomas Thomson (Edinburgh: Bannatyne Club Publications, 1839–45), II, 771.
[3] Dawson, *Knox*, 36.
[4] *Scots Confession*, 41.
[5] *Scots Confession*, 103.
[6] The way 'sincerity' characterised religious practice at an institutional and personal level in Scottish Protestantism was similar to how 'moderation' was the governing principle of polity and piety in the Elizabethan church. See Ethan Shagan, *The Rule of Moderation: Violence, Religion and the Politics of Restraint in Early Modern England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 8.

preaching of the Word, correctly administered the sacraments of baptism and the Lord's Supper, and exercised ecclesiastical discipline through which vice is suppressed and virtue is nourished.[7] This was the sense of 'sincere' James used when he compared the Scottish church to its Genevan and English counterparts. Scotland's church was the 'sincerest' because it adhered to the Word of God, while the church in Geneva was less pure, insofar as it celebrated the feast days of Christmas and Easter, while England was insincere through its celebration of what James decried as the Mass in English. It was in this institutional sense that Scotland's religion was judged by James, and to the delight of his audience, as the 'sincerest' in all the world.[8]

At the same time, a church could only be sincere if its people adhered to the precepts of the bible. Each person had to meet the biblical standards for cognition, emotion, and action.[9] This idea was the outworking of the widespread assumption, embedded into Scottish Protestantism, that Scotland was a 'covenanted' nation.[10] This meant that the people of Scotland had, as a corporate body, a special connection with God. They had the same kind of relationship to the Lord as Israel did in the Old Testament.[11] It meant that, like in the story of Abraham, God promised 'to be God unto' the people of Scotland, but also that the people of Scotland were bound to 'keep my covenant, thou, and thy seed after thee in their generations'.[12] Just as circumcision was a sign that the covenant applied to the new-born child, so infant baptism was the means by which the entire population of Scotland was ingrafted into this covenant with the Lord, and so were obliged to obey the precepts of God laid out in the scriptures.[13] The clearest expression of this

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[7] Jane Dawson, 'The sincerest kirk in all the world': Scotland and the Reformed community', Lecture, *Society for Reformation Studies* (Cambridge, April 2018); *Scots Confession*, XVIII; See *DOST*, https://www.dsl.ac.uk. Date accessed 20/05/2020.
[8] This was also a claim made by the 'Negative Confession'. See *Scots Confession*, 103.
[9] Dawson, 'The sincerest kirk in all the world'.
[10] Spurlock, 'Boundaries', 359; Mullan, *Scottish Puritanism*, 179.
[11] R. Kyle, 'The Nature of the Church in the Thought of John Knox' in *Scottish Journal of Theology*, 37 (1984), 486.
[12] Genesis 17:7-9.
[13] Spurlock, 'Boundaries', 360-361; Dawson, 'Discipline', 124.

demand upon the people of Scotland was in the aptly named National Covenant of 1638. Issued in resistance to Caroline liturgical implementations, its subscribers committed themselves to the defence of true religion and, hence, to a rejection of all innovations. They pledged that, with an 'unfeigned desire', they would 'maintain the true worship of God, the majesty of our King, and the peace of the kingdom, for the common happiness of ourselves and posterity'. This was followed with one final clause:

> And because we cannot look for a blessing from God upon our proceedings, except with our profession and subscription, we join such a life and conversation as beseemeth Christians who have renewed their covenant with God; we therefore faithfully promise, for ourselves, our followers, and all other under us, both in public, in our particular families and personal carriage, to endeavour to keep ourselves within the bounds of Christian liberty, and to be good examples to others of all godliness, soberness and righteousness, and of every duty we owe to God and man…[14]

In this passage, the subscriber committed to obey God's will in their personal conduct. They recognised that true religion could only be maintained at an institutional level if the thoughts, feelings, and actions of the people of Scotland, in private and public, conformed to the standard laid out in the bible. Otherwise, God would not bless their endeavour to reform the institutional church, as their professed desire would be *insincere*. Put another way, a subscriber could claim their defence and maintenance of true religion was genuine if, and only if, this was joined with a zealous pursuit of personal purity.[15] Thus, when James charged his subjects to 'stand to *your* purity', he was commanding them to maintain the sincerity of the Kirk in Scotland not

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[14] *The National Covenant and Other Papers c.1637-c.41*, National Library of Scotland, MS.1939.

[15] That the sincerity of the institutional and personal were considered interconnected is evidenced by the confession of personal sins in the ritual of public fasting. See Struther, *Warning*, 17-34; Spurlock, 'Boundaries', 361; Alec Ryrie, 'The Rise and Fall of Fasting in the British Reformations' in *Worship, and the Parish Church in Early Modern Britain*, eds. Natalie Mears and Alec Ryrie (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2013, 97; W. Ian P. Hazlett, 'Playing God's Card: Knox and Fasting, 1565-66', in *John Knox and the British Reformations*, ed. Roger A. Mason (Aldershot, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1998), 185-186, 189, 192.

only at an institutional level, but also in relation to each person's thoughts, emotions, and actions.[16]

Consequently, testing the sincerity of emotion was an intrinsic dimension of corporate ritual, especially the practice of public repentance. In chapter three, the language of emotion used in the ritual was laid out.[17] The present discussion moves the analysis forward by examining this vocabulary and grammar as it was used to evaluate the sincerity of a penitent's contrition. An offender could only be admitted to the ceremony if the kirk session deemed that they had an authentic 'feare and terrour of God's judgementes', 'haitrent of sinne and doloure for the same', and a 'sense and feilling… of Gods merceys'.[18] If judged to have these emotions, the penitent was allowed to 'witnes and declair his unfained repentance' before the congregation. When allowed to participate in the ritual, the penitent was under intense scrutiny. Only with the consent of the congregation could the minister declare that the offender had been absolved of their sin. As 'we can only se that which is without', the minister and congregation would evaluate the sinner's behaviour to determine whether their profession of unfeigned contrition was genuine. The penitent's posture, clothing, props, choreography, dialogue, and demeanour (as discussed in chapter three) were all evaluated by the onlookers.[19] This inspection would culminate in a 'trial of repentance', a dialogue in which the minister would interrogate the sinner before the entire assembly.[20] If satisfied, the minister asked the congregation to communicate whether they believed the penitent's repentance was sincere.[21] If the congregation showed a 'sign of their consent', the penitent would be absolved; if not, they would be forced to make further satisfaction for their sins. The minister would declare that the penitent's sins 'are forgevin not only in earth, but also in the heaven', while

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[16] Italics added for emphasis.
[17] Chapter Three, 75-89.
[18] Knox, *Repentance*, B1*v*.
[19] Chapter Three, 77-82.
[20] Todd, *Culture*, 156; Dawson, 'Discipline', 128; Macdonald, 'Reconciling', 206-207.
[21] Knox, *Repentance*, B6*r*.

the elders and deacons would embrace, kiss, and lead the reconciled individual to sit with the community.[22]

A process of evaluating emotion, thus, ran through the heart of public repentance. The congregation evaluated the sincerity of the penitent's claims: that they felt godly sorrow, a hatred for what they had done, and were assured they had received God's mercy. They did so by comparing the offender's behaviour with what they would expect someone to exhibit if they had those emotions. In this way, they were able to determine whether the individual was genuinely contrite or had feigned their penitence. Importantly, this meant that the ceremony constituted an examination of whether a sinner had been reconciled to God. It was not, as Nikki Macdonald and Scott Spurlock have argued, a ritual which effected reconciliation between God and the penitent.[23] Rather, they were examinations used to determine whether the offender could be reintegrated back into the community based on whether the penitent had *already* and *continued* to experience the supernatural emotions required for sincere repentance. This is evidenced by the fact that the offender was not admitted to the trial of repentance if they had not already convinced the kirk session that they had genuine contrition. Public repentance, thus, tested whether a penitent was truly sorry for their sin, and as such whether they had already been a recipient of God's grace. In other words, the ritual examined whether a subject had experienced the sequence of emotions which constituted the spiritual journey of the soul (discussed in chapter three).[24]

Ministers urged their communities to evaluate the sincerity of their lives, and by extension their emotions, beyond the context of corporate worship.[25] A clear example is found in *The Anatomie of a Christian Man* by

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[22] *FBD*, VII; Knox, *Repentance*, B6*v*.
[23] Macdonald, 'Reconciling', 235-236; Spurlock, 'Boundaries', 361.
[24] Chapter Three, 77-82.
[25] William Struther, *Christian Observations and Resolutions*, I (Edinburgh, 1628), A2*r*-A4*v*; Dickson, *Writings*, 25, 47, 82; Bruce, *Lord's Supper*, 168-169, 178; Boyd, *Sermons*, 211; Campbell, *Treatise*, A7*r*. Puritan ministers in England and North American also encouraged their congregations to engage in self-examination. See Cohen, *God's Caress*, 86; Bozeman, *Precisianist Strain*, 106-120; Watkins, *Puritan Experience*, 9-12.

William Cowper, Bishop of Galloway.[26] Cowper's stated motivation for the project was to help Scots determine their spiritual status. Many, he argued, were deluded into thinking they were on a path towards fellowship with God. The behaviour of the majority of Scots indicated that they were in fact 'counterfeit Christians': atheists, apostates, adulterers, murderers, and blasphemers.[27] Due to this widespread self-deception, Cowper urged his reader to test their lives against the template presented in *The Anatomie*, as it contained an account of what a person looks like when their lives are conformed to the Word of God. His analysis included a detailed discussion of the emotions a person ought to experience if they are a Christian.[28] Where an individual found similarity between their behaviour and the biblical standard, the reader should 'give thankes to God for beginning of the worke of his grace in thee'. Where they found discrepancy, the individual should 'pray to God further to quicken thee, that thou mayest grow in holy similitude and conformitie with him' for 'thy everlasting comfort in Christ Jesus'. Consequently, Cowper produced *The Anatomie* to help and encourage Scottish Protestants to evaluate whether they were sincere or insincere Christians, with the examination of the emotions an integral part of this process.

Many zealous Scottish Protestants followed this advice and examined their lives, including their emotions, in an effort to establish the sincerity of their religious profession. At various points in Mistress Rutherford's narrative she actively examined her sins and the sincerity of her faith.[29] Lady Hundaly and Bessie Clarkson, their dialogue partners claimed, had examined the sincerity of their emotions and had found them wanting.[30] The Episcopalian John Forbes of Corse and the Presbyterians Archibald Johnston of Wariston and Robert Blair kept spiritual diaries, used to examine both their spiritual

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[26] William Cowper, *The Anatomie of a Christian Man* (London, 1611), C1*r*-C4*r*.
[27] Similar attitudes were expressed by puritan pastors. See Lake, *Moderate Puritans*, 158-159.
[28] Cowper, *The Anatomie*, 99-189.
[29] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 174-176, 180.
[30] Porteous, *Exercise*, 9, 11; Livingston, *Conflict*, 9.

experiences on a regular basis.[31] In a similar vein, the Ayrshire farmer James Mitchell of Dykes wrote a memoir to reflect upon 'the Lord's mercies and dealings with my soul, and some deep exercises of mind'.[32] In a polemical context, William Cowper's *Life* examined his emotions to show those who that thought he was of dubious moral character, given that he had accepted a bishopric despite opposing Episcopalian ecclesiology, that his profession of faith was sincere.[33] Thus, these and other pious Scots, like their puritan counterparts, tested the authenticity of their supernatural emotions.[34] Their private spirituality became an exercise in radical emotional reflexivity, a search for and test of emotional sincerity. Put another way, fervent Scottish Protestants used radical emotional reflexivity to determine whether they were on the spiritual journey and, if so, to evaluate how far they had advanced towards communion with God.

b. The Process of Emotional Identification

To assess the sincerity of their emotions, Scottish Protestants named and identified their experiences. They classified their feelings, and so determined whether their emotions matched the biblical standard or needed revision. Based on a feeling's perceived causes and effects, Scots were able to infer which vocabulary best represented the subject's experiences. Put another way, what was judged to have evoked an emotion, and how that emotion manifested itself in somatic change, were a language Scots were taught to interpret in public worship. Some of those more fervent in the faith used this knowledge adeptly to assess and establish whether there was a presence of genuine supernatural emotion in their own lives, preserved in their extant writings. These thought-processes explain why Scottish Protestants expressed their emotions using the language they did. They provided the tacit rationale for an interpretation of a subject's experience.

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[31] Forbes, *Diary*; Wariston, *Diary*, 1; Blair, *Life*, 31-32.
[32] Dykes, *Memoirs*, 1.
[33] Cowper, *Life*, B3*r*-B4*r*; William Cowper, *The Bishop of Gallovvay his Dikaiologie* (London, 1616).
[34] Watkins, *Puritan Experience*, 11; Cohen, *God's Caress*, 86; Hambrick-Stowe, *Practice of Piety*, 168-175; Bozeman, *Precisianist Strain*, 106-107, 110-113.

Thus, inferences based on the perceived causes and effects of an experience were the fundamental cognitive process Scots engaged in when evaluating the sincerity of a subject's supernatural emotions. They were the essence of their radical emotional reflexivity.

In public worship, emotions were named and identified, in part, through what was perceived to have caused them. In the introduction, it was explained that emotions can be classified by what was thought to have caused these experiences.[35] The Lord's Supper was a prime example. Prior to participation in the Sacrament, ministers taught their congregations that in the ritual Christ was received into their souls.[36] They had framed the event so that any positive emotions experienced during the eating of the bread and wine could be interpreted as an experience of what William Struther called 'spiritual excess' (analysed in chapter four).[37] Put another way, the identified cause of experiences evoked in the Lord's Supper (communion with Christ) justified the categorisation of aroused feelings as the enjoyment of God, as this was an expected experience. In public repentance and corporate fasting, tears were legitimised because of their perceived cause. Within secular contexts in early modern England, it was considered embarrassing and immoral to cry in public.[38] This was symptomatic of the widespread belief that it was a faux pax to display excessive emotion, as such outbursts were a loss of rational control. It was particularly shameful for elite men to cry, as their actions lowered them to the level of women and the lower classes – those less able to control their emotions.[39] However, in the context of worship, tears were not only acceptable, they were desired and expected.[40] This was because they were considered the effect of God-caused repentance. While English and Scottish cultures did differ, the similarity of physiological theory and attitudes towards the emotionality of women in both contexts (explored in chapters one and four) suggest that similar views to public expressions of

[35] Rosenburg, 'Reflexivity and Emotions'; 5-6; Introduction, 2-3.
[36] Chapter Three, 82-83.
[37] Chapter Four, 150-156.
[38] Capp, 'Jesus Wept', 76.
[39] Chapter One, 44-45.
[40] Capp, 'Jesus Wept', 95.

emotion were typical in Scotland.[41] It was because tears in corporate penitence were considered the effect of God-caused emotions that Scots used them as evidence that the penitent, if they wept, was sincere in their repentance. Thus, the perceived cause of an emotion was a kind of justification Scots could use to interpret their experiences as divinely caused feelings.

Those zealous Scottish Protestants who practiced written forms of radical emotional reflexivity also used the supposed cause of an experience to identify the appropriate emotional language to characterise their feelings. Prayer was a prime example, exemplified in the episodic writings of John Forbes of Corse.[42] Forbes's experiences usually began with some unease or anxiety, grieved by doubt, temptation, and sin. This would then proceed to prayers for relief, grace, and mercy, often manifested in tears and groans. Then, he would experience feelings of peace and joy. As argued in chapter four, Forbes typically identified these emotions as God-caused supernatural emotions, such as a 'feeling of mercy'.[43] He judged that these feelings were the experience of God's love and grace in his soul. Such a categorisation was plausible because of the sequence of events leading up to his experience of peace. Forbes had prayed to God for a feeling of mercy. Then he had an emotion with similar phenomenological characteristics to a feeling of mercy. It was reasonable for Forbes to conclude that God had caused his peace and joy, given that he had just requested these emotions from God. The practice of prayer indicated the cause of those experiences which followed it, and as a result informed Forbes that his feelings were a kind of supernatural emotion.

That prayer could be used to identify the cause of an emotion, and thus an experience's categorisation, was evidenced by the specificity Scots could assign to their feelings when they seemed to be evoked through this activity. An important event in the life of James Melville, a Presbyterian

[41] Chapter One, 44-45; Chapter Four, 127-132.
[42] Forbes, *Diary*, 127-132.
[43] Forbes, *Diary*, 130-131; Chapter 4, 142.

minister, illustrates the point. At about the age of fourteen, Melville was sent one day to the smithy for sickles, and on the way he stopped off at a local church. Being 'soar of my lyff', Melville addressed God in his heart. Suddenly,

> the Lord steirit upe an extraordinair motion in my hart, quhilk maid me atteans, being alean, to fall on gruiff to the ground, and pour out a schort petition to God, that it wald please his guidnes to offer occasion to continow me at the scholles, and incline my father's hart till use the saming; with promise and vow, that whatever missour of knawlage and letters he wold bestow on me, I sould, by his grace, imploy the saming for his glorie in the calling of the ministrie; and rising from the ground with joy and grait contentment in hart, again fell downe and worschipped, as sa past on and did the earand, retourning and praising my God, singing sum Psalmes.[44]

The prayer Melville put up to God informed his identification of his feelings. He confessed to God that he was depressed with his farming life. He then felt compelled to ask God to let him continue in his studies and was moved to joy and contentment. Because Melville's subsequent emotions appeared as a response to his conversation with God, he could reason that God had caused his feelings. They were a set of experiences Melville could expect if God deemed to answer the specific prayer he had prayed, which Melville believed God had. The specificity of his prayer, when apparently answered, allowed him to reason that his feelings were God-caused, a supernatural emotion which addressed his particular situation. The supposed cause, indicated by the sequence of the events, was used by Melville, and other Scots, to categorise the emotions they felt.[45]

Emotions were also identified by their effects. In public repentance, it was impossible for the congregation to know 'secreites of the hart', and so the congregation evaluated the sincerity of a penitent's emotions by that 'which is without'.[46] To this end, they looked for somatic signs which manifested supernatural emotions. This was because bodily change was considered involuntary, and thus constituted a naked expression of a person's real feelings. One could feign contrition while wearing the proper

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[44] Melville, *Diary*, 24.
[45] Calderwood, *History*, IV, 635-637; Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 181-182.
[46] Knox, *Repentance*, B3*r*.

costume, adopting the right postures, and confessing they had experienced God-caused emotions. Physiological alteration, however, was out-with a person's control and so revealed the sincere emotions of the individual. This is also why authors drew upon the shared and stable use of language about bodily alteration as a manifestation of authentic emotion in corporate ritual to convey to their readers the nature of a subject's experiences. Consequently, the search for certain somatic signs was crucial in public and private examination of a subject's emotions.

The most significant signs of a penitent's sincere experiences of contrition were tears. This idea was embedded in the *Scots Confession*, subscribers affirming that they would 'sob and murne' when 'tempted in iniquitie'.[47] It trickled down into the processes of ecclesiastical discipline, apparent in the fact that kirk sessions repeatedly cited the penitent's tears in their accounts of an offender's contrition, a kind of encoded justification for the individual's absolution within their records.[48] Ministers like Archibald Simson (1566-1628) drilled into their congregations that it was impossible for an offender to be genuinely sorry for their sin and 'not watred with many teares'.[49] He acknowledged that not all can cry 'showers', but he maintained that the 'smallest sobs of sorrow and teares of compunction' give the congregation 'some signes of a penitent heart'.[50] William Cowper also taught that true repentance manifests itself in 'sighing and crying continually', while Struther urged those involved in a public fast to 'draw waters out of his broke heart and powre out the teares of true repentance'.[51] That tears were so strongly identified as a somatic manifestation of authentic repentance was most clearly demonstrated in the admittance to the Lord's Supper of Andrew Brown, a parishioner in the Scottish Presbyterian church of Larne, Northern Ireland. An individual was only allowed to participate in the ritual if they could

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[47] *Scots Confession*, XIII.
[48] Todd, *Culture*, 160-161; Macdonald, 'Reconciling', 93. See also Blair, *Life*, 68-69.
[49] Simson, *Sacred Septenarie*, 67; See *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020.
[50] Simson, *Sacred Septenarie*, 64.
[51] William Cowper, *Good Newes from Canaan* (London, 1613), 7; Struther, *Warning*, 51; Lamentations 3:40.

demonstrate that they had faith by their knowledge of doctrine and godly behaviour.[52] This would have excluded Brown, who was born deaf and unable to speak, and thus was unable to articulate an answer to a minister's questions. However, following his conversion 'a very sensible change was observed in him', the man partaking in 'God's worship in public and private'.[53] Crucially, he 'would weep at sermons', and it was 'by such signs, these who were acquainted with him understood, he would express many things of the work of God upon his heart'. The ministers of Antrim agreed that Brown's tears expressed his 'earnest desire', and so he was admitted to the Lord's Supper. Put another way, the ministers deemed that, even without the accompaniment of words, Brown's tears were a physiological manifestation of godly sorrow and as such they revealed his sincere faith and desire for communion with Christ.

The interpretation of tears that was integral to public worship presupposed the physiology of emotion discussed in chapter one.[54] Scottish Protestants were taught that when they experienced godly sorrow, the Holy Spirit would 'soften' or 'melt' their hearts so that it could be 'poured' as 'water' to God.[55] This was not figurative language. Sorrow (as explained in chapter one) was considered the retraction of blood to the heart, which cooled the body.[56] Some theorists argued that when this happened the vital spirits, the life force of an individual, were liquified and excreted.[57] Even if this exact explanation was not widely known, the idea that tears were the vital spirits in liquid form was implicit in the language Scots used about their tears. They were literally 'pouring' their 'melted' selves out when weeping.[58] Given that in the presupposed physiological paradigm the excretion of tears was a necessary consequence of sadness, it was plausible to conclude that if a person cried this was a sign that their contrition was sincere.

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[52] *Scots Confession*, XXIII.
[53] Livingston, *Brief*, 24-25.
[54] Chapter One, 39-46.
[55] Struther, *Warning*, 51, 66-66, 71, 73-74; Wariston, *Diary*, 328, 331.
[56] Chapter One, 39-41.
[57] Horstmanshoff, 'Tears', 315-316; Capp, 'Jesus Wept', 76-77; Chapter One, 41-42.
[58] Horstmanshoff, 'Tears', 314.

Inspired by their meaning in corporate religious practice, many fervent Scottish Protestants consistently claimed that their tears were signs of supernatural emotion. On one occasion, John Forbes of Corse claimed that when he was in spiritual and emotional distress, he 'cryed unto the Lord w[i]t[h] mournfull voice & sorrowfull sighs & tears that he would mercifullie help me'.[59] In this context Forbes's tears were interpreted by him as a physical form of repentance. Likewise, Archibald Johnston of Wariston recounted that at one time the Lord 'mad the[e]' pray for 'repentance, remission, praevention' with 'floods of tears'.[60] For the Edinburgh lawyer, his tears were not just caused by his contrition: they were his sorrow for sin. Wariston called this kind of crying 'deprecatorie', tears that were 'wonderfully grievous and plunged me unto the very hels'.[61] However, he also recognised the existence of what he called 'impetratorie' tears, those which were shed for 'the averting of Gods anger and judgements and Gods converting his love and blissings' with 'joyful, hoopful, conjuring tears'. They were a somatic form of petition, exemplified by Forbes's claim that some of his tears were 'humble supplicatiouns' for mercy.[62] Thus, tears had no essential meaning in Scottish Protestant piety: they could be identified as a manifestation of multiple kinds of supernatural emotions. This ambiguity is highlighted by an experience James Mitchell of Dykes underwent when, in response to a sermon preached by David Dickson, he wept tears which were a 'melting of heart, both of a godly sorrow, and sweet consolation mixt together'.[63] Tears were generally considered an embodiment of supernatural emotion, but what exactly they expressed was open to interpretation.

Groans were also viewed as a sign of sincere emotion. It was a non-verbal noise typically identified with a desire or prayer for God's mercy and a relief from sin. The subscribers of the *Scots Confession* declared that the Spirit of God had made them 'groane in Gods presence, for deliverance

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[59] Forbes, *Diary*, 127-130.
[60] Wariston, *Diary*, 223-225.
[61] Wariston, *Diary*, 142-143.
[62] Forbes, *Diary*, 127-130.
[63] Dykes, *Memoirs*, 29-31.

fra this bondage of corruption'.[64] It was an expected behaviour of a penitent in public repentance, though what it expressed was not explicitly defined.[65] However, as the penitent had to hate their sin and desire God's forgiveness, it is plausible that groans were perceived as a manifestation of these supernatural emotions, given what had been affirmed about groaning in the *Scots Confession*. William Struther reinforced this interpretation when he argued that in public fasting the Holy Spirit caused people to pray 'with groanes that cannot be expressed'.[66] In the literature produced by some of the more zealous Scottish Protestants, groans were also a form of desire. However, the nature of that desire could vary. The groan could be, like in public repentance, an expression of lament and a desire for better. These were the kinds of groan Forbes emitted when in distress.[67] However, they could also be interpreted as hope-filled desires for communion with Christ. Wariston found that on one occasion the 'Lord maid me put up petitions to him' in the form of 'strong cryes and groans', all while he felt abundant pleasure.[68] Whether more sorrowful or joyful, authors assumed that these involuntary groans, in the words of Wariston, 'spak to God'.[69] This was a view inspired by Romans 8:26-27, already discussed in chapter four.[70] This present chapter moves beyond the analysis in chapter four because it recognises that because Scots thought groans were a form of prayer or speaking to God caused by the Holy Spirit, they played a pivotal role in their examinations of emotional sincerity in public repentance and personal writings.

Scottish Protestants believed groans were an involuntary manifestation of desire because of their assumptions about physiology. Prayer, frequently a petition for God's mercy, was thought to involve an increase in temperature. John Knox argued that the purpose of prayer is that

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[64] *Scots Confession*, XIII.
[65] Macdonald, 'Reconciling', 93.
[66] Struther, *Warning*, 75.
[67] Forbes, *Diary*, 132.
[68] Wariston, *Diary*, 218-219.
[69] Wariston, *Diary*, 218-219.
[70] Chapter Four, 133.

'*our hartis may be inflamit* with continewall feir, honour, and love of God'.[71] The front cover of Lewis Bayly's *The Practice of Pietie* had an image of a burning heart on an altar named 'prayer', while Protestant emblem books by Georgette de Montenay and George Wither contained burning hearts which symbolised a desire for God.[72] These images were inspired by David's desire for mercy in Psalm 51: he pleaded with God to forgive him, because 'the sacrifices' (burnt offerings) of 'God are a contrite spirit: a contrite and a broken heart, O God, thou wilt not despise'.[73] Yet the burning heart was not just a metaphor. Puritans, like George Foxley (*fl*.1639), believed that the sense of the Spirit in prayer was maintained by 'holy breathings' which 'keepe and cleare the fire upon the hearth, whereby the sense is kindled, when thou settest upon the worke'.[74] Foxley identified the groans emitted in prayer as that which maintains the heat of the body, and in so doing sustains the phenomenological experience of the Holy Spirit.[75] Put another way, groans and heavy breathing maintain and regulate the feeling of joy, the subjective dimension of heat. On this model, groans were a corporeal manifestation of a desire to satisfy the longings of the appetite, and thus sustain pleasurable emotion. In these terms, Robert Rollock's idea that groans instigate prayer make sense.

> And we find that in experience in our selves, that we no sooner sigh unto God, but our souls are watered over with a certain unspeakable joy: so that we truly feel that thing, to wit, that the presence of God, through the Spirit of heaviness and inutterable sighes, causeth the presence of God through the Spirit of joy and unspeakable gladness.[76]

That Scots thought groans maintained the experience of prayer through the regulation of the body's temperature was akin to their views on orgasm. As analysed in chapter one, early moderns believed orgasm was the emission of

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[71] John Knox, *The Works of John Knox*, ed. David Laing, 6 vols. (Edinburgh: Wodrow Society, 1846-64), III, 85.
[72] Bayly, *Practice of Pietie*, Title-Page; Georgette de Montenay, *A Booke of Armes* (Frankfurt, 1619), 62; Wither, *A Collection of Emblemes*, 91.
[73] Psalm 51:17.
[74] Craig, 'Soundscape', 110.
[75] Chapter One, 41-42.
[76] Robert Rollock, *An Exposition upon Some Select Psalms of David* (London, 1600), 273–274, 469; Sugg, 'Flame', 146-152.

excess heat, experienced as rapturous joy.[77] What was not mentioned in that discussion was that an increase in temperature during copulation was associated with groaning. This can be seen in the plays of William Shakespeare (1564-1616), who used the mention of groaning as an innuendo for sexual activity.[78] Given many of the most fervent Scots implied that their experiences of spiritual excess has a similar physiological basis to that of orgasm (a theme analysed in chapter four) it may be reasonable to conclude that they thought groans were the result of similar somatic changes in prayer and copulation.[79] If that is so, it reinforces the idea that groans were considered a kind of desire which maintains the heat of the body, given that in both orgasm and spiritual excess pleasurable feelings are sustained by a high bodily temperature. In turn, this physiological connection would explain why groans were interpreted as a sign of sincere desire in public worship and private writings.

In addition, the manner in which somatic change manifested itself lent credence to the idea that it was an involuntary alteration of the body, and thus an authentic revelation of supernatural emotions. The suddenness and momentousness of a physiological change could be interpreted as evidence that it was God-caused.[80] This was exemplified by the experiences of congregations when swearing the National Covenant. Wariston recorded his experience at Currie Kirk. Prior to the act of swearing, the congregation displayed no emotion. However, when the congregation lifted their hands to swear the Covenant, in a moment,

> tuinkling of ane eye their fell sutch ane extraordinarie influence of Gods Sprit upon the whol congregation, melting their frozen hearts, waltering their dry cheeks… it was a wonder to seie so visible, sensible, momentaneal a chainge upon al, man and woman, lasse and ladde.[81]

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[77] Chapter One, 40-41.
[78] William Shakespeare, *The Works of William Shakespeare: The Globe Edition*, eds. William George Clark and William Aldis Wright (London: Macmillan and Co., 1878), *Hamlet*, III.2.2142; *Romeo and Juliet*, II.4.1243.
[79] Chapter Four, 151-154.
[80] Nathan C. J. Hood, 'Corporate Conversion Ceremonies: The Presentation and Reception of The National Covenant' in *The National Covenant in Scotland, 1638-1689*, ed. Chris R. Langley (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2020).
[81] Wariston, *Diary*, 327-328.

Wariston observed a similar outpouring of emotion at the swearing in Trinity Kirk, Edinburgh. The people were emotionless prior to the act of swearing, but when they lifted their hand they raised 'sik a yelloch, sik aboundance of tears, sik a heavenly harmony of sighs and sobbes, universally through al the corners of the churche, as the lyk was never seien nor heard of.'[82] In both cases, Wariston identified that these were God-caused experiences because the tears and groans of the congregation were sudden and without restraint. The abruptness and volume of these somatic signs indicated that they were not premeditated but the experiences of a passive subject. Given that the subject's absolute passivity was considered a defining quality of God-caused emotion (examined in chapter four), momentous and sudden tears and groans in the context of communal religious practice had to be, in Wariston's view, the work of a supernatural agent acting upon the souls of the gathered people.[83]

While the National Covenant was exceptional, those more zealous Scots who wrote about their supernatural emotions similarly portrayed them as sudden and momentous. On the 20th of September 1636, John Forbes of Corse was 'troubled and fearfullie terrified'.[84] This had been brought about contemplation of his 'former grievous sinnes'. He discovered 'in my self ane hypocriticall evil eye, and at the same tyme I weeped to God for pardon of it & for grace'. He was somewhat comforted, but was 'hindered from the consolation q[ui]ch I had formerlie received, by a new deceitfulness of sin in me'. Forbes wrestled for twenty-four hours with these feelings, when out of nowhere 'the Lord had mercie upon me, he tuched my heart, & opened my mouth, so that upon the forsaid day in the morning in the fields, and again in the evening… I fell upon my face, & humblie and plainlie w[i]t[h] […] tears confessed my sins unto God'. The Lord 'answere me w[i]t[h] the answer of mercie, peace & Grace, blissed be his H.[holy] name'. Forbes's feeling was so elevated that he burst into song about the 'Covenant of mercie & peace'.

[82] Wariston, *Diary*, 330-331.
[83] Chapter One, 22-30; Chapter Four, 123-140.
[84] Forbes, *Diary*, 132-134.

In this episode, Forbes's supernatural emotions did not emerge gradually, but exploded into his consciousness with rapidity and force. Similarly, when William Cowper was on the brink of despair, 'suddenly did there shine (in the very twinckling of an eye)' the countenance of God.[85] His soul was 'instantly raised up' from the brink of the pit to Heaven, from anguish to 'joyfull fellowship with God in Christ Jesus'. The sudden and dramatic change in his emotions was interpreted by Cowper as a sign that it was caused by the 'joyfull Deliverer of my soule'. The supernatural emotions of other Scottish Protestants were also characterised as having a sudden and momentous quality, perhaps most dramatically with the deathbed conversion of Bessie Clarkson.[86] As the immediateness and forcefulness of somatic signs and feeling were prevalent in the literature fervent Scots produced, it is plausible that the same was true for communal worship. It was not enough, as Macdonald has claimed, to have the 'ability to cry on cue' in public repentance.[87] Tears and groans which were sudden and without restraint would convince a congregation that they were sincere. Put another way, they had to look involuntary and thus passively experienced.[88]

While somatic signs had to be sudden, at the same time the constancy of an emotional disposition was considered an indicator of sincere repentance. If an excommunicant desired to repent, 'fourty dayis at the least' was required 'to try whither the signes of repentance appear in offendar or not', a length of time inspired by Jesus's temptations in the wilderness for forty days.[89] The logic of this position was explained by Archibald Simson, who argued that the truly penitent person will be 'ever mourning and boyling our teares', while counterfeit penitence 'dries up sodainly'.[90] This is because, Simson believed, God only creates passions which are 'constant'.[91] Thus, evidence that a person has godly sorrow and a desire for mercy over an

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[85] Cowper, *Life*, B2*v*-B3*r*.
[86] Livingston, *Conflict*, 40-41; Chapter Five, 200-202.
[87] Macdonald, 'Reconciling', 93.
[88] Chapter One, 22-30; Chapter Four, 123-140.
[89] Knox, *Repentance*, A5*r*.
[90] Simson, *Sacred*, 9.
[91] Chapter Two, 68-69.

extended period of time indicate the sincerity of their penitence. A similar emotional logic compelled Robert Bruce to regard Francis Stewart's repentance in public as authentic. Bruce observed that Stewart's *desire* to repent had not come about 'suddenly', but that he had informed James Gibson of his resolution 'a long time before'.[92] The authenticity of Stewart's repentance was shown, Bruce judged, in the duration of his desire to make satisfaction. Behaviour after public repentance could also evidence the sincerity of a penitent's contrition. Robert Blair reported that the repentance of an adulterer was judged authentic insofar as he was 'a reformed man in the rest of his life'.[93] Similarly, Hugh Campbell, who had fled from Scotland to Ireland having killed a man, was substantially changed, so that he would regularly host meetings for those who wanted to pray and meditate for years to come.[94] Even the enemies of the Scottish Presbyterians in Ireland noticed such changes; Henry Leslie stating that many were changed so that 'they are never seen to laugh, and never talk of anything but God'.[95] Lasting change was a quality which evidenced the supernatural origin of an emotion, and as such was an external sign Scots used to categorise a subject's experiences.

In sum, Scottish Protestants in public worship and personal writings identified a subject's emotions, and consequently their emotional sincerity, through analysis of the causes and effects of an individual's feelings. Emotional sincerity was displayed in public worship and private devotionality through somatic change and external behaviour. Due to the shared linguistic and conceptual framework which was sustained by corporate religious practice, Scots were taught to identify sudden and momentous tears and groans that resulted in lasting behavioural changes as signs of supernatural emotion. This is not an exhaustive list: there were occasions where other physiological changes were judged to have revealed divinely inspired feelings. Nevertheless, the marks examined were the main signs of God-caused feeling. They had this status because they indicated that the

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[92] Bruce, *Sermons*, 366.
[93] Blair, *Life*, 69.
[94] Stewart, 'History', 320-321.
[95] Baillie, *Six Mile Water*, 20.

experience which produced them was not premeditated. While in public repentance they were assigned a more definite meaning, in the literature zealous Scots produced, tears and groans were open to a variety of interpretations. All authors, however, implicitly agreed in the extant material that they were the somatic dimension of God-caused emotions. This was, in part, due to inferences based on the perceived causes of these psychosomatic phenomena. Exhibited in public ritual or in prayer, they were the expected effect of any divine action in that context. Thus, the process by which Scots categorised emotions, using the language built into public worship, consisted in both an inference based on the emotion's cause and its observed effects. Interpretation of the emotion's cause and effects revealed how it should be classified, and as such was the basis for evaluating whether a subject's emotions were sincere. In other words, this process of emotional identification provided the rationale for the judgements authors made about a subject's emotions in their personal writings.

A consequence of examining the authenticity of a claim to supernatural emotions was that people could fail the test. In public repentance, the congregation could judge that the penitent was not sincerely sorry for what they had done. In their writings, authors might conclude that their subject did not have God-caused emotions. If one failed to show the signs of godly sorrow, a feeling of mercy, or spiritual excess in contexts they were to be expected, it gave reason to suspect that these emotions were not present. By extension, it provided justification to question one's spiritual status. The search for sincerity, thus, facilitated doubt.

2. The Problem of Doubt

Many of those Scots who engaged in radical emotional reflexivity, at times, judged that they were not sincere Christians. They believed they were members of the reprobate. They arrived at this conclusion because when they evaluated their emotions, they determined that they were not the product of divine agency. Such views were tacitly justified by inferences made about an emotion's causes and its effects. Through this process, many

Scottish Protestants were driven into suicidal despair. As seen with the case of Mistress Rutherford in chapter three, battling the doubt caused by radical emotional reflexivity could be a substantial portion of the spiritual journey.[96]

Some Scottish Protestants were made to question whether they had experienced a supernatural emotion because there was a viable physiological explanation of their feelings. The first time James Mitchell of Dykes believed he had experienced the presence of God, he was tempted to believe that his emotion 'might flow from natural grounds and reasons'.[97] He thought it could be a 'fantasie' or a 'delusion', caused by an excess of black bile, 'melancholy', in his blood. However, he deduced that this was not so, and so concluded he had experienced God-caused emotions. Similarly, when Mistress Rutherford first evaluated her suicidal inclinations, she judged that these thoughts and feelings were caused by a 'naturall desert in the blood'.[98] She had, by implication, concluded that her desire to die was the result of a humoural imbalance in her body. Consequently, she did not believe her inclinations to self-harm had a supernatural origin. It was only later she thought that her will to die was caused by Satan. Pastoral advice could also assume that the cause of an emotion was illness, not the supernatural. On one occasion Archibald Johnston of Wariston fasted so that God would relieve him of his worldly sorrow. His friend Lady Curryhill advised him that this was the wrong approach. Rather than fast, the distraught Wariston should eat food, because in her view his lack of nourishment had facilitated 'hot bilious and dust melancholic humeours', the source of his anguish. Her advice was sound, as after he had some dinner Wariston experienced 'on[e] of the happiest houres of al my luftyme and the freest accesse that ever I had to the Throsne of Graice'.[99] Implicitly, this kind of pastoral advice assumed that the cause, and thus remedy, of the subject's emotional distress was not supernatural but bodily in nature.

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[96] Chapter Three, 97-99, 109-111.
[97] Dykes, *Memoirs*, 3-4.
[98] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 157.
[99] Wariston, *Diary*, 182-183.

Additionally, in polemical contexts physiological explanations were used to undermine claims to supernatural emotion. In the early seventeenth century scholars, like Robert Burton (1577-1640), attacked puritanism because they believed the tradition exploited the psychological distress of its adherents.[100] These critiques were taken up in the late-seventeenth century by Scottish Episcopalians, who argued that Presbyterian ministers exacerbated the melancholic dispositions of their congregations.[101] In this way, Episcopalians in Scotland attacked Presbyterian approaches to pastoral care and their claims that their religious profession was corroborated by experiences of God-caused emotions, as these feelings were nothing more than the product of humoural imbalances. While no evidence has been found of Scots facing this attack on their spirituality between 1590 and 1640, that many of the extant personal writings were written in the latter half of the seventeenth century suggests that authors would have been aware of such critiques. That Mistress Rutherford felt the need to explain that her suicidal inclinations were caused by Satan indicates that she may have been preempting Episcopalian tendencies to explain away her Presbyterian religious experiences as primarily physiological in nature.

What lent some credence to the idea that a supernatural emotion was really the product of bodily processes was that many of the experiences Scots claimed were God-caused were accompanied by physiological abnormality. After the consumption of some powerful alcohol, Robert Blair experienced a burning fever so horrendous that he thought he was about to die.[102] At the same time, he also claimed to have experienced God's love burning within his soul. On more than one occasion, James Mitchell of Dykes experienced communion with God while suffering from a fever.[103] William Cowper first experienced legal terror when he was subject to 'great bodily

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[100] Robert Burton, *The Anatomy of Melancholy* (Oxford, 1621), 362-363, 957; Thomas L. Canavan, 'Robert Burton, Jonathan Swift, and the Tradition of Anti-Puritan Invective' in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 34, no.2 (1973), 234-235; *ODNB*, https://www.oxforddnb.com. Date accessed 20/05/2020.
[101] Raffe, *Controversy*, 129-134.
[102] Blair, *Life*, 18-19.
[103] Dykes, *Memoirs*, 38-39.

infirmities' due to the 'weakness' of the soil and 'unwholesome' waters he had been consuming.[104] The three years Clarkson was wracked with dread and despair her minister and friends were concerned about her 'bitter' physick, of which she eventually died.[105] Lady Hundaly's torment was experienced while she suffered from, and died of, plague.[106] Given Scottish Protestants presupposed that humoural imbalance could cause emotional change (an idea discussed in chapter one) the apparent correlation between bodily alteration and those emotions authors identified as supernatural could reasonably be interpreted as causal.[107] At least, physiological abnormality provided a somewhat plausible explanation as to the origin of an experience, and as such could threaten the identification of an emotion as God-caused. This is why, on some occasions, a physiological explanation of an experience could cause a Scot to question whether they had sincerely experienced a supernatural emotion.

In some cases, zealous Scots doubted that an experience was divinely inspired when they judged that it had been caused by Satan. In chapters three and four, it was argued that the devil could act upon the soul, injecting it with temptations in order to stimulate the corrupted faculties so that they would produce internal, and as a consequence external, sins.[108] The discussion here moves beyond to the idea that Satan was considered capable of causing people to behave in ways which mimicked the effects caused by God's agency in the soul. The clearest example was in the parish of Broadisland in the county of Antrim, Ireland, during the Six Mile Water revival. On numerous occasions, as the sermon was delivered, many in the congregation exhibited sudden and momentous somatic change.[109] During every sermon, about forty people, mainly women, would 'fall down in the church in a trance and are (as it is supposed) senseless, but in their fits they

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[104] Cowper, *Life*, B1*r*; Fleming, *Fulfilling*, 237-238.
[105] Livingston, *Conflict*, 15, 35.
[106] Porteous, *Exercise*, 18.
[107] Chapter One, 42-46.
[108] Chapter Three, 100-102; Chapter Four, 138-139.
[109] Blair, *Life*, 89; Livingston, *Brief*, 17-18; Westerkamp, *Triumph*, 25; Crawford Gribben, *The Irish Puritans: James Ussher and the Reformation of the Church* (Darlington, England: Evangelical Press, 2003), 58; Baillie, *Six Mile Water*, 19-20.

are grievously afflicted with convulsions, tremblings, unnatural motions'.[110] These gestures were joined with a mixture of heavy breathing and panting, and they were probably crying too.[111] This behaviour, though extreme, initially seemed like 'the work of the Lord' to the minister and his congregation.[112] As already intimated, tears and groans were an expected effect of sincere repentance.[113] Additionally, trembling and falling over were considered signs of intense fear and sorrow evoked by the minister's preaching of the law in public worship.[114] It also happened elsewhere during the Six Mile Water revival, a young Andrew Stewart (*d*.1671) witnessing many Scots 'stricken, and swoon with the Word – yea, a dozen in one day carried out of the doors as dead, so marvellous was the power of God smiting their hearts for sin, condemning and killing'.[115] Thus, the initial assessment that this behaviour was God-caused was a plausible interpretation within the linguistic-conceptual framework of Scottish public worship.

However, in time most of the local clergy judged that this behaviour was a work of Satan, intended to 'counterfeit the work of the Lord'.[116] Through conversation it was clear that the group who exhibited this behaviour did so without 'any sense of their sinfulness' or 'any panting after a Saviour'. Moreover, they displayed these gestures regardless of what the minister preached.[117] Ministers like Robert Blair and John Livingston reasoned that if this was truly God-caused repentance then the people would have had, along with their sudden and momentous somatic changes, feelings

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[110] Baillie, *Six Mile Water*, 19.
[111] Livingston, *Brief*, 18. As tears were the principal sign of repentance in public worship, it is plausible that the people of Broadisland wept, as this would explain why onlookers thought they were 'a-mourning'. See Blair, *Life*, 89.
[112] Blair, *Life*, 89.
[113] Chapter Five, 170-175.
[114] Melville, *Diary*, 26; Livingston, *Brief*, 5-6; Wariston, *Diary*, 96-97; Robert Fleming, *The Fulfilling of Scripture* (1669), 244.
[115] Andrew Stewart, *History of the Church in Ireland*, in *A True Narrative of the Rise and Progress of the Presbyterian Church of Ireland (1623-1670)*, ed. W. D. Killen (Belfast, 1866), 317; Blair, *Life*, 70; Schmidt, *Holy Fairs*, 29; Westerkamp, *Triumph of the Laity*, 23-24.
[116] Blair, *Life*, 89. Stewart was not writing about events in Broadisland, as Yeoman has alleged, but in Oldstone, a nearby parish. See Stewart, *History*, 316; Yeoman, 'Heart-work', 193-194.
[117] Livingston, *Brief*, 18.

of godly sorrow and a desire for mercy which were evoked by the sermon. Failing that, their behaviour was not caused by God, and as such was not a sincere manifestation of penitence. However, acknowledging that their actions were involuntary, given its abruptness and lack of restraint, they concluded that it must be the work of some other supernatural agent. As it disrupted the worship of God with insincere repentance, the ministers thought these somatic changes were 'a mere delusion and cheat of Satan to slander and disgrace the work of the Lord'.[118] Thus, when Blair preached the next Sunday service and was interrupted by such behaviour, he rebuked the 'lying spirit' that had 'disturbed the worship of God'. Thus, the belief that the behaviour exhibited could only be produced by the demonic led the ministers to doubt the authenticity of the people's repentance. It provided justification, in their view, to alter their former judgement that these were God-caused emotions.[119]

Doubts about whether a subject's emotions were God-caused arose when an individual did not experience the expected effects of such a feeling. After her conversion, Mistress Rutherford believed she 'had no repentance' because she 'had not constantly tears'.[120] She later thought that she was a 'hypocrit' because she did not have 'such a sense of God and greif for sin as I would measure to myself'.[121] Because she continued to sin, Rutherford was tempted to believe her faith was a 'temporary faith', doubting whether she was 'the child of God or not'.[122] Her experience was not unique. Porteous conveyed to his reader that although initially Lady Hundaly had thought

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[118] Blair, *Life*, 89.
[119] It should be noted that the ministers may have been pressured into such a judgement. Episcopalian bishops had accused the Presbyterians of preaching that 'no man can be counted converted unless he feel the pains of his new birth'. To prevent ecclesiastical censure backed by royal support, it was essential that the ministers distanced themselves from 'enthusiasm', which was associated by the Caroline regime with the subversion of the natural and societal order. Thus, even if they had been initially sympathetic or had even supported such behaviour, the Presbyterian ministers had to denounce it to appear orthodox. Consequently, while ministers like Blair and Livingston provided reasons as to why this behaviour should be considered demonic, there were political factors which may have motivated their judgements. See Blair, *Life*, 89-90; Livingston, *Brief*, 17-19; Baillie, *Six Mile Water*, 19-23.
[120] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 172.
[121] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 174.
[122] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 176.

herself ‘effectually called and converted’, through her practice of radical emotional reflexivity she had concluded that she was damned.[123] This was because she had ‘rushed again into divers sins and fearful thoughts, and that willingly and deliberately’. Thus, she believed she was a ‘hypocrite’, her emotions insincere. Many Scots faced such doubts, which inspired a proliferation of texts, written mainly by ministers, dedicated to the soothing of troubled souls.[124] A similar literary market flourished in England, through which Protestant divines such as William Perkins addressed the doubts many had about the sincerity of their faith.[125] The prevalence of these texts indicates that many Protestants, in Scotland and elsewhere, judged that they did not experience the effects they would expect if God had caused their emotions.

Even when a subject observed in themselves the signs of supernatural emotion, they could doubt that they were God-caused because of their theological commitment to the doctrine of predestination. The predominant view taught by ministers was that God had, before the creation of the world, decreed who was elect and who was reprobate.[126] Yet Protestant divines agreed that the lives of the elect and the reprobate could be fairly indistinguishable. Perkins’s chart of the order of salvation illustrated this interpretation, as it indicated that the reprobate (although not united to Christ) were able to experience some signs of the spiritual journey.[127] Consequently, emotions could not be identified as God-caused with absolute certainty, given that both the elect and reprobate could, in theory, have similar feelings and exhibit the same somatic changes. John Stachniewski and Anite Pacheco

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[123] Porteous, *Exercise*, 11.
[124] Cowper, *Dialogue*, (London, 1611); George Muschet, *The Complaint of a Christian Soule* (Edinburgh, 1610). Livingston, *Conflict*; Porteous, *Exercise*, 3; Zachary Boyd, *The Last Battell of the Soule in Death* (Edinburgh, 1628); Drummond, *Flowers*; Melville, *Exhortation*; Campbell, *Treatise*; William Morray, *A Short Treatise on Death* (Edinburgh, 1633); Gordon Raeburn, ‘Rewriting Death and Burial in Early Modern Scotland’ in *Reformation & Renaissance Review*, 18, no.3 (2016): 254-272.
[125] Bozeman, *Precisianist Strain*, 129-132; Watkins, *Puritan Experience*, 10-12.
[126] Mullan, *Scottish Puritanism*, 211.
[127] William Perkins, *The Workes of that Famous and Worthy Minister of Christ in the Uniuersitie of Cambridge, Mr. William Perkins* (London, 1626), I, Pag.II; Lake, *Moderate Puritans*, 164.

have argued that this 'doubleness of predestination' produced a 'doubleness of vision', so that Protestants were able to identify their emotions as signs of either election or reprobation.[128]

The problem of doubleness was often worked through in the literary genre of dialogues. As already established, Lady Hundaly believed she was a hypocrite because she did not observe in herself the emotional and behavioural effects of sincere faith. However, her pastoral support, Archibald Porteous, argued that Hundaly did exhibit the signs of authentic supernatural emotion. At one point in the dialogue, Hundaly judged that she did not have a genuine desire for communion with Christ, as if it was sincere it would be stronger than her current feelings.[129] Porteous disagreed. He argued that God is the cause of any desire for Christ, no matter how weak, and as such Hundaly's weak desire was of supernatural origin. William Livingston had similar exchanges with Bessie Clarkson. Clarkson lamented that she did not have faith in God, while Livingston argued that her desire for faith was reputed by God as faith.[130] The minister claimed that Clarkson's emotions were an affliction sent by the Lord to mobilise in her a sorrow for sin, but was unable to convince the tormented woman that her feelings were not an apprehension of the wrath of God.[131] These exchanges highlight the ambiguity the doctrine of double predestination introduced into the identification of emotion. The theological consequences of the dogma entailed that it was just as plausible to interpret an emotion as God-caused as not; as evidence of election as of reprobation. It undercut the inferences, based on the supposed causes and effects of an experience, used to justify its categorisation as a particular kind of supernatural emotion, and as such left every judgement made about feeling open to question.

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[128] John Stachniewski and Anita Pacheco, 'Introduction' in *Grace Abounding with Other Spiritual Autobiographies*, ed. John Stachniewski and Anita Pacheco (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), xiv; Sullivan, *Beyond Melancholy*, 185. Peter Lake has made the more cautious argument that the doctrine of predestination removed the possibility of certainty over one's election, as in the final analysis salvation depended solely on the secret will of God. See Lake, *Moderate Puritans*, 150-156.
[129] Porteous, *Exercise*, 14.
[130] Livingston, *Conflict*, 9.
[131] Livingston, *Conflict*, 10.

The transience of the emotions exacerbated the doubt caused by the problem of doubleness. As noted in the introduction, sociologists have argued that feeling influences the interpretations subject's reach about their emotions.[132] This principle was reflected in the practice of radical emotional reflexivity undertaken by Scottish Protestants. In many cases, a change in feeling precipitated an alteration in how a subject viewed their past emotions. Porteous told his reader that Hundaly initially believed that she had been 'effectually called and converted'.[133] However, her view had changed, so that she now thought her previous experiences 'false conceptions' of supernatural emotions.[134] Hundaly arrived at this conclusion because, in her present state, she was 'void of Sense and Feeling' and filled with 'wreathful Fears and Terrors'.[135] Yet, at the end of the dialogue she once more changed her position on her prior experiences. Former experiences were now characterised as 'real access to God' and 'true joys'.[136] Such a reversal in position was motivated by her becoming a 'ravished creature with joy'. Thus, every time Hundaly changed her interpretation about the sincerity of her prior experiences it was caused by her present emotional change. No new factors came into play with regard to those past experiences. It was just that at the time of examination Hundaly felt differently.

A change in feeling also influenced how other zealous Scottish Protestants evaluated their emotions. Rutherford first believed her suicidal tendencies were caused by a humoural imbalance, but after her conversion and experience of communion with God she was convinced it was the work of Satan.[137] Clarkson had originally enjoyed prayer, but her experience of legal terror convinced her that it was futile.[138] Every Scottish Protestant who had progressed along the spiritual journey, by definition, experienced the impact emotions could have on the evaluation of their past emotions. The

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[132] Burkitt, 'Emotional Reflexivity', 465-466, 469; Holmes, 'Emotionalization', 140; Introduction, 2.
[133] Porteous, *Exercise*, 11.
[134] Porteous, *Exercise*, 15.
[135] Porteous, *Exercise*, 16.
[136] Porteous, *Exercise*, 21.
[137] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 157.
[138] Livingston, *Conflict*, 24-25.

person who was in a state of legal terror believed all their emotions were signs of reprobation, whereas the individual who had faith and assurance was convinced that they had experienced supernatural emotions. It was the weakness of the narrative form: the present subject, which was subject to change, fashioned the past self in relation to the thoughts and feelings that were currently experienced.[139] Present feeling and notions of self-identity similarly influenced the judgements of English puritans.[140] However, emotion need not have had such a dominant effect upon the results of radical emotional reflexivity. Its power was rooted in the problem of doubleness. The doctrine of double predestination meant it was arbitrary whether one characterised an emotion as supernatural or not, given that no evidence could indicate one way or another. As a result, there was no inference strong enough that could compel a subject to maintain their prior beliefs about their past emotions, as they could be plausibly reinterpreted as evidence of an alternative position. Thus, whatever interpretation one derived from the experience of present feelings it was just as reasonable an analysis of the evidence as any other. With nothing else to check a subject's practice of radical emotional reflexivity, changes in feeling pulled with it the categorisation of the emotions. Consequently, the constant state of flux which afflicts the emotions, combined with the double vision produced by Scottish Protestant theological beliefs, created a perfect storm from which doubt could be born.[141]

Many of the most zealous Scottish Protestants were driven to experience acute anxiety because of the doubt produced by their practice of radical emotional reflexivity. Believing they were damned, subjects could be trapped in a pit of dread and despair.[142] Bessie Clarkson was emblematic of this condition. A woman who was overwhelmed by hopelessness, she was in a perpetual state of emotional distress. She likened her anguish and misery

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[139] Introduction, 2, 5.
[140] Lake, *Moderate Puritans*, 156.
[141] This perspective contrasts with the view of ministers who believed that the doctrine of predestination was able to comfort the anxious soul. See Leif Dixon *Practical Predestinarians in England*, c. 1590-1640 (London: Routledge, 2016).
[142] Mullan, *Scottish Protestantism*, 99, 102-103.

to ‘hell’ itself.[143] Another who embodied this angst was Mistress Rutherford, who was tormented by the prospect that her faith was insincere.[144] Robert Bruce was anxious over his particular calling for nearly ten years, while William Cowper frequently experienced ‘terrors’ in his daily piety.[145] Robert Blair lamented that many ‘gracious sound believers, who have received Jesus Christ, and rested on him as he is offered to them in the Word, have been much puzzled, as if they were not believers at all’.[146] The anxiety produced when testing the sincerity of the emotions was so widespread that Bruce reassured his congregation that doubt ‘may lodge in the soul with faith’, even afflicting the ‘best servants God has ever had’.[147]

3. Ways and Means to Mobilise Supernatural Emotions

The final section of this chapter argues that the function of the test of sincerity was to evoke desired, supernatural emotions. Radical emotional reflexivity was considered an instrument God could use to advance a person’s spiritual journey by creating in them the emotions which facilitated communion with God (identified in chapter two as faith and love).[148] In other words, the examination of the emotions was integral to communal religious practice and the private piety of zealous Scots because it could mobilise the sequence of emotion which constitutes the pilgrimage of the soul (outlined in chapter three).[149] Consequently, the discussion here argues that Scottish Protestants integrated the examination of emotion into public worship and personal writings to stimulate supernatural emotions. This thesis is defended by exploring how corporate ceremonies and narratives created by fervent Scots functioned as ‘mobilising practices’.[150] In so doing, the final part of this chapter moves beyond what Scots said about their experiences (chapters three and four) and the process through which they decided how to

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[143] Livingston, *Conflict*, 26, 28.
[144] Mistress Rutherford, ‘Conversion Narrative’, 176.
[145] Calderwood, *History*, IV, 636; Cowper, *Life*, B2*v*-B3*r*.
[146] Blair, *Life*, 33.
[147] Bruce, *Lord’s Supper*, 188.
[148] Chapter Two, 60-67.
[149] Chapter Three, 89-120.
[150] Introduction, 5.

categorise their feelings (the first two sections of this chapter) to analyse the purpose of the language they used about their emotions. Put another way, the close of this chapter explains why Scots examined and tested the sincerity of their emotions in public worship and personal writings.

Ecclesiastical censure could be used to provoke a subject to practice radical emotional reflexivity and so stimulate supernatural emotions. Warding and excommunication were used by kirk sessions to force an offender to apprehend their sins and as such experience worldly sorrow, two important stages in the spiritual journey.[151] Offenders were sometimes 'warded' as a form of punishment.[152] This meant that the guilty person was placed in an often dark, filthy, and vermin infested room in the church building, living on a diet of bread and water. Alone with their thoughts, warding provided a space in which offenders could examine themselves and what they had done to merit their predicament. When it worked the unpleasantness of warding could make an offender sorrowful for what they done, insofar as it had caused their current misery. Excommunication was supposed to produce similar results.[153] This was the most severe ecclesiastical punishment an individual could receive. It meant that the excommunicant had 'no societie with us', the community treating the offender like an 'ethnik'.[154] *The First Book of Discipline* instructed that, apart from the sinner's family and the minister, no one was allowed to have any 'conversation' with the excommunicant, which included not 'eating and drinking, buying or selling, yea, in saluting or talking with him'.[155] Excommunicants were also excluded from public worship and their children were refused baptism.[156] The isolation of the offender was meant to evoke worldly sorrow by forcing them, through self-examination, to

[151] Chapter Three, 95-109.
[152] Todd, *Culture*, 141.
[153] Margo Todd, '"None to haunt, frequent, nor intercommon with them." The Problem of Excommunication in the Scottish Kirk' in *Dire l'inderdit: The Vocabulary of Censure and Exclusion in the Early Modern Reformed Tradition*, eds. Raymond A. Mentzer, Françoise Moreil, and Philippe Chareyre (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 219-238; Macdonald, 'Reconciling', 178-233.
[154] Knox, *Repentance*, C7*r*
[155] *FBD*, VII.
[156] *FBD*, VII.

apprehend their sinfulness. Ministers would ask the Holy Spirit to use this punishment to 'peirs thow his hart, [so that] he may feil in his breast the terrours of thy Judgementis, that by thy grace he fructfullie may be converted to thee'.[157] The dire consequences of excommunication were supposed to motivate an offender to practice radical emotional reflexivity, thereby evoking legal terror and advancing the sinner forward on their spiritual journey. In other words, warding and excommunication were supposed to force a person into a self-examination which would mobilise the sequence of emotions that were essential for a penitent to have in public repentance: legal terror, godly sorrow, and a feeling of mercy (analysed in chapter three).[158]

Radical emotional reflexivity was also used as a means in public fasting to stir up contrition. After the reading of Deuteronomy 27 and 28, the minister and congregation were to prostrate themselves for at least fifteen minutes. This was done so that each person present could 'discend secretly into himself to examine his owen conscience, whereinto he findeth him selfe giltie before God'.[159] The exercise was a means by which the congregation could apprehend their sin, a stage in the spiritual journey, and so be moved to repentance.[160] The idea that the practice of private meditation in public fasting was meant to stimulate supernatural emotions may be supported by the renewal of the covenant of grace at the Synod of Fife in 1596, during which a period of self-examination channelled a sudden and momentous outpouring of repentance. James Melville recounted that after a powerful exhortation by the moderator of the synod that:

> the Lord steirit upe sic a motioun of hart, that all war forcit to fall down befor the Lord, with sobbes and tears in aboundance, everie man mightelie commovit with the affections of their conscience in the presence of their God, *in privat meditatioun, rypping out thair ways, confessing and acknawledging thair unworthines, and cravin earnestlie grace for amendiment, and that a lang space*.[161]

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[157] Knox, *Repentance*, C6*v*.
[158] Chapter Three, 77-82.
[159] Knox, *Fast*, F3*r*.
[160] Chapter Three, 95-110; Yeoman, 176-178.
[161] Melville, *Autobiography*, 354-355. Italics added for emphasis.

In this case, the exercise of private meditation while kneeling was used to evoke a sorrow for sin and a desire for mercy which was manifested in excessive crying and groaning. Similarly, at one point in the swearing of the National Covenant at Currie Kirk the congregation responded to the 'extraordinarie influence of Gods Sprit' by:

> falling doune on thair knees to mourne and pray… for ane quarter of ane houre [they] prayed verry sensibly with many sobs, tears, promises, and voues to be thankful and fruitful in tymcoming.[162]

The swearing ceremony had taken place during a public fast and had replaced the period of private meditation in the order of the liturgy. That for fifteen minutes the congregation knelt, sorrowed for their sin, and resolved to amend their lives in the context of a public fast (albeit in exceptional circumstances), implies that they were engaged in something akin to the private meditation usually reserved for that segment of the liturgy. If the 1596 and 1638 events are comparable to the examination of the self and emotions in a corporate fast, it would indicate that the practice of private meditation – radical emotional reflexivity – in public fasting was an instrument used to elicit a momentous emotional response: specifically, those God-caused feelings which constituted repentance and conversion.

Listening to sermons was also used to engage a listener in self-examination in Scottish Protestantism and international puritanism, and as such mobilise in them supernatural emotions.[163] The preaching of the law (analysed in chapter three) was used to identify a sin, and was effectual when a person, through radical reflexivity, applied its teaching to their lives.[164] It was best exemplified in the sermons of James Glendinning (*fl*.1617-1662), which started the Six Mile Water revival.[165] He believed that the majority of the Scots settlers in Ireland were insincere in their religious belief, and so he preached primarily on the law of God. He identified the sins which his congregation had committed and, with a powerful voice and robust

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[162] Wariston, *Diary*, 328; Hood, 'Corporate Conversion Ceremonies'.
[163] Yeoman, 'Heart-work', 21-28; Cohen, *God's Caress*, 86.
[164] Chapter Three, 85.
[165] Baillie, *Six Mile Water*, 11-12.

style, pronounced that they were damned.[166] His preaching pierced many hearts, so much so that many of his listeners were in a state of dread and despair, falling over as if they were dead. John Knox's preaching made James Melville 'grew and tremble', his condemnation of pride and the love of money terrifying the university student.[167] Bessie Clarkson blamed William Livingston's preaching for making her fear the wrath of God.[168] The powerful effect of preaching the law was most dramatically expressed in the writings of Archibald Johnston of Wariston who, as his minister spoke, recognised the estate of his life (and emotions). He said in his heart:

> Lord, I haive playd the idiot foole by sleaping over al the dayes of my prosperitie without dreaming of the[e] as I ought to haive done or yet of my selth: I haive been the pratling fool, idocile, delighting year tormenting myselth with schadoues wordlie, and building on false grounds of outward shaues; I haive played the mad foole by abusing thy blissings, contemning thy threatnings, and misregarding thy comandements…[169]

When the gospel or evangelical syllogism (analysed in chapter three) was preached it was meant to evoke feelings of assurance and joy in the congregation.[170] James Mitchell of Dykes was moved by David Dickson to ravishing feelings of God's mercy.[171] Countless times Wariston was greatly comforted by sermons, on one occasion his heart in a 'continual spiritual rysing', at every point 'bringing tears unto my eies and cryes, strong cryes, unto my mouth'.[172] John Livingston delivered a famous sermon at the Kirk of Shotts on 21st June 1630, which generated such a 'liberty and melting of heart' that over five hundred people claimed that it was the instrument God used to convert them.[173] In these and other cases, the subject was convinced by the sermon that mercy applied to them and thus they were ecstatically assured of their salvation. Put another way, preaching could compel a

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[166] Blair, *Life*, 70; Stewart, *History*, 316.
[167] Melville, *Diary*, 26.
[168] Livingston, *Conflict*, 1.
[169] Wariston, *Diary*, 71.
[170] Chapter Three, 110-112.
[171] Dykes, *Memoirs*, 29-31.
[172] Wariston, *Diary*, 100, 106, 231, 328.
[173] Livingston, *Brief*, 11; Fleming, *Fulfilling*, 244.

listener to reevaluate their lives and emotions in a way that could evoke God-caused feelings.[174]

Psalm-singing was another way Scots engaged in the examination of the emotions in public worship as a means to evoke supernatural emotions. As already discussed in chapter three, its musical nature meant that it was a mode of experiencing David's radical emotional reflexivity.[175] It was, when sung in a heartfelt way, interpreted as an authentic experience of God-caused emotion.[176] To represent the emotionality of the experience, Wariston claimed it was his 'heart' which sang Psalm 119.[177] He was later 'extraordinarily moved at the singing' of Psalm 42 in public worship.[178] Participating in the Lord's Supper, Mistress Rutherford and her fellow participants sang Psalm 34:6, and this 'did me good'.[179] As boys, James Melville and Robert Blair enjoyed learning and singing the psalms in public worship.[180] The proliferation of poems and godly songs among zealous Scottish Protestants, many of which were cited in chapter two, indicates that there was a demand for this music because of its power to mobilise supernatural emotion.[181]

In addition to its function in public worship, radical emotional reflexivity was used as an instrument to evoke God-caused emotions in private piety. That it had this function in personal devotion was nowhere more evident than in the main strategy ministers recommended and employed for dealing with doubt. In much of the literature that was produced to combat and harness the widespread anxiety analysed in the second section of this chapter, readers were urged to examine themselves and attempt to identify the 'marks of

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[174] Todd, *Culture*, 51-54; Crawford Gribben, 'Preaching the Scottish Reformation, 1560-1707', in *The Oxford Handbook of the Early Modern Sermon*, eds. Hugh Adlington, Peter McCullough, and Emma Rhatigan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 278; Yeoman, 'Heart-work', 175-176; Mullan, *Scottish Puritanism*, 52.
[175] Chapter Three, 85-89.
[176] Goodman, 'Musical Piety', 703.
[177] Wariston, *Diary*, 100.
[178] Wariston, *Diary*, 106.
[179] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 183.
[180] Melville, *Autobiography*, 22-23; Blair, *Life*, 7.
[181] Chapter Two, 48-73.

election'.[182] These were thoughts, feelings, and behaviours which were supposed to evidence that the subject was one of the chosen few.[183] Once identified, the marks could be used to infer whether one was a member of elect. The logical structure of this inference, or 'practical syllogism', took the following form:

1) Whoever has *x* is elect.
2) I have *x*.
3) Therefore, I am elect.[184]

This line of reasoning was a form of *modus ponens*, a deductive form of argument which states that if the conditional proposition 'if *p* then *q*' is true, and the antecedent '*p*' is true, then the consequent '*q*' must be inferred. Thus, if someone judges that they have a mark of election, then by this rule of inference it is valid and sound for them to conclude that they are elect. Consequently, if an individual is convinced that whoever has *x* is elect and that they had *x*, they could have justification, and as such assurance, that they were a member of the elect. Put another way, identifying a mark of election could evoke a persuasion and assurance that God loves and has forgiven the sinner, otherwise known as a feeling of mercy.[185]

Many of the marks of election could only be identified through radical emotional reflexivity. Robert Bruce provided an overview of several feelings which could be considered signs of salvation. He argued that if one had a 'desire to ask God's mercy for your sins', then what one has is 'assuredly the true effect of genuine faith'.[186] As iterated above, William Livingston and Archibald Porteous used this line when counselling Bessie Clarkson and Lady Hundaly respectively.[187] Another mark was 'accusing your dissoluteness, and finding fault with your behaviour'.[188] Thus, even if one continues to sin, as long as one feels 'remorse and sorrow' for what they had

[182] Chapter Five, 179-189.
[183] Bozeman, *Precisianist Strain*, 132-137; Von Rohr, *Covenant of Grace*, 159-170; Mullan, *Scottish Puritanism*, 105-107.
[184] Bozeman, *Precisianist Strain*, 126; Von Rohr, *Covenant of Grace*, 166; Alec Ryrie, *Being Protestant*, 44.
[185] Chapter Three, 81, 110-115.
[186] Bruce, *Lord's Supper*, 185.
[187] Livingston, *Conflict*, 2; Porteous, *Exercise*, 12.
[188] Bruce, *Lord's Supper*, 191-192.

done, they are a member of the elect. Some Scottish Protestants followed Bruce and identified lament for sin as a mark of election. Livingston attempted to comfort Clarkson using this reasoning. When Clarkson declared that she would happily be damned if it would glorify God, Livingston assured her that 'these are not the wishes and words of a castaway'.[189] Archibald Johnston of Wariston judged that though at the time he felt as if God had 'forsaken' him, subsequently he viewed his confession of sin as a sign of God's work in his life.[190] Love of neighbour was also a mark of election. Bruce argued that it is a 'gift of God' to love, 'especially those who are of the family of faith'.[191] Thus, an ability to forgive or have compassion on others was a sign of sincere supernatural emotion.[192] Mistress Rutherford used her apprehension that she loved the godly to convince herself that she was saved, which gave her a degree of peace.[193] The most significant 'pillar, and the surest refuge' from 'the brink of desperation' was, in Bruce's view, identifying that one had experienced a feeling of God's mercy.[194] Bruce recommended that a subject in anguish over the sincerity of their faith and emotions should examine whether at any time they had 'felt the love and favour of God in your heart and conscience'. If this had ever been the case, Bruce argued, it means that the 'heart that has once felt this love of God will feel it again'. Thus, Bruce claimed, it should be 'the first point in which every one of you ought to try and examine your own conscience' because it can mobilise a feeling of God's mercy.

Even when a subject failed to identify the marks of election in their own lives, their radical emotional reflexivity could still be used to mobilise desired, supernatural emotions. Near the beginning of this chapter it was observed that William Cowper believed most Scots were 'counterfeit Christians', and he believed that through self-examination they could

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[189] Livingston, *Conflict*, 14-15.
[190] Wariston, *Diary*, 59.
[191] Bruce, *Lord's Supper*, 194-198.
[192] Bruce, *Lord's Supper*, 185-186.
[193] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 153, 175.
[194] Bruce, *Lord's Supper*, 193-194.

determine if they were sincere believers or hypocrites.[195] If a person found dissimilarity between themselves and the portrait of a Christian's thoughts, emotions, and actions, he argued that they should 'pray to God further to quicken thee, that thou mayest grow in holy similitude and conformitie with him' for 'thy everlasting comfort in Christ Jesus'. David Dickson was clear that he wanted his congregation to be thrown into doubt by their practice of radical emotional reflexivity. He asked them to:

> Speir at thy prayer, what devotion is in thee, and it will say, that thy prayers are so coldrife, that they cannot pierce up to heaven. Speir at thy conversation among men, what is thy estate, and it will tell thee it is coldrife, stubborn, implacable, cankered, unmerciful, and has a heart that cannot repent. Speir what love thou hast to God, and it will be told thee, thou can hear his name dishonoured, and care little for it; and thou cares not much how thy children and servants grown in knowledge, or fear of God. And if thy deeds speak thus, why art thou so secure?[196]

He wanted his congregation to 'suspect' themselves of insincere faith and feigned supernatural emotion, so that they would repent of their sin and desire mercy.[197] William Livingston explained to Bessie Clarkson that this was the purpose of her emotional distress. God facilitated such doubt so that the elect would not be:

> casten up in a dead sleepe of fleshly securitie; and so perish with the wicked of the world, in that great wrath that is to bee revealed; and to bring them to an hatred of sinne and sorrow for it: and to teach them how farre they are obliged to the Sonne of God… this sort of dealing drives atheisme best out of the heart.[198]

Thus it was not an unfortunate accident that the practice of radical emotional reflexivity could evoke doubt. It was considered a vital part of the spiritual journey because it was a means by which a subject could apprehend their sin and so be moved to experience legal terror, godly sorrow, and a desire for mercy. Put another way, radical emotional reflexivity – the test of sincerity – was supposed to awaken the conscience to the true spiritual state of the

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[195] Cowper, *Anatomie*, C1*r*-C4*r*; Chapter Five, 164-165.
[196] Dickson, *Writings*, 81-82.
[197] Dickson, *Writings*, 82, 25.
[198] Livingston, *Conflict*, 1-2.

individual to evoke either personal amendment (repentance) or assurance (a feeling of mercy).[199].

With these ends in mind, zealous Scottish Protestants produced written forms of radical emotional reflexivity to evoke in their readers supernatural emotions. Some authors explained this in their texts. Archibald Johnston of Wariston's aim in writing his diary was to let God 'opine my eies for seie and sanctifeie my memorie' so that he would remember all the times he had experienced 'faytherly wrayth' and God's 'deyvering me from it'.[200] This was so that 'this experience of they favour may strenthen myn fayth in the day of neu troubles'. Robert Blair kept a diary for sixteen years, probably the basis for much of his autobiography, which charted both the 'failings and escapes they were overtaken with' so that they could be 'considered and laid to heart'.[201] Through this process he was able to identify and overcome any 'obstruction' to his progress on the spiritual journey. In his memoir, James Mitchell of Dykes focused on 'the Lord's mercies and dealings with my soul, and some deep exercises of mind'.[202] He asked God to work into his heart the lessons he had learned from these experiences.[203] Each author wrote about their spiritual journey and tested the sincerity of their emotions so that when they read their text it would evoke in them either repentance or assurance.

Dialogues were also presented by authors as a means by which their reader could be motivated to engage in radical emotional reflexivity and thus mobilise supernatural emotions. James Balfour wrote down his dialogue with Jean Kincaid for the 'good and benefit of others' so that they may 'follow the example of her repentance'.[204] The spiritual journey of Bessie Clarkson was presented by William Livingston as a warning against complacency. At the end of the text, he urged his reader that the moral of Clarkson's story was to

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[199] Mullan, *Scottish Puritanism*, 98-104; Bozeman, *Precisianist Strain*, 106-107, 121-144; Watkins, *Puritan Experience*, 11-12; Lake, *Moderate Puritans*, 167; Cohen, *God's Caress*, 86.
[200] Wariston, *Diary*, 1.
[201] Blair, *Life*, 31-32.
[202] Dykes, *Memoirs*, 1.
[203] Dykes, *Memoirs*, 13, 28.
[204] Balfour, *Conversion*, I, XXXVI.

avoid ‘a bare show of an outward profession’ and pursue ‘a lively and effectuall faith, in the deepe of our soules’.[205] The examples of Kincaid and Clarkson, who practiced radical emotional reflexivity and advanced far on their spiritual journeys within these dialogues, were supposed to inspire readers to engage in their own self-examination so that they would also achieve communion with God. At least, that is how the authors of these texts chose to present the function of Clarkson’s and Kincaid’s stories for their readers.

The practice of radical emotional reflexivity, whether in public worship, private devotion, or written form, was an instrument able to evoke supernatural emotions because it presented the subject with the right stimuli. As mentioned in the introduction, one way to evoke an emotion is to control the exposure a subject has to those things which cause emotions.[206] This can be achieved either through increasing the contact a person has with a set of stimuli or by reducing the level of interaction an individual has with that which causes emotion. Given that thoughts can cause emotional experiences, a way to mobilise desired emotions is to control the thoughts one has. For example, if one feels down, a strategy for changing this emotion is to replace the sad thoughts which evoke this emotion with those that are positive. In this vein, radical emotional reflexivity mobilises desired feelings by determining the object of a person’s cognition. Evaluated against the goal of communion with God (explored in chapter two) the emotions were categorised within the linguistic-conceptual framework of the spiritual journey.[207] Thus the standard by which the emotions were judged limited how they could be presented to the subject; they were either examples of sin or the effect of divine agency; insincere or sincere. This meant that the examination of emotion conducted in public worship or private devotion restricted the thoughts of an individual to those about the authenticity of their emotions in relation to the pilgrimage of the soul. In turn, this manipulation of

[205] Livingston, *Conflict*, 41.
[206] Rosenburg, ‘Reflexivity and Emotions’, 10-11; Introduction, 5.
[207] Chapter Two, 57-67; Chapter Five, 160-179.

a person's thoughts could cause them to experience repentance or assurance, depending upon the results of their self-examination. As a consequence, the practice of radical emotional reflexivity was a means by which one could manipulate the thoughts of an individual as a means to evoke in them desired emotions. Put in a language recognisable to early modern Scots (outlined in chapter one), the examination of one's passions made the affections a formal object that was judged by the understanding and will as to whether it is good or bad for the subject's pursuit of happiness, which in turn moves the sensitive appetite.[208] This process worked because it limited the subject's exposure to select stimuli – the subject's sincere supernatural emotions or lack thereof – that could mobilise repentance or assurance.

Self-examination in form of a written narrative had an additional advantage in its evocation of emotion, particularly joyous consolation, insofar as the structure of its plot typically presupposed that the story was one of struggle with a happy ending. To write about the journey of their soul (or somebody else's) presupposed that the person in question had been on a spiritual journey. This was implied by the language authors used about their subject's emotions: they categorised their feelings using the language of the spiritual journey present in public worship (examined in chapter three).[209] This would only be appropriate if the subject had in fact experienced an emotional sequence which could constitute advancement towards communion with God. Thus the narratives fervent Scots produced took as a given that it was a story of the subject's transition from misery to happiness. Consequently, every plot had either an implicit or explicit happy resolution: the subject had either attained or was on the path towards communion with God.[210] Crucially, it was *how* the story reached its happy ending which

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[208] Chapter One, 18-47.
[209] Chapter Three, 75-89.
[210] Lynch and Calderwood have both argued that the end of a spiritual autobiography was extremely important for early modern Protestants as it allowed the author to establish a clear sense of their subject's identity and the veracity of what God had done in their lives. See Lynch, *Protestant Autobiography*, 15; Patricia Caldwell, *The Puritan Conversion Narrative: The Beginnings of American Expression* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 25.

enabled the writings about a subject's spiritual journey to evoke supernatural emotions.[211] Every pilgrimage of the soul had what J. R. R. Tolkien called (in relation to fairy stories) a 'eucatastrophe' – a 'sudden joyous "turn"'.[212] It is a 'sudden and miraculous grace' which reverses and denies the failure, sorrow, and 'universal final defeat' in a manner 'never to be counted on to recur'. In so doing, it gives a 'fleeting glimpse of Joy, Joy beyond the walls of the world, poignant as grief'.

The narratives produced by fervent Scots were filled with good catastrophes. The story of John Forbes of Corse was typical insofar as each time he experienced misery it was a dramatic and sudden instant of divine action which rescued him (examined in chapter four).[213] It was only when William Cowper was in the 'greatest extremitie of horror' and looked for nothing else 'but to be swallowed up' in a pit of despair, that 'suddenly did there shine… God proclaiming peace'.[214] Similarly, it was when Robert Bruce was so 'fearfullie and extremelie tormented' that he would have rather been in a cauldron of molten lead, that God 'restrained these fureis' and showed him mercy.[215] The reader was told that after three years of dread, anguish, and torment, Bessie Clarkson had a sudden conversion on her deathbed.[216] Similarly, Lady Hundaly wrestled with doubts about her salvation for many days before she had a vision of Christ which turned her fear to joy. This change was a day before she died.[217] Mistress Rutherford was only given an absolute love for God by the Lord when she was grieving her son's death.[218] Eucatastrophe was even, in a limited way, incorporated into public worship;

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[211] Joan Webber has argued that the motivation for puritan self-examination was an 'anxiety to determine whether one's every experience fits the proper pattern'. Watkins has interpreted this definition as perceptive because it emphasises that the puritan was concerned with 'the process of his experience'. It was not just that one had attained communion with God which mattered when writing a conversion narrative: how one got there which was just as important. See Joan Webber, *The Eloquent 'I': Style and Self in Seventeenth-century Prose* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), 137; Watkins, *Puritan Experience*, 228.
[212] J. R. R. Tolkien, 'On Fairy-Stories' in *The Monsters and the Critics and Other Essays*, ed. Christopher Tolkien (Boston: Houghton, 1984), 153.
[213] Forbes, *Diary*, 132.
[214] Cowper, *Life*, B3*r*.
[215] Calderwood, *History*, IV, 636.
[216] Livingston, *Conflict*, 40-41.
[217] Porteous, *Exercise*, 19-24.
[218] Mistress Rutherford, 'Conversion Narrative', 188; Chapter Three, 116-119.

the momentous and sudden onset of tears and groans were considered a sign that God had reversed the fortunes of the subject (as discussed above).[219] Fundamentally, the spiritual journeys were stories in which the natural corruption of humanity and the machinations of Satan were overcome by divine agency. Thus by its very nature the pilgrimage of the soul was a plot propelled by a series of eucatastrophes, climaxing in a final victorious reversal from the jaws of ultimate defeat.[220] Consequently, when zealous Scots read texts depicting a person's spiritual journey the narrative structure of the plot had the potential to evoke in them a consoling and powerful joy. This was the great advantage of written forms of radical emotional reflexivity, and so may help to explain their existence and function in Scottish Protestant piety.

Because the practice of radical emotional reflexivity could mobilise God-caused emotions, it was considered a part of the spiritual journey towards communion with God. Given that God was the only one capable of creating supernatural feelings, to engage in self-examination had to be the result of divine agency.[221] As such, David Dickson claimed that it was God who had caused him 'to examine myself'.[222] Similarly, Archibald Johnston Wariston believed it was God who moved him to 'mor humbly and attentively to passe over every on[e] of my sins'.[223] Implicit in these claims was the idea (discussed in chapter four) that God was the cause of supernatural emotions.[224] It was an example of God's indirect action upon the soul, presenting a the self as the formal object of a passion. An author could not, therefore, produce an account of their spiritual journey in a neutral,

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[219] Chapter Five, 170-177.
[220] It may be because puritan conversion narratives consisted in a series of eucatastrophes that scholars like Cohen and Lake have characterised its emotionality as cyclical. Additionally, that the story of conversion was a narrative about a puritan experience of eucatastrophe may explain why Watkins believed that puritan conversion stories were a commentary on two stages of experience: conviction of sin (law) and an experience of forgiveness (gospel). See Cohen, *God's Caress*, 104; Lake, *Moderate Puritans*, 162; Watkins, 5-9, 37-40.
[221] Similar views about self-examination were held by puritans. See Cohen, *God's Caress*, 86.
[222] Dickson, *Writings*, 25.
[223] Wariston, *Diary*, 223-225.
[224] Chapter Four, 123-140.

dispassionate manner. Nor could a reader engage with a spiritual narrative from a disinterested standpoint. To engage in and with a written form of radical emotional reflexivity was to take a step towards communion with God. In other words, the practice of self-examination and testing the sincerity of the emotions, the context in which Scots used the language of emotion analysed in chapters three and four, was not only used as an instrument to mobilise supernatural emotions in public worship and private piety; it was an activity which constituted a conscious experience of the divinely inspired pilgrimage of the soul. Put another way, when a person wrote or read a narrative of a spiritual journey, or engaged in radical emotional reflexivity in public worship, they were engaged in their own advancement towards communion with God.

This chapter has argued that radical emotional reflexivity was central to early modern Scottish Protestantism. It was embedded in its religious practices and fervently practiced by some of the more zealous adherents of the faith. It was used to test the sincerity of a subject's supernatural emotions. This was done by evaluating the causes and effects of an experience, which from it could be inferred whether it was God-caused or not. Sudden and momentous tears and groans, joined with long-lasting change, were considered the primary somatic signs of supernatural emotion. Many Scots, in their assessment, failed the test. They doubted whether their emotions were divine in origin based on the perceived causes and effects of their experiences. Yet even if they did have evidence that they had divinely caused emotions, the problem of doubleness and the transience of emotion undercut the justification for thinking one was on the spiritual journey. Thus, doctrinal commitments and an overreliance on feeling in the practice of self-examination stoked the flames of doubt. However, this was all part of the plan. The purpose of examining feeling in public worship and personal writings was to mobilise supernatural emotions. Radical emotional reflexivity was able to evoke desired emotions because it presented to the cognition the

subject's spiritual journey, moving the appetite to repentance or assurance. Moreover, written narratives could stimulate in their readers consoling joy because their plot consisted in a series of eucatastrophes. Because self-examination was a God-caused activity, writing and reading an account of the soul's pilgrimage was an experience of its subject-matter. Put another way, it was a step towards communion with God.

Consequently, Scots examined their emotions to mobilise supernatural emotions. By extension, they wrote and read narratives to evoke those feelings which constitute the spiritual journey and to engage in an activity – the test of emotional sincerity – which was itself a part of the pilgrimage of the soul. These functions of radical emotional reflexivity clarify why it, and the language of emotion examined in chapters three and four, were a central feature of public worship and private piety in early modern Scottish Protestantism.

Conclusion

This thesis has analysed the intense emotionality of Scottish Protestantism between 1590 and 1640. It did so through an original approach to the source material which breaks new ground in the study of the history of emotions: the examination of the Scottish Protestant practice of radical emotional reflexivity. Such a methodology recognised that the extant texts relevant to the study of emotion were produced through engagement in an interpretative process whereby zealous Protestants in Scotland classified their experiences in order to mobilise desired emotions. Consequently, the thesis undertook an analysis of the judgements Scottish Protestants made about their emotions and why they examined their emotions at all.

The first four chapters explained the meaning of the language Scottish Protestants used about their emotions in public worship and personal writings. The argument was, thus, able to make explicit the tacit beliefs about emotion that those who wrote and read these texts in early modern Scotland took for granted. The first chapter achieved this through an examination of the Scottish Protestant theory of emotion, which claimed that it was assumed that passions were psychosomatic effects caused by an external agent's action upon a passive subject's faculties. This was followed by an analysis of the emotional core of Scottish Protestantism: communion with God. Chapter two explained why Scots believed fellowship with Christ was the goal of human existence, how they thought it could be obtained, and why they believed human nature obstructed the acquisition of happiness. Chapter three examined the language of emotion built into corporate worship and personal writings. It argued that the vocabulary of communal religious practice and those texts produced by fervent Scots categorised the sequence of a subject's emotions in the form of a narrative: the spiritual journey of the soul towards communion with God. Analysing a conversion narrative written by Mistress Rutherford, the chapter schematised the shifts in her emotional language into six-stages, which together represented a shared linguistic-conceptual framework authors used and adapted from public worship in their

spiritual writings: love for devotion, apprehension of sin, legal terror, repentance, a feeling of mercy, communion with God. The fourth chapter examined the role of God in the spiritual journey, and argued that Protestants in Scotland identified God as the absolute cause of 'supernatural emotions' – those that make up the spiritual journey – and that sometimes they interpreted experiences of ecstatic joy as the subjective dimension of communion with God.

The final chapter explored how and why Scottish Protestants engaged in radical emotional reflexivity. The first section examined how Scots categorised their emotions in public worship and private piety. It argued that through an analysis of an experience's causes and effects a person was able to determine what kind of emotion they had experienced and as such what language they should use about their feelings. The segment explained that Scots engaged in this intentional practice of classification to test the sincerity of their emotions. This was followed by a discussion of how this process could cause an individual to doubt the authenticity of their emotions. It was found that because of the problem of doubleness – caused by belief in double predestination – and the transience of the emotions, scepticism and acute anxiety were an inevitable result for many Scottish Protestants who practiced radical emotional reflexivity. The final section addressed why the examination of emotion was an important part of public worship and private piety. It argued that the purpose of the test of sincerity was to mobilise desired emotions. Thus it was claimed that zealous Scottish Protestants examined their emotions with rigour because they thought that this would help them attain communion with God. This was why they wrote about their emotions. They used radical emotional reflexivity in public worship and private devotion to fix the subject's cognition on either their internal sins or God's mercies. In so doing, they hoped that the subject would be moved to either repentance or assurance. Written forms of radical emotional reflexivity had an additional advantage as instruments of mobilisation insofar as their narrative structure, consisting in 'eucatastrophes', made them capable of stimulating in a reader consoling joys. As means and ways of mobilising

supernatural emotions, writing and reading narratives of the spiritual journey were activities that were considered the effect of divine agency. Consequently, reading such texts was meant to both evoke desired emotions and be an experience of the soul's pilgrimage towards communion with God.

The thesis, hence, has presented many original insights into the emotionality Scottish Protestantism. It has provided, for the first time, a comprehensive analysis of the assumptions Protestants in Scotland carried about their emotions. Key findings include: the fundamentally passive nature of emotion; that happiness was an integral ambition of Scottish Protestants, contrary to popular stereotypes; that a narrative of emotion, conveyed through linguistic shifts, was built into corporate worship and personal writings; how God caused emotion from within the subject's consciousness; the role that the causes and effects of an experience has in how Scots classified their feelings; the reasons why Scottish Protestants practiced radical emotional reflexivity. Additionally, the thesis has been innovative in its use and analysis of the source material. It included sources, such as poetry, which have been largely excluded from the study of emotionality in Scottish Protestantism. In this regard, its most important contribution was to examine the language of emotion built into liturgical practices like public repentance, public fasting, preaching, the Lord's Supper, psalm-singing, and the swearing of covenants. The thesis has also treated the extant sources as the result of an interpretative process, which integrated into its analysis of their content the origin and purpose of these texts for those who created and read them. Hence, this project has offered inventive ideas about the content of Scottish Protestant emotion and the methodology that should be used to analyse it.

The most important outcome of this study is that it has found Scottish Protestants were intensely and intentionally aware of their emotionality. Many scholars have argued that early modern Protestants, in Scotland and elsewhere, had an experiential brand of piety which cultivated strong feelings. However, what they have not analysed is that the evidence for these claims was produced by a purposeful and rigorous examination of a subject's experiences. The sources required that an author be motivated to evaluate

their subject's emotions. Moreover, the content of the extant material was informed by a linguistic-conceptual framework which influenced the judgements the author made about their subject's emotions. The creation of such texts and what they conveyed to their readers reveal that Scottish Protestants inhabited a community which was conscious of its emotionality and actively sought to mould its experiences in public worship and private devotion. Thus, the thesis argued that the extant source material must not be examined as if it delivers immediate access into the experiences of Scottish Protestants. Instead, it has claimed that the texts provide the historian with a window onto how Protestants in Scotland interpreted their emotions as a means to stimulate supernatural emotions. Put another way, the thesis has defended the idea that the meaning personal writings had for authors and readers can only be understood in light of their content and function. Consequently, the project has shown that Scottish Protestants identified their emotions in order to mobilise desired emotions, a process built into public worship which encouraged zealous Scots to create a religious literature charged with emotional piety.

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